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It is indisputable that theoretical and empirical research on food in criminology needs to be 
developed further. My qualitative green criminological study advances this endeavour by 
understanding how the process of pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland leads to 
environmental injustice. The study establishes how power relations that are driving the process of 
intensification (in the context of the Going for Growth agri-food strategy and beyond) may affect the 
context of environmental decision-making and ultimately influence both the distribution of 
environmental harms from farming intensification and the realm of capabilities. To achieve this aim, 
legislation and policy documents related to farming, planning, environmental regulation have been 
reviewed, twenty-nine semi-structured interviews with four different participant categories (local 
residents, government, farming industry, NGO participants and public-spirited citizens) have been 
conducted, and official statistics related to farming and agriculture and media data have been 
analysed.  
The study reveals the workings of the political economy of neoliberal capitalism in meat production 
on the international, national, and local levels. It demonstrates how power relations between the 
corporate farming industry actors and the state operate to secure and perpetuate a growth- and 
efficiency-driven model of meat production, thus reinforcing the hegemony of the neoliberal 
capitalist order. Power relations between the farming industry actors and the state also affect the 
processes of environmental decision-making. My study demonstrates that such processes are marked 
by recognitional and procedural injustices, rooted in an imbalance of power between those 
reinforcing the hegemony of the neoliberal capitalist order and those seeking to challenge it. 
Discussions around power and injustice are closely intertwined with the discussion around harm. I 
conclude that recognitional and procedural injustices will result in an uneven distribution of 
environmental harm from new intensive farms, negatively affect the meta-capability of sustainable 
ecological capacity and compromise other capabilities such as bodily health, play, affiliation, and 
other species.   
The findings reveal the role of power in legitimisation, normalisation, and regulation of harm. My 
study expands the knowledge of complex relationships between political and economic actors from 
a green criminological perspective and demonstrates how, within those relationships, power is 
exercised, maintained, and ultimately directed to preserve the status quo of neoliberal capitalism. 
The findings also advance the idea that non-minority populations that do not face discrimination can 
nevertheless face environmental injustice on the grounds of their disenfranchisement in the processes 
of environmental decision-making. Finally, the findings in my study allow to expand on the 
insufficiently discussed concept of capabilities in environmental justice and highlight the importance 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Meat production in the twenty-first century is nearly five times higher than in the early 1960s; it has 
increased from 70 million tonnes to more than 330 million tonnes in 2017 (Ritchie, 2019) and 
resulted in dramatic changes to both the society and the natural environment. Thus, meat, rather than 
being simply food for humans, provides a lens for examining political economic processes in society 
today. 
1.1 Food, criminology, and intensive farming  
Since the processes of food production and consumption illuminate the relationship between society 
and the natural environment as well as the inner workings of the global political economy, food has 
been increasingly used by scholars to explore the world. Food-focused research has also been 
developing in criminology. In recognition of the changes in food industry practices, the concept of 
food crime has been introduced, referring to the ‘many crimes that are involved in the production, 
distribution and selling of basic foodstuffs’ (Croall, 2007, p. 206). Since then, food crime-related 
research has intersected with white-collar and particularly corporate criminological 
perspectives (Fitzgerald, 2010; Croall, 2012; Cheng, 2011; Gray and Hinch, 2015). Some of 
the avenues for research have included food fraud (Flores Elizondo et al, 2018; Lord et al, 2017; 
Ruth et al, 2018), food poisoning (Tombs and Whyte, 2010), food mislabelling (Croall, 2012), trade 
practices and environmental law (Walters, 2006), exploitation in food production (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2007; Davies, 2018), and crimes in the rural context (Donnermeyer and DeKeseredy, 
2014), to name a few. However, some authors note that these accounts are only ‘the tip of the 
iceberg’ (Gray and Hinch, 2019, p. 19), urging advancement of empirical and theoretical research on 
the topic (Walters, 2007; Cheng, 2011; Croall, 2012). This thesis thus advances both empirical and 
theoretical research on food in criminology. Positioned at the nexus of harm, power, and justice, 
it presents a qualitative green criminological study of the political economy of pig farming 
intensification in Northern Ireland. The overall aim is to understand how power relations that create 
and reinforce intensive pig farming lead to environmental injustice.   
The emergence of food crime research inevitably revived the persistent debate on what crime 
is (Tappan 1947; Sutherland 1939; Quinney 1970; Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 
1970). Focusing solely on food crime creates boundaries preventing one from venturing beyond the 
rigid framework of criminal-lawful behaviour. Food production may involve serious harms that lie 
beyond traditional definitions of crime and are not statutorily proscribed. It is indisputable 
that the concerns about environmental degradation and pollution in relation to the current modes of 
food production and consumption have been on the rise. Environmental and social harms associated 
with food production have been brought to light by green criminologists (White, 2008, 2011; 
Walters, 2006, 2011; Beirne and South, 2007; Sollund, 2015; Brisman and South, 2018). A green 
criminological perspective acknowledges that certain food production practices, despite their 
legality, ubiquity, and social acceptance, cause widespread and long-lasting harms. This critical 
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perspective within criminology sees the need to analyse such harms, the socio-political forces behind 
them and their consequences (Lynch et al, 2015; Gray and Hinch, 2015; Gray and Hinch, 2019). In 
my research, I address the above-described knowledge lacunae and focus on a problematic yet under-
researched food production practice – intensive farming1. The subject of intensive farming warrants 
further criminological attention as disciplinary engagement with this subject is limited. Green 
criminologists have predominantly focused on harm towards animals (Sollund, 2012; Beirne, 2014; 
Wyatt, 2014; Fitzgerald, 2019), while other criminologists acknowledged a broader set of harms 
associated with industrialisation, corporatisation and neoliberalisation of the food industry 
(Boekhout van Solinge, 2010; White, 2013; Gray and Hinch, 2015; Gray, 2019; Del Prado-Lu, 2019; 
James, 2019; White and Yeates, 2019).  
In this chapter, I first elaborate on the harms from intensive farming and justify their 
connections to the notions of power and justice in my research. I introduce the context of Northern 
Ireland and formulate the questions that will be answered in my research. The chapter concludes by 
discussing the chapter structure in my thesis.  
1.2 Effects and implications of intensive farming    
Intensive farming affects not only non-human animals, environment, and society – something that 
Winders and Nibert (2004) label as an ‘entanglement of oppression’ – but also the workings of 
the political economy. Below, I address each of these aspects.   
1.2.1 Effects on non-human animals   
Animal harm is an integral part of factory farming. Both Agnew (1998) and Nurse (2013) single out 
factory farming as one of the causes of animal abuse. Animal abuse has become a normalised practice 
that keeps the wheels of the meat production industry turning. Over 56 billion farmed animals are 
killed yearly for human consumption (Fitzgerald, 2019). The advent of factory farming overturned 
the values of animal husbandry where farmers were considerate of the needs of non-human animals. 
Instead, non-human animals are used to meet the needs of the meat production industry (Fiber-
Ostrow and Lovell, 2016), one of which is profit-making achieved through production increases 
and lowering of production costs. The latter results in farm animals being maimed, confined in 
crammed spaces, raised in artificial settings, fed unnatural diets, and fattened with growth 
hormones (Fiber-Ostrow and Lovell, 2016).    
Lives of industrially farmed animals are significantly shorter than of those animals living in 
the wild. For instance, in the UK farmed male pigs only live for 20-24 weeks (Wyatt, 2014), whereas 
pigs that are well-cared for can live for up to twenty years. Living conditions on the majority 
of industrial farms contribute to shorter life spans. In the US, pregnant pigs are kept in small sow 
 
1 I use the terms intensive, industrial and factory farming interchangeably and refer to the farms 




stalls (gestation crates), pigs with piglets are transferred to slightly larger but still confined farrowing 
crates, while growing pigs live in barren, overcrowded pens (Farms Not Factories, 2018). Gestation 
crates have been banned in the UK since 1999, yet most UK sows farrow in crates (RSPCA, 2020). 
Such conditions contribute to the proliferation of infectious diseases, threatening animal health and 
welfare. The recent case of swine fever is illustrative – the disease has already killed sixty percent of 
domestic pigs in China alone and a quarter of all domestic pigs in the world (Neubauer, 2020).     
Moreover, industrial farming is sustained by inflicting unnecessary violence against non-
human animals. Wyatt (2014) and Fitzgerald (2019) describe how pigs’ tails are docked or clipped to 
prevent the animals from biting each other’s tails when they come into contact. Another common 
practice is clipping piglets’ teeth. Since the majority of the above described practices aim to reduce 
harm and prevent injury, the question of why harm is so prevalent among animals on industrial farms 
arises (Wyatt, 2014). In the pigs’ case, the stress related to confinement and the inability to express 
their natural behaviours induce them to bite each other’s tails and other limbs. Pigs also bite at the 
bars of their enclosures, leaving the front of their crates to be covered with blood (Farms Not 
Factories, 2018). Finally, being the end-goal of the industry, killing of an animal reflects the ethos 
of brutality that defines intensive farming. In the UK, pigs are first made unconscious electronically 
or gaseously and then have the blood vessels in their chests slit. The first part of the killing often 
leaves the pigs still conscious while their blood vessels are cut, thus causing severe pain (Wyatt, 
2014).  
1.2.2 Effects on the environment    
Ruhl (2000, p. 266) provides an exhaustive summary of the environmental implications of intensive 
farming: ‘farms pollute ground water, surface water, air, and soils; they destroy open space and 
wildlife habitat; they erode soils and contribute to sedimentation of lakes and rivers; they deplete 
water resources; and they often simply smell bad’. The process of farm construction implies that 
either a new area needs to be converted into a farm or an existing farm needs to be expanded. As a 
result, farming does not just shape the countryside, it becomes the countryside, as landscapes start 
resembling industrial sites set in rural areas (Harvey, 1997).  Furthermore, intensive farming results 
in increases of animal waste. Whereas in non-intensive farms animal waste is an essential element 
of a natural recycling process, animal waste disposal becomes a problem in intensive 
farms (Goodman and Redclift, 1991; Blanchette, 2020). Mismanagement of both waste itself and 
wastewater result in air, soil, and water pollution.      
Air pollution occurs when nitrogen compounds from animal waste are drawn into the air. 
The combination of nitrogen and hydrogen makes ammonia, which is seen as the predominate form 
of air pollution from intensive farming (Ruhl, 2000). The source of soil pollution are the ponds or 
lagoons where animal waste is kept. When these facilities are not well insulated, animal excrement 
can enter the soil resulting in zinc and nitrate contamination. The toxicity of both make the soil 
unsuitable for other agriculture. Moreover, soil can also be contaminated through pathogens when 
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slurry (a mixture of animal manure and water) is spread across the fields as fertiliser (Ruhl, 
2000).  Water pollution stems from the fact that ‘generally accepted livestock waste management 
practices do not adequately or effectively protect water resources from contamination’ (Burkholder 
et al., 2007, p. 308). Analyses of animal manure find potentially dangerous substances, such as 
bacteria, ammonia, methane, hydrogen sulphide, carbon monoxide, disinfectants, cyanide, 
phosphorous, nitrates, heavy metals, drugs administered to animals and other pathogens 
(Stathopoulos, 2010; Tietz, 2010). Some of these substances present in the waste may enter ground 
water from manure storage facilities or from the fields on which high doses of manure have been 
applied (Gerber et al, 2005). Such occurrences pose a threat for drinking water quality. Even when 
manure is not contaminated, it is still high in nitrogen and phosphorous, and when these elements are 
added to water, it can cause eutrophication, killing fish and the animals that consume it (Fitzgerald, 
2019).     
Animal agriculture also takes up a lot of land – when the land used to produce animal feed 
is taken into consideration, animal agriculture is reported to use more than two-thirds of agricultural 
land globally (Fitzgerald, 2019). As a result, it imperils biodiversity, as soil and water pollution can 
spread over to other areas in close vicinity to farms. This can affect the wellbeing of both plants and 
non-human animals. According to Wyatt (2014), intensive farming foments deforestation and loss of 
vegetation and has adverse effects on wildlife. Deforestation is a particularly acute problem in some 
regions, such as Latin America. Yet, even locally, 150,000 miles of hedgerow have been lost in 
England since the introduction of agricultural subsidies (Harvey, 1997), and the declining trend 
continues (Countryside Survey, 2007). Moreover, habitats such as wetlands and mangrove swamps 
are directly impacted by water pollution, which may lead to biodiversity loss (Gerber et al., 
2005). Biodiversity loss also occurs as a result of changing climate, and intensive 
farming exacerbates the challenge of climate change. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) has estimated that animal farming is responsible for eighteen percent of the 
total greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change (Steinfeld et al, 2006). It occurs 
primarily through production of methane, nitrous oxide, and carbon dioxide.     
Lastly, a large water footprint is another negative characteristic of intensive 
farming (Ponette-Gonzalez and Fry, 2010; Ruhl, 2000). One quarter of the global freshwater 
resources relates to meat and dairy production. Water is essential at all stages of industrial farming: 
it is needed to produce animal feed, provide animals with drinking water, and meet other farming 
needs. Large amounts of fresh water are also used to dilute animal waste before it can be spread on 
fields as fertiliser. Cattle and pig farming are considered particularly water-intensive (Compassion in 
World Farming, 2012) as they account for thirty-three and nineteen percent of water used by farm 






1.2.3 Effects on society   
Intensive farming also results in major transformations for society as local residents become 
concerned about environmental degradation in their area (Ladd and Edwards, 2002). Public health 
concerns have been voiced as animal farming has been identified as ‘the single biggest cause of worst 
air pollution in Europe’ (Harvey, 2016). As nitrogen compounds from animal waste mix with air, 
they form solid particles that can stick in the lung tissue. Communities in the vicinity of intensive 
farms are at greater risk of developing health complications (Fitzgerald, 2019). First, such 
communities are more likely to be disturbed by the odour emitted from intensive farms (pig ones in 
particular) (Ponette-Gonzalez and Fry, 2010). Second, it has been demonstrated that residents less 
than two kilometres from intensive pig farms could be exposed to ammonia levels up to 40 times 
greater than average ammonia concentrations (Ponette-Gonzalez and Fry, 2010). This results in 
increased occurrences of headaches, runny nose, sore throat, excessive coughing, diarrhea, and 
burning eyes (Wing and Wolf, 2000) compared to communities with no intensive farms in their 
vicinity. Worsening air quality has been associated with respiratory diseases (Mirabelli et al, 2006) 
and other health consequences may include mood and sleep disorders (Donham et al, 2007). 
Moreover, if animal manure is stored in lagoons, the latter have high concentrations of zinc, which 
inhibits copper and iron absorption in humans and non-human animals. This can lead to 
anaemia, liver, and kidney damage (Wyatt, 2014).    
Furthermore, a brief look beyond the local reveals that intensive farming is not proving to be 
beneficial for the society overall. Intensive farming ruptures the social fabric of rural communities, 
making the link between production and consumption thinner. It undermines small-scale and organic 
farms, which provide thirty percent more jobs in the UK (Compassion in world farming, 2012). Not 
only does industrialised meat production fail to provide safe, healthy food, but it also fails to provide 
decent employment as the increase in mechanisation results in fewer jobs (Tudge, 2003). Along with 
it, the exploitation of the remaining manual laborers in industrialised meat production intensifies 
(Blanchette, 2020). Finally, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has brought into focus the harmful 
nature of the global food production and consumption practices for society. Intensive farming in 
particular has been identified as the principal driver of zoonotic diseases (Jones et al, 2013), such 
as SARS-CoV-2, the strain of coronavirus that caused COVID-19.  
1.2.4 Political economic implications   
Intensive farming both constructs and is constructed by the global capitalist economy. It is one of the 
forces that makes up the global food economy, along with trade liberalisation, the growing power of 
corporate actors and processes of financialisation. These forces have been described as the third food 
regime (McMichael, 2005; Burch and Lawrence, 2009)2.  McMichael (2005) argues that the third 
 
2 The concept of ‘food regime’ refers to the manner of structuring the world food order (Carolan, 
2012). The first food regime orbited around British imperialism, and the second was driven by the 
USA in its disposal of agricultural surplus. 
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food regime is the corporate food regime. Its goals are emblematic of the broader ‘globalisation 
project’, which refers to ‘an emerging vision of the world and its resources as a globally organised 
and managed free trade/free enterprise economy pursued by a largely unaccountable political and 
economic elite’ (McMichael, 1996, p.300). The third food regime is characterised by asymmetries 
and volatility (Clapp, 2012). The volatility lies in rapid price changes and the economy’s predilection 
for crisis. The asymmetry manifests itself in the growing discrepancy between the world’s poorest 
and richest countries, where poor countries have to rely on food imports and rich countries experience 
food surpluses. This growing divide creates a culture of dependency and is to the benefit of the rich 
industrialised countries responsible for the global promotion of agrifood industrialisation in the first 
place (Clapp, 2012). The emergence of food surpluses in rich countries stems from 
the prioritisation of production growth. Production growth has transformed the ethos and the 
economy of farming. Farming is framed as a business and good farming becomes equated with cost 
reduction, high turnover, and profit maximisation (Tudge, 2003). In the case of meat, its increased 
production guarantees constant turnover and profit, thus solving one of the most pressing problems 
of agriculture (Tudge, 2003).   
Once the industrial mode was set as a benchmark for production, agribusinesses developed 
an interest in further profit maximisation and intended to block any political incentives that impeded 
that (Ruhl, 2000). The agribusiness industry started consolidating more decision-making 
power (Tudge, 2003). It organised into focused lobby groups that governments were reluctant to 
challenge (Tanentzap et al, 2015). Additionally, the lobby groups rewarded governments for policies 
that did not hinder their activities (Tanentzap et al, 2015). Such trends can be described as neo-
corporatism (Schmitter, 1974), meaning that interest groups not only help to formulate, but are also 
involved in the implementation of public policies. In parallel with that, a number of consumer, 
environmental, human rights, and animal welfare groups emerged in the late 1960s to draw public 
attention to the negative externalities associated with intensive farming and galvanise the public into 
action (Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2012). They demanded stricter environmental regulations and 
challenged the control of the agribusiness lobby groups over policymaking. However, some authors 
describe environmental movements as diffuse (Tanentzap et al, 2015) and stress the fact 
that agribusiness lobbies have managed to compromise the efforts of environmental movements by 
highlighting the positive cultural and environmental impacts of farming (Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 
2012).      
1.3 Power relations and environmental justice   
It is clear that certain food production practices, despite their legality, ubiquity, and social 
acceptance, can cause widespread and long-lasting harms. Intensive farming is an example of 
this. The scale of farm practices and the manner in which farming is done have been radically altered 
in the last century (White and Yeates, 2019). Having outlined the harms associated with intensive 
farming and positioned this practice in an analysis of the structures and processes of the late-capitalist 
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political economy, it is evident that intensive farming can be seen as ‘lawful but awful’ (Passas, 
2005; Wyatt and Brisman, 2017). Yet, the harms underlying it are often unaddressed, regarded as an 
inevitability or dismissed. Passas and Goodwin (2004) demonstrate how the current food system is 
defended as necessary to feed the world, inevitable as an outcome of ‘progress’ and innovation-
driven, whereby any problem can be addressed through technological advances. Such 
claims necessitate a deeper understanding of the processes that underlie intensive farming because, 
as Pearce (1976, p. 80) identified decades ago, it is ‘only by understanding why certain actions are 
not prohibited by law… that we can make sense of the social relationships inside the capitalist world 
system’.  
Power structures and relations within the capitalist political economy are pertinent in the 
context of intensive farming because the practice is emblematic of capitalist relations of production 
and consumption. Critical criminologists frequently subject the capitalist political economy to 
critique and draw their attention to the power structures and relations within it (Lynch and Stretesky, 
2003; Westra, 2004; Friedrichs, 2009; Lynch et al, 2013; Lynch and Stretesky, 2014; Sollund, 2015; 
Lynch et al, 2017). Power imbalances in capitalism result in a skewed understanding of harm 
(Stretesky et al, 2013); powerful actors controlling the means of production ensure that not all 
environmental harms can be punished through law. The process of attaching criminal labels depends 
on who has the power to label and is related to ‘the political economy of marginalisation’ (Hauck, 
2008, p. 639). Law, therefore, becomes a form of legitimisation that produces harm (Henry and 
Milovanovic, 1996). For instance, state and corporate power are mobilised in different ways in the 
regulatory context (Walters, 2011) to ensure that possibilities of control are reduced (Kramer et al, 
2002). Power relations also work to reproduce the capitalist political economic order as power 
is often used to reinforce and justify a market model of capitalism (Ruggiero and South, 
2010; Walters and Martin, 2013). Those in positions of power protect their vested interests through 
institutional practice (Kluin, 2013) or use their influence to manipulate events for desired outcomes 
(Walters, 2011). Power can also be used to legitimise harmful practices through so-called soft power, 
therefore making avoidable harm appear as necessary (Tombs and Whyte, 2010; Michalowski, 
2018). Mol (2013) states that green criminology plays a crucial role in deepening the central focus 
on power relations within critical criminology by performing the analysis in the socio-ecological 
realm. Considering the role of power in legitimisation, normalisation, and regulation of harm, it is 
evident that green criminological scholarship will benefit from a more nuanced understanding of the 
workings of power in the context of intensive farming and the relations that underlie this legal yet 
harmful practice.   
Furthermore, the dynamics related to power raise issues around injustice (Walters et al, 
2013). The previously described array of harms resulting from intensive farming is extensive; as the 
process of intensification of farming takes place, the question of how the harms are distributed 
emerges. In the context of intensive farming, environmental harms are inseparable from social harms 
(Dybing, 2012; White, 2013) as the negative effects on the environment will also have profound 
impacts on the people living in that environment. Once the question 
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of the distribution of environmental harm emerges, the debate around it shifts into the realm of 
environmental justice. While the environmental justice literature will be reviewed in more detail in 
the next chapter, it is sufficient to say that environmental justice has its roots in the 1980s United 
States, with the activists drawing attention to the disproportionate location of environmentally and 
socially hazardous facilities in ethnic minority and low-income areas (Bullard and Wright, 
2009). In green criminology, environmental justice constitutes one of the perspectives, helping to 
recognise individuals and communities as victims of harm (White, 2008). Therefore, in addition 
to the relations of power, my research also draws its attention towards environmental (in)justice in 
the context of intensive farming.     
Environmental (in)justice in the context of intensive farming fills several 
research lacunas. First, as the next chapter will demonstrate, there is a need to advance environmental 
justice research in green criminology (Zilney, 2006; Brisman, 2007; Lynch et al, 
2015). Second, the research bridging intensive farming and environmental justice is not abundant. 
It focuses on the rural injustices associated with the industrialisation of food production (Ashwood 
and Mactavish, 2016; Kelly-Reif and Wing, 2016) and environmental and social impacts of large 
livestock operations in marginalised areas (Wing et al., 2000; Wilson et al., 2002; Bullers, 
2005; Wing et al., 2008; Imhoff, 2010; Lenhardt and Ogneva-Himmelberger, 2015; Guidry et al., 
2018). The impacts of corporate pig meat production on farm loss among minority communities have 
been analysed (Edwards and Ladd, 2000). The environmental justice paradigm has been applied to 
grassroots protests against corporate agriculture (Ladd and Edwards, 2002) and has demonstrated 
how community voices confront corporate influence on scientific knowledge production and 
environmental management (Rhodes et al, 2020). Green criminology has not developed such 
research, with some rare exceptions. For example, Wyatt (2014) considered the discriminatory nature 
of intensive farm locations, stating that farms tend to be isolated in more rural, poorer areas with no 
social capital or political power.  
Third, the majority of environmental justice-focused research (including in green 
criminology) problematises the issues of discrimination and marginalisation, regarding them 
as the essential components of harm maldistribution. Such research orientation poses the question of 
whether non-discriminated and non-marginalised communities can be victims of environmental 
injustice. The latter is an example of a less visible environmental injustice (Mah, 2017) and deserves 
to be theorised further. Its closer examination addresses another gap in green criminological 
research on environmental justice – a limited engagement with the concept of recognitional and 
procedural environmental justice (Heydon 2018, 2019) and the notion of capabilities. The 
capabilities approach (Sen, 1985; Nussbaum, 1997) encompasses both the environmental 
circumstances and control over one’s environment, thus bringing the distributional and procedural 
aspects of environmental justice together. In relation to recognitional and procedural justice, 
researchers have highlighted the phenomenon of marginalisation of individuals and communities in 
the processes of environmental decision-making (Arnstein, 1969; Young, 1990; Fraser, 1990; Gill, 
2018). A significant proportion of such marginalisation is attributed to power inequalities where 
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political and economic elites prevail over those challenging them (Forester, 1982; Young, 1990, 
2000; Pellow and Brulle, 2005). The interlinkage between harm and power is germane in the context 
of intensive farming. Relations of power play a particularly important role in the context of 
environmental decision-making, affecting recognition, the procedure, and the subsequent unequal 
distribution of harm (Culley and Hughey, 2007; Deacon and Baxter, 2013). A closer analysis of 
the processes of environmental decision-making in the context of intensive farming also considers 
the broader engagement between the capitalist economy and democratic politics. 
Environmental decision-making is a political process. Yet, a number of scholars have been 
documenting the process of ‘elimination of the political’ under neoliberal capitalism (Mouffe, 
2005; Swyngedouw, 2007; Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014). This claim deserves to be explored 
further in the context of environmental justice.  
My thesis advances empirical research on food in criminology by developing an original 
green criminological study of a legal yet harmful intensive meat production practice. A consideration 
of power relations that underlie it contributes to the existing problematisation of power relations in 
green criminology and advances environmental justice research within it. In doing so, the research 
contributes new knowledge to the field by bridging intensive farming and environmental justice, 
analysing a less visible environmental injustice that non-marginalised communities experience in the 
procedural realm and understanding how the latter affects the distribution of harm from intensive 
farms as well as the realm of capabilities. The focus on intensive farming, thus, fills several 
criminological knowledge gaps through a closer scrutiny of harm and justice in relation to the 
structures of political and economic power. Finally, Neo and Emel (2017) assert that the academic 
focus should be placed on the process of proliferation of intensive farming. My thesis does this by 
using an under-researched case study of Northern Ireland.  
1.4 Northern Ireland - a brief overview of the research context  
Northern Ireland has a rich farming heritage – the land has been farmed for centuries, and the mild 
weather is a contributing factor to the Northern Irish farming success. The geographic position of the 
country ensures natural protection for food production – winds guarantee protection from wind borne 
diseases and the sea acts as a shield for land borne diseases (AFSB, 2013). The island has been 
labelled a ‘food fortress’ as a result (AFSB, 2013).  Agriculture has shaped the landscape of Northern 
Ireland – seventy-five percent of the land area is engaged in food production (Friends of the Earth 
NI, 2020). The country’s agri-food and food processing sectors remain of high value for the Northern 
Irish economy; agri-food is a crucial export sector for Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland also has a 
greater reliance on its agricultural sector than the rest of the UK; the total share of the country’s Gross 
Value Added (nearly two percent in 2017) from agriculture is higher in Northern Ireland than in the 
rest of the UK (half a percent) (Playfair, 2018). The agri-food industry accounts for two and a half 
percent of total employment in Northern Ireland, more than double the UK-wide level of just over 
one percent (House of Commons, 2018).     
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Farming has been long characterised by small, usually family-owned, farms: their average 
size is 41 ha compared to 81 ha in the UK (DAERA, 2019). Yet, the status quo is changing with the 
policy drive to encourage growth and intensify production. In 2017, it was reported that Northern 
Ireland experienced a sharp increase in the number of intensive pig and poultry farms. The number 
of farms went up by sixty-eight percent from 154 in 2011 to 259 (The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism, 2017). Environmental NGOs and campaigners attributed this trend to a broader shift in 
farming intensification, in addition to the Northern Irish government’s adoption of the Going for 
Growth (GfG) strategy in 2012.  GfG was an industry-led strategy that endeavoured to expand the 
agri-food sector and set out a vision of ‘growing a sustainable, profitable and integrated Agri-Food 
supply chain, focused on delivering the needs of the market’ (AFSB, 2013, p. 11); it will be described 
in more detail in Chapter 3. GfG placed an emphasis on growth within specific sectors, notably the 
pig and poultry. The pig sector has been recognised as having the potential to be successful since it 
does not rely on government subsidies as a source of income and is able to meet market demand for 
pork. Comparing the Agricultural Census in Northern Ireland conducted by the Department of 
Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA) in 2000 and 2017 shows the evolution of the 
pig sector in terms of concentration and intensification. In 2000, 808 pig farms in Northern Ireland 
had a total of 413,480 pigs (DAERA, 2000); in 2017, the number of farms fell to 322, but the number 
of animals increased to 649,120 (DAERA, 2018). The 2017 census emphasised that ‘a small number 
of large, highly productive businesses drive most of the change in the sector’ (DAERA, 2018, p. 
17). The above-described GfG strategy further encouraged the sector’s expansion. Since 
the commencement of the strategy in 2012, the total number of pigs rose from 480,317 in 2013 to the 
above-mentioned 649,120 in 2017 (DAERA, 2018). Despite GfG coming to an end in 2017, it is 
reported that it embodies the desired direction for the industry (Attorp and McAreawey, 2020). The 
number of planning applications for new pig farms or pig farm extensions currently appears to be on 
the rise; according to Friends of the Earth Northern Ireland (2018), these applications would add 
more than 150,000 new pigs each year to the already existing pig population.    
A detailed study of pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland allows an insight into an 
environmentally and socially harmful practice, which may exacerbate the harms described in the 
previous section. Northern Ireland also presents a favourable context for analysing power relations 
that underlie the process of intensification. As it was stated above, agriculture and farming are of 
paramount importance for the economy (O’Kane, 2011), which allows the sector to assume a central 
role in policy-making (Greer, 1996; Source Material, 2018; Attorp and McAreavey, 2020). GfG 
strategy is a prime example of it and illustrates concerns about a clientelist relationship between agri-
food industry and the government (McAreavey and Foord, 2016). Furthermore, my research will 
demonstrate that regulation of the farming sector is reported to be compromised (Purdy and Hjerp, 
2016) both within GfG and beyond; there are multiple environmental governance failures (Purdy and 
Hjerp, 2016; Brennan et al, 2017; Gravey et al, 2018; Brennan et al, 2019), which make the harms 
from ongoing intensification in Northern Ireland even more concerning.  
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Finally, Northern Ireland is fitting for the development of environmental justice research 
(Turner, 2007). It allows consideration of how the harms from intensification will be distributed 
and affect the realm of capabilities. It also provides an interesting context for recognitional and 
procedural environmental justice research. Researchers into community participation in Northern 
Ireland note a strange dichotomy. While members of the public are encouraged to actively engage in 
decision-making on the matters that affect them (Cave, 2013; Knox and Carmichael, 2015), there are 
accounts of public disengagement (Turner, 2007), difficulty in influencing decisions due to power 
imbalance, and difficulty in understanding the basis on which decisions are made (Turner, 
2007; Mcalister, 2010). Considering this, it becomes crucial to analyse how decisions in relation to 
the emerging intensive pig farms are made and how the outcomes of these decisions influence the 
distribution of harms. The context of pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland, thus, provides 
a solid ground for research intersecting harm, power, and justice. I now proceed to formulate the 
questions that will be answered in my thesis.    
1.5 Research questions  
The main question in my research is:  
 
How does the process of pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland lead to 
environmental injustice?  
 
To answer the main question, three sub-questions have been formulated:    
  
1. How does the process of pig farming intensification take place in Northern Ireland and how 
do power relations that support and reinforce it operate on the three levels of inquiry: macro 
(international), meso (national) and micro (local)?  
 
Having considered the political economic effects of intensive farming above, it is clear that the 
process of intensification cannot be analysed solely at the level of the nation state. It invites a 
consideration of global trends in meat production, their interaction with the national context of 
Northern Ireland and the subsequent impact on local farmers. The analysis of farming 
intensification through the interaction of the macro, meso and micro levels also allows the relational 
aspect of power to be brought to the surface, thus demonstrating how power is diffused within the 
three levels.  
  
2. What is the current distribution of harms from farming in the studied area and what effect 
does it have on the realm of capabilities?   
  
As I will show later in my thesis, the studied community is already exposed to environmental harms 
from farming in the area. The second research question allows for a more nuanced understanding of 
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these harms and their effect on the realm of capabilities, in particular sustainable ecological capacity 
as a meta-capability and the capabilities dependent on it – bodily health, play, affiliation, other 
species.   
  
3. How does the process of environmental decision-making regarding the new farms in the 
studied area take place and what are the dynamics of power within it? What are its effects on 
the distribution of future harms associated with farming intensification?  
 
The third question looks in detail at the micro level process of environmental decision-making and 
dissects power relations connecting the studied community to the institutional structures of decision-
making. The third question analyses recognition of the views of the studied community on farming 
intensification, environmental decision-making procedure and the political dimension of 
the capability to control one’s environment. The second part of this question links the matters of 
procedure and distribution, considering how harms will be distributed as the process of farming 
intensification persists.   
My research, therefore, brings together an exploration of power relations underlying a legal, 
ubiquitous, socially acceptable, yet harmful practice of intensive farming, the effects of power 
relations on the micro level processes of environmental decision-making, the realm of capabilities, 
and the present and future distribution of environmental harms in the context of intensive farms. The 
remainder of this chapter addresses the organisation of my thesis.   
1.6 Thesis chapter structure   
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 develops an integrative theoretical framework for my 
research. It further elaborates on the suitability of the green criminological perspective and 
considers how ‘lawful but awful’ acts have been theorised in green criminology. The literature on 
crimes of the powerful is reviewed with an intention to theorise the process 
of pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland and analyse the relations of power that support and 
reinforce it on the international, national, and local levels. This part of the theoretical framework 
considers the concept of state-corporate crime to understand the catalysts for farming intensification 
harm – motivation, opportunity structures and operationality of control. This part of the integrative 
framework is not only fitting for the consideration of the interrelationship between the levels of 
inquiry, but also combines the diverse theoretical perspectives. Finally, considering the links 
between harm, power and justice in my research, the integrative theoretical 
framework includes an environmental justice perspective. I review the different components of this 
perspective, such as distribution, recognition, procedure, and capabilities, and outline their relevance 
for my research.   
Chapter 3 introduces a more nuanced idea of the context of my research. While this 
chapter outlined a broader trend for pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland and justified its 
suitability for my research, it is important to further dissect the context in which intensification takes 
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place. Green criminologists maintain that context is crucial (White, 2016). The historical context 
of Northern Ireland is unique – the legacy of the sectarian conflict affects all spheres of life. This 
statement resonates with state-corporate crime theorists (Kramer et al, 2002), maintaining that an 
analysis of a historical context should be a starting point in any scholarly investigation of 
crime. Chapter 3 examines how the legacy of the sectarian conflict influences the present political 
economic and social development realms. Yet, Chapter 3 also emphasises that Northern 
Ireland is embedded in the political economy of globalised neoliberal capitalism, which influences 
the country’s development. It is in these circumstances that the GfG strategy was adopted and 
farming intensification is taking place. Chapter 3 discusses farming and agriculture in Northern 
Ireland, dissects the dynamics of pig farming intensification and analyses the environmental 
impacts of farming. The latter is linked to the discussion of environmental governance, which 
demonstrates the origins of current environmental challenges in Northern Ireland by initiating the 
discussion of the relations of power and the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism in the environmental 
governance context.    
Chapter 4 outlines the methodology in my research. I use a case study approach, which in 
social sciences is employed to understand a phenomenon in question with a particular attention to 
the actors within it and relationships between them. Ultimately, it is a foundation for data collection 
and analysis, and the case study method is used frequently both in green criminology and when 
examining crimes of the powerful. While the relevance of the Northern Irish case is 
demonstrated earlier in this thesis, Chapter 4 also justifies the sampling strategy in my case study. 
A non-probability sampling framework with purposive sampling is used, as I select the sampling 
context for the macro and meso level of analysis – Belfast – and the sampling context for the micro 
level of analysis - Antrim and Newtownabbey district, which represents a community where pig 
farming intensification is presently taking place. The sampling strategy discussion also includes the 
sampling of participants as I outline four participant categories: local residents, government, farming 
industry, NGO participants and public-spirited citizens. Chapter 4 presents how the primary data 
– twenty-nine semi-structured interviews – as well as the secondary data – official statistics related 
to farming in Northern Ireland and media data – were collected in this research. Furthermore, I 
describe the three stages of the thematic and comparative data analysis process and outline 
how credibility of the themes that emerged in my research was explored through member checking. I 
also discuss the relationship between the chosen theoretical framework and my findings and reflect 
on the ethical issues and limitations in my research. To conclude, my positionality in this research is 
clarified.   
Chapter 5 analyses the findings pertaining to the first research question - how does the 
process of pig farming intensification take place in Northern Ireland and how do power relations 
that support and reinforce it operate on the three levels of inquiry: macro (international), meso 
(national) and micro (local)? I demonstrate that the political economy of meat production on the 
international level is premised on profit-driven competitive market rule ideology, which necessitates 
efficient organisation of production. Efficiency implies production intensification, and these trends 
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shape the motivation for growth consolidated by the GfG strategy in Northern Ireland. Consequently, 
I demonstrate how catalysts for farming intensification harm – motivation, opportunity structures 
and operationality of control – operate on the national level. The national goals for meat production 
in Northern Ireland are to drive efficiency of farming as well as professionalise it. I show how 
opportunity structures were developed by the state and corporate farming industry actors to meet 
these goals: in the case of the efficiency goal, opportunity structures include promulgation of the 
discourse against small-scale farms, providing material support for technological innovation and 
research into efficient production. In the case of farmer professionalism goal, they include education 
of farmers and organisation of business development groups. Chapter 5 analyses the effectiveness of 
controls – regulatory frameworks – in dealing with farming intensification. International and national 
political economic contexts also influence the happenings on the local level, where I evidence a 
gradual marginalisation of small-scale farmers and analyse a trend for intensification. Power 
relations are crucial for understanding the above-described processes, as Chapter 5 analyses their 
influence in the realms of goal formation, opportunity structures development and regulatory 
controls. It concludes that a state-corporate symbiosis supports and reinforces a market-
oriented, profit-driven model of farming that prioritises efficiency and ultimately leads to ‘lawful but 
awful’ intensification. The pursuit of the intensification agenda also safeguards the hegemony of the 
dominant capitalist order, as power relations work to exclude the alternatives to it.    
Chapter 6 analyses the findings pertaining to the second and third research questions - what 
is the current distribution of harms from farming in the studied area and what effect does it have on 
the realm of capabilities? And how does the process of environmental decision-making regarding 
the new farms in the studied area take place and what are the dynamics of power within it? What are 
its effects on the distribution of future harms associated with farming intensification? In terms of the 
second question, I describe an already disproportionate exposure of the studied community to 
environmental harms from farming, which affects the community’s capabilities. In terms of the third 
question, the chapter shows how power relations supporting and reinforcing a market-
oriented, profit-driven model of farming affect the process of environmental decision-making, 
resulting in recognitional and procedural injustices. These injustices indicate that the ability of 
planning frameworks to act as a mechanism of regulatory control for farming intensification is 
compromised, which catalyses harm. The latter paves the way to the uneven distribution of 
environmental harms from farming intensification and negatively affects sustainable ecological 
capacity as a meta-capability, capabilities dependent on it, and the capability to control one’s 
environment.   
Finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary of the research and deepens the discussion developed 
in my findings chapters to ultimately answer the main question posed in this research - how does the 
process of pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland lead to environmental injustice? It also 
questions whether the dominant capitalist order is compatible with environmental justice 
principles and suggests ideas for reforming the harmful status quo on macro, meso and micro levels. 
The chapter concludes with directions for future research.   
27 
 
Chapter 2 – Integrative theoretical framework development 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to develop and discuss the integrative theoretical framework that will guide data 
collection and analysis. Ultimately, the theoretical framework will be instrumental for answering the 
main research question: how does the process of pig farming intensification in Northern 
Ireland lead to environmental injustice?  First, the field of green criminology will be discussed, and 
the relevance of the socio-legal approach and the concept of ‘ordinary harm’ for this research will be 
detailed. Research on intensive farming in green criminology is not extensive and a detailed analysis 
of the political economy of intensification has not been conducted thus far. The green criminological 
perspective can further develop an understanding of environmental and social harm that originates 
in the commonplace meat production practices and consider the contribution of the powerful to it. 
The integrative theoretical framework also includes the literature on crimes of the powerful, 
emphasising the importance of ‘studying up’ in criminology and the possibilities that such research 
opens up. As part of it, I discuss the integrated model of state-corporate crime. The inclusion of the 
latter in the integrative framework helps to analyse the political economy of farming intensification 
on the three levels of inquiry – international, national, and local – by understanding their 
interconnectedness. Finally, the environmental justice perspective is included in the integrative 
theoretical framework of my research to examine the convergence of harm and power emanating 
from the state and corporate farming industry actors. This chapter presents the theorisation of 
environmental justice that I will be using in my research; it encompasses the notions of distribution, 
recognition, procedure, and capabilities.   
2.2 Green criminology  
Green criminology provides an academic space for criminologists to explore issues related to the 
environment. The term appeared in the 1990s in an attempt to systematise the study of environmental 
crime (Lynch, 1990; South, 1998). Green criminology endeavoured to shift the criminological focus 
to natural environments, re-examine the definition of crime to include acts that are environmentally 
harmful but legally permitted and expand the concept of justice in relation to environmental frames 
(Lynch and Stretesky, 2014). As a result, much of the green criminological research focused on 
exposing various social and ecological injustices (Lynch and Stretesky, 2001; White, 2003, 2008; 
Brisman, 2007; Carrabine et al., 2009).  
2.2.1 Approaches in green criminology  
One conceptual lens for analysing environmental crime in green criminology is a legal-procedural 
approach. The legal-procedural approach is premised on the superiority of the criminal law and 
subsequently defines harms by drawing on the practices proscribed by the law (Brisman, 2007). 
Violations of the laws protecting the environment and health of the people, therefore, are seen as 
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environmental crimes. However, it has also been suggested that the lens of crime may not always be 
suitable for discussing certain harmful behaviours, especially those perpetrated by the state or 
corporate actors (Bradshaw, 2014; Zaitch and Gutierrez Gomez, 2015). As a result of this 
recognition, green criminology also features a socio-legal approach. The socio-legal approach in 
green criminology embraces studies of harm that do not fall under the umbrella of existing criminal 
law (Sollund, 2015) and regards harm as a practice that is firmly rooted in the dominant social 
paradigm, but is nonetheless environmentally damaging (Brisman, 2007). The socio-legal approach 
in green criminology supports the idea that the discipline of criminology should not be ‘undermined 
by having its subject matter defined by political and legal elites deciding what is labelled as crime 
and what is not’ (Zaitch and Gutierrez Gomez, 2015, p. 389). The development of the socio-legal 
approach brought about a reconsideration of the definition of environmental crime. Walters (2010, 
p. 180) suggests the term ‘eco-crime’ that encompasses both legal definitions of environmental crime 
and the harms beyond the legal apparatus, such as those ‘lawful acts of ecological degradation 
committed by states and corporations’. Some of the definitions of eco-crime focus on the existing 
political economic system. Systems of exploitation such as capitalism generate widespread social 
harm, yet do not face a proportionate amount of judgement and scrutiny (Michalowski and Kramer, 
2006b). For instance, Lynch et al’s (2017, p. 13) vision of environmental crimes centres on the role 
of globalised capitalism in ecological destruction. They define them as acts ‘that regardless of their 
legality cause significant identifiable harm to ecological systems – what we call ecological 
destruction and disorganisation – for the purposes of promoting capital accumulation’. Similarly, for 
Halsey (1997) criminal conduct is tantamount to the acts and interests of the powerful in control of 
the forces of production infringing upon human rights and natural environments. Considering the 
harmful yet legal nature of intensive farming and its embeddedness in the political economy of 
capitalism, the socio-legal approach appears to be suitable for its analysis.  
Moreover, the socio-legal approach also draws the link between environmental and social 
harm, which is crucial for my research; as I showed earlier, intensive farming affects not only the 
environment, but also the communities inhabiting this environment. The major aspiration of any 
society is to maximise its wellbeing, and harm prevents the achievement of such potential (White, 
2013). Consequently, Dybing (2012) concludes that environmental harm is a social harm. 
Environmental and social harms are connected in terms of their effects (Hauck, 2008; Walters, 2010; 
Lasslett, 2010). There is also a link between the causes of environmental and social harms and 
solutions to them; several authors discuss the inevitable connection between factors contributing to 
the degradation of humans and degradation of natural environments (Halsey, 1997; Green et al, 
2007), thus dissolving the division between social and natural worlds in their attempts to address 
environmental harms. Environmental and social harms are also connected in terms of justice, which 
is particularly relevant for my research. Both humans and natural environments exist in 
‘circumstances of justice’ (Baxter, 2005, p. 81) where they influence each other’s welfare and 
interests. The harms suffered by the ecosystem mirror the harms of marginalisation and 
disenfranchisement (Hauck, 2008; Pellow, 2018). 
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2.2.2 The concept of ‘ordinary harm’ – theorising intensive farming 
As stated above, certain systemic environmental and social harms are normalised social practices 
(Halsey and White, 1998; White, 2008) and are 'the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth 
functioning of our economic and political systems' (Zizek, 2009, p. 1). The discussion around the 
normalisation of harm has been further developed by Robert Agnew (2013). He contends that certain 
ordinary acts (such as consuming meat on a regular basis; choosing gasoline-powered automobiles 
for transportation; purchasing consumer products) contribute to environmental degradation. Their 
ordinary nature ensures their regular repetition, and, as they are deemed acceptable and even 
desirable, their cumulative effect aggravates environmental problems. While Agnew focuses on the 
individual-level environmental harms, Copson (2018) cautions that individual harms can only be 
identified once structural harms have been addressed. Therefore, an assumption can be made that 
acceptable and desirable routine activities that create environmental problems can also be performed 
in the form of structural harm.   
Agnew (2013) focuses on individual meat consumption, but leaves the interrogation of meat 
production intact. Yet, intensive meat production is an example of a trivialised harmful practice that 
has structural origins. It is an ‘ordinary act’ characterised by conformity with existing norms of meat 
production, rather than an act of deviance (Brisman and South, 2018). Ritchie (2004, p. 179) suggests 
that the legal practice of industrial farming that ‘impoverishes rural communities, pollutes our rivers, 
depletes our soils, destroys our wilderness, extinguishes wildlife species, mistreats animals, and 
sickens and kills people’ should be interrogated rather than taken for granted. Passas (2005) also 
stresses that factory farming results in social and environmental grievances. Sollund (2015) 
concludes that industrial farming should be open for green criminological exploration as it opens 
multiple avenues for studies of harm construction, denial and neutralisation. Larsen (2012, p. 44) 
concurs with this statement, suggesting that agricultural production can also be viewed as ‘structural 
violence or structural damage’ and its damage-wreaking consequences should be considered criminal 
in either a judicial or a moral sense.   
As mentioned in Chapter 1, existing criminological research on intensive farming draws 
attention to human-animal relationships in food production. Beirne (2014, p. 55) coined the term 
‘theriocide’ to summarise the diverse ways human actions cause the deaths of animals. The spectrum 
of the term covers, among others, intensive rearing regimes. Moreover, speciesism has surfaced as a 
topic encompassing the magnitude of animal abuse (South, 2007; Sollund, 2012), referring to ‘a set 
of widely shared beliefs that result from, and support, oppressive social arrangements’ (Sollund, 
2012, p. 94). In regard to intensive farming, Sollund documents how prejudice against animals was 
transformed into a harmful, exploitative practice because of ideological legitimation expressed by 
the meat industry and state authorities. She also applies Sykes and Matza’s (1957) neutralisation 
techniques to shed light on meat eating from the consumers’ point of view. Wyatt (2014) further 
expands the research on the human-animal relationship in food production by investigating animal 
abuse that takes place on English and Welsh pig farms. She applies the environmental justice 
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perspective to recognise harm and suffering of non-human animals in addition to exploring 
environmental degradation and human health concerns resulting from industrialisation of pig 
farming. Concluding that industrialisation should not be the way forward, she suggests boosting 
financial incentives for high welfare farms and helping larger farms transition to a smaller scale. One 
of the most recent criminological forays into industrial farming through the socio-legal lens is 
Schally’s (2017) investigation of the discursive construction of harm and business as usual by US 
agribusiness. She chooses the case study of Tyson Foods to investigate the techniques of legitimation 
of harm-doing, urging researchers to focus their future endeavours on discourses of resistance to 
harm. Other criminologists draw on the subject of industrialised meat production less directly. 
Boekhout van Solinge (2010) investigates deforestation in Brazil linked to agricultural production, 
developing a discussion of global consumption patterns and their hidden harms, and debating the 
conundrum of responsibility for harm in the context of globalisation. Gray and Hinch (2015), while 
considering transformations of food industry by corporatisation, touch upon agribusinesses’ negative 
effects on traditional farming. White and Yeates (2019) demonstrate the intersections between the 
dominant food production practices and climate change. Finally, existing research demonstrates that 
monolithic power of agribusinesses is highly resistant to regulation (Croall, 2012) and that laws 
around food production have been manipulated to preserve the interests of agribusinesses (Boekhout 
van Solinge, 2010), echoing Michalowski’s (2012) concerns that legal apparatus designed by the 
powerful cannot respond to harms committed by the powerful. 
It is clear that the socio-legal approach in green criminology can be employed to analyse the 
harms associated with farming intensification in Northern Ireland and it reveals the relevance of the 
concept of ‘ordinary harm’ for my research. I apply the latter to the realm of meat production, rather 
than consumption. Moreover, current green criminological engagements with the topic of intensive 
farming demonstrate the importance of its further research in green criminology. It is evident that the 
political economy of farming intensification has not been studied in detail, and a study of a legal yet 
harmful intensive pig meat production practice in Northern Ireland will advance both theoretical and 
empirical criminological research. Lynch (2020) suggests that green criminological research 
overlaps with crimes of the powerful research, which I also emphasised in the previous chapter. The 
next section, therefore, continues the development of the integrative theoretical framework in my 
research by discussing the literature on the crimes of the powerful and zooming into the integrated 
model of state-corporate crime. 
2.3 Crimes of the powerful 
In this section, I first introduce the history of crimes of the powerful research to further criticise the 
legal-procedural approach in criminology and justify adopting a socio-legal approach in my thesis. 
Second, I unpack the integrated model of state-corporate crime; I demonstrate how its inclusion in 
the integrative theoretical framework serves to analyse the political economy of the ‘ordinary harm’ 
of intensive farming and theorise power dynamics within it.  
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2.3.1 Crimes of the powerful research in criminology  
Criminology is a biased discipline. In mainstream criminology, traditional offences such as homicide, 
robbery, assault or, in Barak’s (1991) words, ‘crimes of the powerless’ are well-researched. On the 
contrary, crimes of the powerful, despite their widely acknowledged injurious nature (Pearce, 1976; 
Barak, 1991; Ward, 2004; Tombs and Whyte, 2009; Rothe, 2020) receive less scrutiny. The focus 
on the powerless stems from a constellation of several factors. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
powerful dominate the process of crime labelling by shaping the law. Some practices remain under 
the umbrella of legality due to the ability of the powerful to ‘mobilise financial and other resources 
in order to avoid stricter regulation’ (Passas and Goodwin, 2004; Passas, 2005, p. 772). Moreover, 
criminal law focuses on the harms ‘committed by individuals and suffered by individuals rather than 
harms produced collectively and experienced collectively’ (Barton et al., 2007, p. 202). Hence, 
allocation of responsibility in criminal law vindicates the structural forces. Criminal responsibility is 
an individual responsibility and implies that the responsible body is the only one rendered 
accountable for the problem, thus decontextualising social, political, and economic factors behind it. 
Crimes of the powerful are also marked by a greater distance between the perpetrator and the effects 
of their crime, and lack of integration of elite criminality into the channels of mass communication 
further diverts public and scholarly attention away from the elites (Michalowski and Kramer, 2006b).  
Yet, not only does the focus on the powerful provide a vital insight into the workings of crime, but 
it helps to understand power itself (Whyte, 2009) through the consideration of ‘economics-politics-
culture nexus’ (Michalowski, 2010, p. 26). The focus on the powerful also addresses formation, 
distribution and maintenance of power (Tombs and Whyte, 2003), and, more importantly, 
possibilities for the alteration of the status quo (Ruggiero, 2015).   
The dearth of research on crimes of the powerful was interrupted in 1939, when Edwin 
Sutherland first introduced the concept of the crimes of respectable people (or white-collar crimes). 
His definition of crime implied that individuals of high social status violate the law, breaching trust 
that was delegated or implied to them (Sutherland, 1939). In the 1960s and 1970s, a new radical 
criminological paradigm shift paved the way for the research that included illegalities perpetrated by 
private business organisations, corporations, and state institutions. Frank Pearce introduced the 
concept ‘crimes of the powerful’ in his seminal 1976 book, focusing predominantly on the state and 
its agents as crime perpetrators. ‘State-organised crimes’ emerged as an area of study – the term was 
coined by William Chambliss – referring to ‘acts defined by law as criminal and committed by state 
officials in pursuit of their jobs as representatives of the state’ (Chambliss, 1989, p. 184). Most 
research on state criminality focused on atrocities such as state terrorism, torture, murder, arms 
trafficking and drug smuggling, and violations of internationally established human rights (Barak, 
1991). Echoing white-collar crimes, it was also argued that all corporate activities are inherently 
criminogenic (Punch, 1996; Leon and Ken, 2017) and Lasslett (2010a) suggested that corporate-
initiated and corporate-facilitated crimes should also be scrutinised.  
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The research on crimes of the powerful is still far from becoming mainstream in criminology. 
The umbrella term ‘crimes of the powerful’ has been featured in several academic works 
encompassing both state and corporate deviance: Tombs and Whyte’s (2003) ‘Unmasking the Crimes 
of the Powerful’, Barak’s (2015) ‘Routledge International Handbook of the Crimes of the Powerful’, 
‘Crimes of the Powerful: An Introduction’ by Rothe and Kauzlarich (2016) and Bittle et al’s (2018) 
‘Revisiting crimes of the powerful: Marxism, crime and deviance’. Yet, more ‘deviant knowledge’ 
production, ‘unfavourable to, and / or critical of, agents of power’ (Walters, 2003, p. 2) is yet to be 
developed. The intersection of power, harm, and justice in the context of pig farming intensification 
in Northern Ireland appears suitable for this purpose.  
The environmental toll of the deviant acts committed by the powerful has been gaining some 
recognition. Some of the examples include: Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) considering 
environmental contamination from the nuclear weapons industry; Katz (2010) investigating 
environmental pollution in the chemical industry; Standing (2015) exploring ecological and social 
impacts of industrial fishing in Senegal, where collusions between political and business elites are 
powered by the neo-colonial ethos. Green criminologists in particular have been zooming into the 
intersection of power and environmental harm, considering the links between organised crime and 
mass production of waste (Ruggiero and South, 2010), and environmental crimes of the powerful in 
the oil, chemical and asbestos industries (Ruggiero and South, 2013). Some green criminologists 
applied the concept of state-corporate crime to analyse environmental harms (Lynch et al, 2010; 
Smandych and Kueneman, 2010; Kramer and Michalowski, 2012; Bradhsaw, 2014; White and 
Heckenberg, 2014; White, 2018). Yet, Bradshaw (2014) posits that environmental harm and state-
corporate crime research have taken two separate trajectories, without much overlap between the 
two. It is, therefore, crucial for a ‘greening’ of state-corporate crime to take place (Bradshaw, 2014, 
p. 166). Consequently, including state-corporate crime scholarship into my integrative theoretical 
framework allows examining power relations that support and reinforce the process of legal yet 
harmful pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland on the three levels of inquiry: macro 
(international), meso (national) and micro (local). Below, I discuss the state-corporate crime 
framework.  
2.3.2 State-corporate crime framework 
The inspiration behind state-corporate crime comes from Richard Quinney’s (1970) radical 
criminology and his writings on the construction of political power in capitalist states. The term 
‘state-corporate crime’ was coined in 1989 by Ray Michalowski after his discussion with Ron 
Kramer about a case study of the space shuttle Challenger disaster (Kramer et al, 2002). Its 
subsequent development centred around the fact that the existing literature, while covering both 
corporate and state crime, did not link the two together, despite the claims that ‘there is neither 
economics nor politics; there is only political economy’ (Michalowski and Kramer, 2006, p. 3). State-
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corporate crime scholarship, thus, aimed to scrutinise the deviance at the nexus of economic and 
political spheres. 
Invoking such contentious terms as ‘state’ and ‘corporate’ inevitably instigates definitional 
debates. While the term ‘state’ can encompass all citizens and the term ‘corporate’ can encompass 
all corporate employees, state-corporate crime refers to the acts most beneficial to the state and 
corporate leadership class and disproportionally harmful to other state and corporate actors 
(Friedrichs and Rothe, 2014). Henry (1991) argues that the framework turns to the government rather 
than the state: the state is not the government in itself but a structure for governmental action. What 
produces harm is government policies that have been created and enacted in the name of the state 
(Henry, 1991). Moreover, Friedrichs and Rothe (2014) suggest that it might be useful to distinguish 
between deviant acts initiated by the public sector actors and those initiated by the private sector 
actors (i.e. state-corporate crime and corporate-state crime). Therefore, state-corporate crimes occur 
as a result of collusion between the forces wielding political power and the forces wielding the power 
of economic production and distribution (Chambliss et al., 2010). Such crimes can either be state-
initiated or state-facilitated, but inevitably result in injurious actions. Moreover, ‘pathologies of 
power’ created by the welding of the state and corporate realms amplify the possibilities for harm 
while decreasing the likelihood of rigorous control (Kramer et al, 2002), thus laying the foundations 
for illegal avoidances and omissions (Barak, 2015).  
Aulette and Michalowski (1993, p. 175) defined state-corporate crimes as ‘illegal or socially 
injurious actions that result from a mutually reinforcing interaction between (1) policies and/or 
practices in pursuit of the goals of one or more institutions of political governance and (2) policies 
and/or practices in pursuit of the goals of one or more institutions of economic production and 
distribution’. Later, Michalowski and Kramer (2006, p. 15) truncated this definition into ‘illegal or 
socially injurious actions that occur when one or more institutions of political governance pursue a 
goal in direct cooperation with one or more institutions of economic production and distribution’. 
The integrated framework has been applied to the issues as diverse as crimes related to nuclear 
weapons (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998), safety crimes of chemical companies (Katz, 2010), the 
crash of Valujet Flight 592 (Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2000), and violations of treaty rights (Robyn, 
2006). 
Some authors also urge to use a more critical definition that considers various forms of harm 
occurring at intersections of governance and capital accumulation that remains legally beyond 
incrimination (Michalowski, 2010; Barak, 2015). As a result, the framework has been used to analyse 
crimes of American corporations conducting business with Nazi Germany (Matthews, 2006), and the 
invasion of Iraq (Kramer and Michalowski, 2005). The plea to consider the cases that exemplify 
harmful, yet legal wrongdoings particularly resonates with my research and the socio-legal approach 
in green criminology. Furthermore, my research addresses another shortcoming of the state-corporate 
crime framework: its immediate focus is on specific incidents, institutional flaws, and ‘moments of 
rupture’ (Bernat and Whyte, 2017, p. 71). Both Tombs (2012) and Lasslett (2010) suggest that this 
focus may obscure more entrenched practices that are part of a broader system of production as well 
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as enduring and ongoing relationships that are more similar to a process rather than a single event. 
By focusing on the ‘ordinary harm’ of intensive farming and analysing it as a process, I bring such 




Figure 2.1. Integrated framework. Source: Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998). 
 
Rather than looking at deviant acts in isolation, the integrated framework proposed by Kramer and 
Michalowski allows analysis through the lens of vertical and horizontal relations between social 
institutions and actors (Kramer et al, 2002). The integrated framework blends together the aspects of 
core criminological theories (political-economic, organisational, and differential association) to 
consider state-corporate crime from the perspective of the three levels of analysis: political-economic 
(macro), institutional (meso), and individual (micro). Thus, the framework addresses Rothe and 
Friedrichs’ (2015) concern that criminological theories tend to focus on one level of analysis and 
overlook the interdependent nature of social reality.  Yet, the relationship between the levels of 
inquiry should be carefully unpacked to enhance the explanatory power of the integrated framework 
(Zaitch and Gutierrez Gomez, 2015). It is suggested that an international level of analysis can be 
embedded in the political-economic level (Rothe and Friedrichs, 2015). Other authors suggest that 
international and political-economic levels of analysis be studied as distinct ones (Mullins and Rothe, 
2007; Zaitch and Gutierrez Gomez, 2015) as they exist in dialogue but are also influenced by forces 
within them. Moreover, the analysis of the political economic level should not be reduced to the 
analysis of capitalism or globalisation but rather be focused on ‘a series of specific happenings that 
fuel these contemporary dynamics’ (Zaitch and Gutierrez Gomez, 2015, p. 389).  
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The state-corporate crime scholars locate the origins of crime in the structures of capitalism, 
particularly in its drive for accumulation (Bernat and Whyte, 2017). Kramer and Michalowski (2006) 
suggest that the structure and cultural meanings of the broader political economic arrangements shape 
the goals and means of economic and political organisation. Political economic theories, thus, 
connect the goals and means of institutions of political governance and institutions of economic 
production and distribution with the overarching political economic arrangements. The structure of 
political economy creates the conditions that shape the relationship between political and economic 
actors (Kramer et al, 2002; Kramer and Michalowski, 2006). Moreover, Kramer et al (2002) assert 
that the goals defined by political economic arrangements are embedded in the tapestry of historical 
contexts. Historical context also influences the cultural definitions integral to a political economic 
system, which can influence the development of criminal behaviour. Other levels of analysis within 
the integrated model include institutional and individual. The goals and means of economic and 
political organisation are linked to the workings of specific economic and political institutions. 
Finally, the role of social relations that define an individual symbolic reality also needs to be 
considered.  
Furthermore, the integrated framework includes so-called catalysts for crime and harm – 
they include motivation (goals), opportunity structure (means) and operationality of control. The 
analysis is rooted in the assumption that deviance produced by interactions between political and 
economic actors stems from pressure for goal attainment, availability and attractiveness of 
illegitimate means, and the weakness of social control (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998) under the 
conditions of the political economy of capitalism.  
State-corporate crime theorists maintain that the greater emphasis on goal attainment results 
in criminal and harmful behaviour (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998; Tombs and Whyte, 2010; Tombs 
and Whyte, 2020). A goal-oriented individual positioned within an organisation that adheres to goal 
attainment as a measure of success in a society whose political economic frameworks advocate for 
ambitious goal pursuit ‘will be more susceptible to pursuing deviant organisational strategies than if 
one or more of these conditions is absent’ (Kramer et al, 2002, p. 279). The goals can also be 
artificially constructed (Merton, 1957) and individuals are often governed by a ‘bounded rationality’ 
that stems from incomplete or inaccurate information that shapes their goal articulation (Rothe and 
Friedrichs, 2015). In line with differential association theory, the goals and behaviour of an individual 
are moulded by social relations in the context of ‘the symbolic reality derived from social interaction 
within bounded organisational niches’ (Kramer et al, 2002, p. 279).  
Opportunity structure of the means used to meet the established goals constitutes another 
building block of the integrated framework for state-corporate crime. The discrepancy between goals 
and means to achieve those goals is rooted in Merton’s (1957) strain theory and his claims that 
deviance is inevitable when social expectations do not match the opportunities to achieve the goals, 
which is particularly relevant for the political economy of capitalism. According to him (1957, p. 
132), ‘culturally defined goals, purposes and interests’ are comprised of ‘a frame of aspirational 
reference’ and are the things ‘worth striving for’. Scarcity of legitimate means of goal achievement 
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fuels deviance. Misallocation of means might create an impression that individuals are barred from 
access to legitimate means, thus resulting in them seeking alternative harmful routes. Moreover, the 
choice of illegitimate means may stem from their higher efficiency in achieving the established goals 
(Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998).   
Finally, state-corporate crime theorists maintain that researchers’ attention should be 
directed towards establishing how opportunities for deviance are expanded while the possibility of 
constraint disintegrates in regulatory structures (Ruggiero, 2015). Social control determines 
compliance on the political-economic, institutional, and individual interaction levels of the integrated 
model. Assessments of potency of social control mechanisms are, therefore, crucial for unravelling 
the factors behind state-corporate crimes. Michalowski and Kramer (2006) suggest that societies with 
high level of social control produce economic actors that favour compliance with laws and 
regulations. Regulatory agencies play an important part in social control regulation. Yet, their critical 
scrutiny demands inspecting ‘the balances of forces between and within states, capital and 
populations’ (Tombs and Whyte, 2009, p. 110). Mullins and Rothe (2007, p. 138) also observe an 
inconvenient overlap between the concepts of opportunity and control, ‘where controls that are 
assumed to be non-existent or non-functional are conceptualised under the rubric of opportunity’. 
They conceptualise control as a complete barrier to a criminal or harmful act whereas a constraint 
restrains the activity thus forcing the criminal to change the course of their action.  
The state-corporate crime framework highlights that illegal and socially injurious actions 
positioned at the state-corporate nexus are produced both as part of the broader system of economic 
production and as part of social relationships (Bernat and Whyte, 2017). In regard to the former, they 
can be seen as what Ruggiero (2013) labels ‘crimes of the economy’ as they are rooted in the global 
economic forces of supply and demand. In regard to the latter, the state-corporate crime framework 
sheds light on the relations of power between economic and political actors, and their symbiotic 
production of socially and environmentally disadvantageous scenarios. It illuminates the constitutive 
nature of state-corporate relationships, a hypothesis discussed by several authors (Kramer, 1992; 
Aulette and Michalowski, 1993; Kramer et al, 2002; Tombs, 2012; Whyte, 2014; Bernat and Whyte, 
2017). Indeed, there is often no conflict of interest between state and economic actors as they pursue 
shared or mutual goals. State actors act to enable capital accumulation, while economic actors are 
crucial for realising capital accumulation (Bernat and Whyte, 2017). Whyte (2014, p. 244) labels this 
phenomenon a ‘regime of permission’. Such regimes are not only enabled by particular institutional 
relationships but originate from power architectures that lie beyond the observable empirical 
manifestations of power. Such power architectures are embedded in global political economic 
systems of production and consumption and are needed to uphold capital accumulation.  
Thus, the question of power becomes yet more important. While it is clear that a state-
corporate symbiosis (Tombs, 2012) relies on the economic (organisation of production and 
distribution) and political (organisation of rulemaking) powers, Michalowski (2018) also urges to 
consider cultural power. He defines it as ‘the organisation of consciousness, including the creation 
of subjectivity, causal narratives of the past and predictive narratives of the future’ (2018, p. 109) in 
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accordance with the ideology of neoliberal capitalism. Other authors also pay attention to how 
deviant outcomes are produced by the culture that normalises and trivialises deviance (Vaughan, 
2007): ‘a ‘crime’ is not a crime so long as its commission is controlled and directed by those in 
authority towards goals which they define as socially constructive’ (Bensman and Gerver, 1963, p. 
598). Although occasionally state and corporate actors obscure their harmful actions to avoid 
accountability, some harmful actions are pushed beyond that realm and are ‘culturally approved and 
therefore rewarded’ (Vaughan, 2007, p. 12). As a result of trivialisation, actors might not be aware 
of the adverse effects of their practices or portray them as inevitable or necessary risks pertaining to 
processes of production, thus using some of the techniques to neutralise the effect of their activities 
(Sykes and Matza, 1957). This discussion resonates with the main subject of my research – farming 
intensification in Northern Ireland – which, as I described earlier, also presents an example of a 
culturally approved, normalised, ‘ordinary’ harm. Some state-corporate crime scholars argue that an 
analysis of the relationship between power and harm should pay closer attention to the production of 
consciousness regarding state-corporate harms and the processes that make ‘avoidable harm appear 
as necessary harm’ (Michalowski, 2018, p. 107). Therefore, an analysis of the production of 
consciousness regarding normalisation of harm becomes significant for my understanding of the 
political economy of pig farming intensification. 
Pearce (1976) states that the process of normalisation of harm is an important component of 
societal reproduction, which also helps to reinforce the hegemony of capitalism. The discussions 
around the production of consciousness and normalisation of harm inevitably invoke the discussion 
around hegemony. For Gramsci (1971), ideological hegemony is the process of permeation of a 
particular ideology throughout society (including institutions and social relations), whereby the 
dominant order is justified and maintained through consent of those dominated and subsequently 
appears unquestionable or as a common sense. Yet, its common sense framing also obscures the harm 
that the system is built on and the powerful actors that perpetuate it. While pursuing their goals, state 
and economic actors also reproduce and maintain the political economy of capitalism (Hall, 2012; 
Rothe, 2020), which ultimately results in environmental and social harm. Such harm becomes banal, 
disavowed, depoliticised, and normalised through cultural hegemony and hegemonic discourse 
(Rothe and Collins, 2015). Pearce (1976) frames the same condition through the lens of the imaginary 
and the real social orders. Capitalism projects an imaginary social order – a portrayal of reality that 
is different from the actual conditions under capitalism (or the real order). The imaginary social order 
is conceptualised as ‘[the] ‘ideological’ portrayal of American society as being a democratic free 
enterprise system, wherein the majority rationally control the legislature and the government’ 
(Pearce, 1976, p. 104). The imaginary order is reproduced through the relations between political 
and economic actors, which create a hegemonic discourse and justify the status quo, thus masking 
the harms perpetrated by the powerful. For instance, ‘capital accumulation is more generally 
reproduced through regulatory structures’ (Bernat and Whyte, 2017, p. 77). Mahon (1979) develops 
an idea of regulatory bodies becoming captive agents of capitalist forces. As they simultaneously 
represent the cause and strive to control it, they function as an ‘instrument of hegemony’ (Mahon, 
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1979, p. 192). As a result, the existing order becomes ‘predominant to the extent that [it] seeps into 
popular consciousness, ruling out alternatives’ (Pearce and Tombs, 1998, p. 52). The absence of 
alternatives is an integral part of the ideological hegemony as, according to Ruggiero (2018), 
perpetuation of the dominant ideology relies on the silent consensus around it. Gramsci (1971) also 
suggests a close relation between consensus and hegemony.   
The integrated framework of state-corporate crime allows considering the horizontal and 
vertical power relations underpinning the dominant political economy. As a result, the integrated 
framework of state-corporate crime is well-positioned to analyse how the process of pig farming 
intensification came into being in Northern Ireland and power relations that support and reinforce it. 
Additionally, an advancement of the hegemonic aspect of power in my integrative theoretical 
framework allows analysing the role of power relations in securing the ideological hegemony, ruling 
out the alternative ways of social, political, and economic organisation, and normalising 
environmental and social harm. The levels of analysis in my research need to be clarified: on the 
macro level, I scrutinise broader political economic arrangements such as international dynamics of 
meat production; on the meso level, rather than considering an institution, I look at the interactions 
between the farming industry and the government on the national level in Northern Ireland; on the 
micro level, I consider the experience of individual farmers in Northern Ireland. The micro level is 
also important for analysing the experience of environmental decision-making in the studied 
community, underpinned by the planning framework as another mechanism of control of farming 
intensification. The effectiveness of the planning framework as mechanism of control determines the 
distribution of harms from farming intensification and has a direct impact on the realm of capabilities. 
The next section includes environmental justice paradigm into my integrative theoretical framework 
to theorise the experience of environmental decision-making around farming intensification in the 
studied community and link it to the distribution of harms and the realm of capabilities.  
2.4 Environmental justice paradigm 
This section will first consider convergence of green criminology and environmental justice and 
proceed to discuss the theoretical foundations of environmental justice, its distributional, 
recognitional and procedural dimensions, and the notion of capabilities in environmental justice.  
2.4.1 Environmental justice and green criminology   
A green criminological perspective posits that addressing environmental harm entails focusing on 
justice (White, 2008). White (2008) proclaims environmental justice as one of the approaches of 
green criminology, along with ecological and species justice. The three approaches are helpful in 
distinguishing between who or what is recognised as a victim of harm – human beings, the natural 
environment, and/or non-human species, respectively. White (2008, p. 15) defines environmental 
justice as ‘the distribution of environments among peoples in terms of access to and use of specific 
natural resources in defined geographical areas, and the impacts of particular social practices and 
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environmental hazards on specific populations’. Lynch and Barrett (2017) observe that the worlds of 
green criminology and environmental justice converge when injustices against the environment or 
non-human animals fuel injustices against humans. Westra (2004, p. 97) states that ‘the defence of 
human rights, particularly the right to one’s biological integrity and unimpaired normal function, 
goes hand in hand with the defence of life’s habitat’. Ultimately, concerns within green criminology 
echo environmental justice concerns: the blend of environmental issues and destructive tendencies 
of global capitalism in their relation to class, gender, and race inequalities.   
However, both Zilney (2006) and Lynch et al (2015) conclude that criminologists have not 
paid sufficient attention to environmental justice and the concept demands a more thorough 
integration into criminological literature. Zilney outlines the themes appearing in environmental 
justice research from both academics and scholars from 1970 until 2003, concluding that criminology 
is woefully underrepresented in the environmental justice literature. Orthodox criminology created a 
narrow conception of justice based on criminal law alone, gradually incorporating social justice and, 
finally in the 1990s, environmental justice issues (Lynch et al, 2015), but the latter remains niche. 
Yet, green criminology as a subdiscipline can benefit from focusing on environmental justice issues, 
which is further reflected in the theoretical work. Brisman (2007) argues in favour of forming 
multidisciplinary collaborations to expand the boundaries of environmental justice research. Lynch 
et al (2015) come to the same conclusion, advising to direct further criminological attention to the 
topics of capitalism and strategies to remedy environmental injustice. Considering the need to 
advance environmental justice research in green criminology, the next subsection reflects on the 
theoretical foundations of environmental justice.  
2.4.2 Theoretical foundations  
The notion of justice arises when people want more than they can have (Wenz, 1988). It is in a direct 
relationship with the notion of scarcity (real or perceived) and is categorised by the power over the 
distribution of what is scarce. Liu (2000) outlines three major perspectives of justice. Libertarianism 
pronounces the market to be the arbiter of justice and seeks to champion liberty and individual rights. 
Utilitarianism (or a teleological perspective) is built around the consequences of action; the objective 
is to maximise beneficial outcomes for society as a whole. Utilitarians suggest that victims of 
environmental risks might benefit from environmental injustices (through employment and/or lower 
housing costs). Moreover, they claim that ‘the mere correlation of hazardous sites and the presence 
of poor or minority communities does not prove that racism or injustice actually caused the siting 
there’ (Shrader-Frechette, 2002, p. 15). Contractarianism (or a deontological perspective) focuses on 
the rightness of an action itself; justice is seen as beneficial to the poor and the vulnerable, with 
suffering minimisation being its ultimate goal.   
The contractarian theory of justice was developed by one of the most influential liberal 
political philosophers of the twentieth century John Rawls. In his work A Theory of Justice Rawls 
offers a philosophical basis for liberal egalitarianism. Rawls refers to justice as ‘a standard whereby 
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the distributive aspects of the basic structure of society are to be assessed’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 9). He 
sees fairness as a fundamental idea for justice. Rawls also emphasises that, to achieve justice, 
individual choices should be made ‘behind the veil of ignorance’. An individual decision-maker 
would not be aware of their position in society, which gives an incentive to create a just order; the 
decision-maker would not want to make decisions benefitting a certain group, because the decision-
maker could hypothetically be part of that group. Rawls formulates two principles of justice based 
on that. The first principle dictates that ‘each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 302). The second is the 
difference principle: 
 
‘social and economic inequalities [of primary goods such as liberty and opportunity, income 
and wealth] are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged… (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 302). 
 
However, it is suggested that some of the assumptions within Rawls’s theory made it amenable to 
the transformations of the neoliberal era (Forrester, 2019). Additionally, Rawls’ work has been 
criticised for its narrow focus on justice exclusively in distributional terms, i.e. the terms concerning 
the distribution of benefits and burdens in society (Fraser, 2012). These concerns also resonate with 
environmental justice scholarship.    
As I stated in Chapter 1, the concept of environmental justice originated in the 1980s in the 
United States, intersecting anti-toxics3 and civil rights movements (Temper and Del Bene, 
2016). Empirical environmental justice research has focused on the topic of unequal access to 
environmental quality (Pellow and Brulle, 2005; Wolford, 2008; Kelly-Reif and Wing, 2016). 
Environmental justice activism initially focused on the environmental hazards and pollution affecting 
minority groups in the US (Bullard 2005; Bullard and Wright 2009; Taylor 2014), thus echoing 
Young’s (1990) statement that the notion of justice has its roots in domination and oppression. 
However, environmental justice activism grew to encompass the variety of unsustainable practices, 
including resource depletion, energy use, consumption patterns, food systems, and industrialisation 
(Pellow and Brulle, 2005; Holifield  et al, 2018). Environmental justice as a movement has 
experienced multiple successes (Pellow and Brulle, 2005); it succeeded at policy making, prevention 
of environmental and social harms and grew as both a movement and institutionally. Yet, the 
convergence of the environment and justice in academia is fairly recent (Schlosberg, 2001).  
A great portion of theoretical environmental justice work produced since the 1980s has 
focused on environmental ethics and environmental values. Bullard (1990, 1993) suggested in the 
early 1990s that environmental justice research embodies cultural values and norms, behaviours, 
regulations, and public policies that support sustainable communities and safe, nurturing, and 
 
3 The Anti-toxics movement sought to understand and ultimately challenge the system of toxic waste 
production in the US. Its origins can be traced back to Rachel Carson's work Silent Spring in 1962 
that focused on the use of chemical pesticides. 
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productive environments. Building on that, Dobson (1998), Barry (1999) and Low and Gleeson 
(1998) have focused on the distribution of goods and bads in society and applied it to the 
environment. For instance, Dobson’s (1998) thesis is that the position one gets in the distribution of 
social justice would determine their environment. In a similar vein, Low and Gleeson (1998, p. 156) 
do not venture beyond distributional justice but made an important contribution of formulating two 
key principles of environmental justice: ‘every natural entity is entitled to enjoy the fullness of its 
own form of life’ and ‘all life forms are mutually dependent and dependent on non-life forms’.   
In green criminology, research on environmental justice has also dedicated substantial 
attention to the uneven distribution of environmental harms (Lynch and Barrett 2017; Lynch and 
Stretesky 2012; Stretesky 2003; Stretesky and Lynch 1998, 2002; White 2003, 2008). Stretesky and 
Lynch (1998) conducted a pioneering investigation of corporate pollution adversely impacting 
minority communities and thus framed it as an instance of corporate environmental violence. Later, 
they discovered the proximity of schools with higher proportions of African Americans and 
Hispanics to environmental hazards in Florida, thus continuing to document evidence of 
environmental injustices in the US (Lynch and Stretesky, 2002). Stretesky (2003) researched air lead 
levels and disproportional exposure of African American communities to air lead pollution across 
the US. White (2003) analysed the intersection of environmental justice and green criminology 
beyond the US, turning to fresh water access in South Africa and other African countries. Another 
topic that narrowed the gap between green criminology and environmental justice was indigeneity; 
Lynch and Stretesky (2012) charted the instances of social and environmental injustices inflicted on 
Native American communities. Some studies also incorporated environmental justice concerns of 
class, race, and ethnicity in relation to exposure to pollution and punishment of environmental 
offenders (Lynch and Barrett, 2017), investigating how social structures influence the location of 
environmental crime and determine response to such crime. Therefore, discussions of environmental 
justice in green criminology have revolved mostly around distributional justice.  
However, as I mentioned above, the focus on distributional justice has been subject to 
criticism. Walker and Bulkeley (2006) suggest that uneven distribution of risks could be addressed 
by evening out the sharing of burdens without a fundamental overhaul of the structures behind 
problems in question. They also question the very essence of even distribution, pointing out that the 
environment is uniquely distributed into particular places and cannot be experienced equally. 
Therefore, uneven distribution of environmental goods and bads might not be classified as unjust. It 
is, therefore ‘the ‘fairness’ of the processes through which the distribution has occurred and the 
possibilities which individuals and communities have to avoid or ameliorate risk, or to access 
environmental resources, which are important’ (Walker and Bulkeley, 2006, p. 656). Indeed, 
different aspects of justice are linked (Schlosberg 2007). Most environmental justice advocates have 
become concerned with social, cultural, and political processes of environmental decision-making 
(Chakraborty 2017; Holifield, Walker, and Chakraborty 2018), thus echoing the call of prominent 
environmental justice scholars (Young, 1990; Bullard, 1993; Pulido, 1996; Fraser, 1998; Hunold and 
Young, 1998; Hampton, 1999) to address not only distribution, but the causes of maldistribution of 
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environmental benefits and burdens. The focus on the latter allows examination of social, cultural, 
and political processes, which is reflected in Schlosberg’s (2007) multifaceted conception of justice. 
Schlosberg (2007) theorises environmental justice as a synthesis of distribution, individual and 
community recognition, participation, and delivery of basic capabilities.   
The concern regarding the limitations of the distributional element in environmental justice 
has also resonated with the green criminological scholarship and invited further engagement with the 
concept of procedural environmental justice. Heydon (2018) states that environmental victimisation 
is linked to procedural injustice in his analysis of the consultation process with indigenous people on 
proposed oil sands projects in Canada. He identifies marginalisation of indigenous people at key 
stages of the consultation process, accompanied by a systemic misrecognition of their rights. Heydon 
acknowledges that some green criminologists have established the links between the institutional 
contexts underpinning decision-making and uneven distributions of harm (Goyes and South, 2016; 
Goyes and South, 2017), but his analysis develops the concept of procedural environmental justice 
within green criminology theoretically. This endeavour continues in his later paper (Heydon, 2019, 
p. 14) on the opposition to the felling of Sheffield’s street trees that illustrates a broader applicability 
of the concept of procedural environmental justice to ‘situations involving citizens without legally 
recognised participation rights and to deliberation procedures that are not rigidly defined from the 
offset’. He demonstrates how citizen input was not taken into consideration and that citizens were 
not meaningfully integrated in the decision-making process, and highlights the role of the neoliberal 
context, which hinders inclusive and just process of environmental decision-making. Finally, 
Maxwell and Maxwell (2020) also use the lens of procedural justice on the micro level to understand 
citizens’ responses to an environmental regulatory body in the Philippines.  
As I suggested in Chapter 1, it is evident that the concept of procedural environmental justice 
in green criminology needs to be developed further. Links between distributional environmental 
injustice and discrimination pose a question of whether the groups that do not experience 
discrimination and are not considered minority can experience injustice. Williams (1996) suggests 
that environmental justice scholars may create dichotomies of powerless victims defined in terms of 
their group identities and powerful offenders, thus ignoring other victims of environmental injustice 
that fall outside the gender, class, and race group identities. I continue the line of argument developed 
by Bustos et al (2017) and partly by Heydon (2019), who suggest that explorations of procedural 
environmental justice allow analyses to go beyond discriminated minority groups. If the core of 
environmental injustice is disenfranchisement, then those who do not experience discrimination and 
are not considered minority can also face environmental injustice; injustice occurs if they have 
limited influence within the decision-making process over the changes in the local environment that 
are likely to impact their lives. Therefore, formal mechanisms of environmental decision-making 
need to be examined to determine whether they can be classified as just.  
Having considered the theoretical foundations of environmental justice and identified the 
need to develop environmental justice research in green criminology, with a particular focus on the 
procedural dimension, I proceed to theorise environmental justice in my research, which will enable 
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me to analyse the processes of environmental decision-making in relation to farming intensification 
in Northern Ireland. The theorisation is inspired by Schlosberg’s (2007) conceptualisation of 
environmental justice, yet with a minor difference. Rather than considering participation alone, I look 
at the procedure of decision-making in more detail. This part of my integrative theoretical framework 
rests on the pillars of recognition, procedure, and capabilities. 
2.4.2.1 Recognition 
Recognition can be seen as a relationship (Young 1990), which is embedded in social relations both 
culturally and politically (Walker 2012b). It refers to dignity accorded to all despite the differences 
in ways of living that might exist (Sikor and Newell 2014). For environmental justice scholarship, 
recognition entails the diversity of participants from affected communities and recognition of their 
experiences (Schlosberg 2004). Fraser (2001) suggests that, in line with human subjective freedoms, 
individuals and groups should be able to define what qualifies as a good life and pursue it, without 
impeding on others’ individual liberties. Such definitions of a good life, as well as other 
heterogeneous positions and perspectives present in society (Hunold and Young, 1998) should be 
recognised in decision-making. Moreover, Fraser (1998) suggests that within the recognition 
paradigm differences should not only be recognised but celebrated.   
Recognitional injustice might take forms of non-recognition (where individuals are rendered 
invisible as a result of dominant cultural norms), misrecognition (where individuals are seen as 
lacking value and as inferior) and disrespect (where individuals are maligned or disparaged in 
everyday interactions or representations) (Fraser, 1997). Recognitional injustice creates a scenario in 
which individuals are not treated equally (Heydon 2018). It might arise when social institutions 
operate according to cultural norms that do not allow for equal participation (Fraser, 2001). Fraser 
(1995) also suggests that cultural misrecognition is the root of injustice, and any economic injustice 
ultimately stems from the cultural root. However, Young (1997) disagrees, instead proposing that 
cultural injustices inevitably have economic sources and consequences, such as economic 
exploitation and deprivation. Thus, cultural injustices are interrelated with the economic ones (Fraser, 
2000), with political economy being embedded in culture and culture bearing signs of the economic 
realities (Young, 1997).   
The question of what can be done to achieve recognition also arises. The standards to aspire 
to in decision-making are inclusivity, respectfulness and equality (Heydon, 2018). Fraser (2000) 
suggests making a particular consideration for the affected groups to make sure they are not being 
prevented from participating as a peer in social life (Fraser, 2000) and operating in the realm of 
participatory parity. Participatory parity requires two conditions. The first is the distribution of 
material resources to ensure participants’ independence and voice to avoid material inequality that 
forecloses parity of participation (Fraser, 2000). The second is parity of participation in the 
institutional realm, where respect for all participants and equal opportunity for participation are 
guaranteed (Fraser, 2000). Additionally, Bostrom (2012) posits that recognition is also achieved 
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when access during different stages of a decision-making process is granted to all individuals and 
well-designed communication structures to share information are set in place. However, Velicu and 
Kaika (2017) proclaim that mere recognition within the institutional imaginary without 
understanding of identity construction risks not tackling the core of the misrecognition problem, 
whereas mere redistribution of environmental bads reproduces the status quo without subverting it 
(Blechman et al, 2005). Velicu and Kaika (2017, p. 311) suggest discussing recognition practices as 
issues of visibility, in terms of becoming ‘equal as a political subject who can reason, pass judgement, 
and decide for oneself what kind of life one wants’. The issue of visibility is particularly important 
when it comes to recognition and inclusion of ‘non-elite’ voices in the decision-making processes 
(Walker, 2012b). He suggests that community-based research should be recognised as having an 
equal value to expert research. Gauna (1998) concurs, asserting that formal expertise excludes the 
knowledge that those affected by environmental harm have and consequently reinforces the power 
disparity between those responsible for harm and those suffering its consequences. Therefore, 
environmental justice as recognition also demands that non-expert voices should be given 
consideration and ability to affect the decisions made.  
Discussions of recognition focus predominantly on the recognition of individuals or 
communities. However, some authors also consider that individuals’ and communities’ values, 
rationales, and lifestyles as well as their ideas can be unrecognised (Bustos et al, 2017), leaving 
individuals and communities disempowered. The authors suggest that participatory arrangements are 
not designed to recognise what Schlosberg (2004, p. 524) identifies as ‘diverse cultures, identities, 
economies, and ways of knowing’, and such lack of recognition hampers meaningful participation. 
Bustos et al (2017, p. 297) suggest that the reason behind this instance of misrecognition is the 
exclusion of the views situated outside ‘the reigning ‘consensuses’ (in economic, environmental and 
development terms)’ in formally participatory processes of environmental decision-making. This 
idea resonates with the above-discussed concept of the hegemony of capitalism. The presence of 
formally participatory processes may be interpreted as an example of the ‘normal’ exercise of 
hegemonic neoliberal capitalism (Gramsci, 1971) where the decisions affecting the environment 
appear to be based on the consent of the majority, while in reality favour the interests of those 
benefitting from these decisions. In other words, the political economy of neoliberal capitalism has 
reconfigured political processes and capitalism is regarded as an unquestionable foundation of social 
and economic order. Social actors, thus, operate within the boundaries of the consensus around a 
growth- and profit-driven neoliberal capitalist system and those challenging it are placed outside the 
consensus and dismissed (Swyngedouw, 2007). This trend has been described as post-politics 
(Ranciere, 1999; Zizek 1999; Mouffe, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2007, 2009) or anti-politics (Fawcett et 
al, 2017). These authors also point out that the hegemony of capitalism is constituted through power 
relations that are safeguarded through eliminating the conflict between the powerful and the 
powerless in political processes (Mouffe, 2005). Consensus-based decision-making is linked to the 
phenomenon of depoliticisation. This idea is fitting with the context of my research; as I stated in 
Chapter 1, the process of environmental decision-making in relation to new intensive pig farms is 
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inherently political. Depoliticisation can be defined as the set of processes that remove or replace the 
potential for choice and deliberation around a particular political issue (Hay, 2007). The space of 
disagreement gets narrower to include ‘different opinions on anything imaginable (as long as it does 
not question fundamentally the existing state of the neo-liberal political-economic configuration) in 
arrangements of impotent participation and consensual ‘good’ techno-managerial governance’ 
(Swyngedouw, 2009, p. 610). In addition to being circumscribed, political choices are also often 
deemed too complex to comprehend, necessitating the involvement of experts to legitimise particular 
decisions (Swyngedouw, 2011). The problematic nature of this involvement in light of recognitional 
justice has been outlined above. Additionally, depoliticisation in this case occurs as members of the 
public become disillusioned with political participation because of their conviction that certain issues 
can be only understood by experts (Young, 1990). 
Thus, environmental justice as recognition in my research implies inclusion and respect of 
participants in decision-making, their experiences as well as their ideas, values, rationales, and 
lifestyles. Moreover, environmental justice as recognition also implies that non-expert voices should 
be given consideration and the ability to affect the decisions made.  
2.4.2.2 Procedure 
The analysis of procedure of environmental decision-making in my thesis is underpinned by the 
Aarhus convention on Access to Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (UNECE, 1998). The Aarhus convention is concerned with the decisions on 
the activities that are likely to have a ‘significant effect’ on the environment. The convention was 
signed in 1998 by the European Community, came into force in 2001, and rests on the three pillars 
of principles outlined below.  
2.4.2.2.1 Access to information 
The first pillar is the access to environmental information. European Commission (n.d.) defines 
environmental information as ‘information on the state of the environment, but also on policies or 
measures taken, or on the state of human health and safety where this can be affected by the state of 
the environment’. Such information can include ‘biological diversity and its components, including 
genetically modified organisms, energy, noise and radiation’ in its definition (Lee and Abbot, 2003, 
p. 89). According to Lee and Abbot (2003), members of the public can obtain this information within 
one month of the request and without giving a reason for the request - from the perspective of the 
public authority in discharging their obligations, it is also known as the ‘passive’ right of access to 
environmental information (Whittaker et al, 2019). The first pillar of the Aarhus convention also 
obliges public authorities to disseminate environmental information in their possession (European 
Commission, n.d.) – which is known as the ‘active’ right of access to environmental information 
(Whittaker et al, 2019). The convention also includes ‘cost-benefit analysis and other economic 
analyses and assumptions used in environmental decision-making’ in its definition of information to 
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which access should be provided to recognise the importance of economic evaluation in 
environmental decision-making (Lee and Abbot, 2003, p. 89).  
2.4.2.2.2 Public Participation  
The second pillar secures the right to participate in environmental decision-making. This right 
focuses on ensuring early participation of the public affected and environmental non-governmental 
organisations. Members of the public should be informed (either by public notice or individually) in 
a timely manner about a planning application in their area (Lee and Abbot, 2003). Such information 
can include ‘the proposed activity and the application on which a decision will be taken; the nature 
of possible decisions or the draft decision; the public authority responsible for making the decision; 
the envisaged procedure including opportunities for public participation; the fact that the activity is 
subject to a national or transboundary environmental impact assessment procedure’ (Lee and Abbot, 
2003, p. 97). Members of the public should also be provided with all documentation relevant to the 
decision-making process and suitable arrangements should be made to allow them to comment on 
the proposed developments. Finally, the outcome of public participation should be considered, and 
information should be provided on the final decision (European Commission, n.d.).  
Beyond the Aarhus convention, the idea of participation in environmental decision-making 
originates and is developed in the literature on public participation and engagement. It is often traced 
to Arnstein’s (1969) work that developed a typology of eight levels of participation extending from 
non-participation (i.e. manipulation and therapy), to tokenism (i.e. informing consultation, 
placation), to citizen power (i.e. partnership, delegated power, citizen control). She argued that 
oftentimes public participation is reduced to an empty ritual rather than a community empowerment 
exercise. More recent engagement with Arnstein’s work has extended her discussion of public 
participation to discuss a continuum from technical to participatory decision-making (Deacon and 
Baxter, 2013), with the latter focusing on the engagement with the populations directly affected by 
the changes in the local environment. Yet, Arnstein’s model of public participation has also been 
criticised for its focus on the outcomes, rather than processes of public engagement (Tritter and 
McCallum, 2006).  
In the environmental justice literature, participation is seen as a crucial element of a just 
procedure and refers to the manner in which the different experiences of individuals and communities 
are validated (Schlosberg, 2004). Participation implies wider engagement boosted by democratic 
decision-making (White, 2014), where individuals and communities have the ability to influence the 
outcome of decision-making (O’Faircheallaigh, 2010). The rationale for public participation and its 
role in achieving environmental justice is multifaceted. Public participation allows access to local 
knowledge, which broadens the range of solutions (Stewart and Sinclair, 2007). Participatory 
decision-making is also integral to the notion of environmental democracy (Gellers and Jeffords, 
2018) and is a condition for social justice (Young, 1990). In theory, it should contribute to individual 
and community empowerment (Stewart and Sinclair, 2007). Empowered participation for Reed 
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(2008) takes two forms: ensuring that participants have the power to really influence the decision 
and ensuring that participants have the technical capability to engage effectively with the decision. 
Therefore, scrutinising the idea of public participation oftentimes means engaging with the question 
of power. Uneven environmental outcomes result from political economic relations of capitalism, 
within which inequalities of power in environmental decision-making persist (Walker, 2012; 
Brisman, 2013; Holifield et al, 2018), as I stated in Chapter 1. Some authors suggest that public 
participation tends to reflect the distribution of social power rather than change the status quo (Devlin 
and Yap, 2008). For instance, Brisman (2013) suggests that restrictions of participation contribute to 
cultures of silence that extinguish willingness and compromise the ability to contest environmental 
harm and environmental injustice, while Heydon (2019) concludes that unequal distribution of 
environmental harms may result from unequal participation in decision-making processes, which in 
turn might stem from the lack of recognition. Others are more optimistic, claiming that public 
participation challenges the inequitable distribution of social goods and burdens, as well as the 
culture of misrecognition (Schlosberg, 2004). Yet, in the context of environmental justice, process 
goals (i.e. ensuring that the process of participation is conducted appropriately) are as important as 
outcome goals (i.e. re-distribution of environmental burdens and benefits and improved 
environmental quality) (Gellers and Jeffords, 2018). Therefore, discussions on the nature of 
participation need to be considered to respond to the need identified by O’Faircheallaigh (2010) to 
examine how public participation is practised and what impact it has.  
Such an examination invites a more thorough discussion of the dynamics of power in 
decision-making. To continue the theorisation of power developed in the previous section and apply 
it to the context of public participation in environmental decision-making, Lukes’ (1974) three-
dimensional conceptualisation of power deserves further attention. Using this conceptualisation, 
Forester (1982) considers how power is exercised in decision-making. He states that one’s superior 
bargaining resources allow them to shape the flows of information available to the public in decision-
making. Moreover, those in power can also control participation through the setting of agendas: ‘the 
influence over which citizens find out what and when, about which projects, which options, and 
about what they might be able to do as a result’ (Forester, 1982). In a similar vein, Tauxe (1995) 
suggests that institutional practices of planning will always present a structural obstacle for individual 
and community empowerment, even when the impediments for democratic participation are 
removed, since the agendas for planning are set on the institutional level. Finally, power in decision-
making is also exercised through shaping of the interests of those participating through the above 
described ideological hegemony, which is the most insidious and intangible exercise of power 
(Gramsci, 1971; Lukes, 1974; Bourdieu, 1984).   
Later academic engagement with power and participation also deepens one’s understanding 
of the relationship between the public and decision-making structures. O’Faircheallaigh (2010) 
develops a classification of how the public can participate: public input can be used for decisions 
taken separately from the public, the public can participate in decision-making directly, and the 
public can attempt to change the distribution of power to restructure decision-making. Similarly, 
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Bishop and Davis (2002) identify six different forms of public participation, similar to Arnstein’s 
ladder of public participation, ranging from ‘Participation as Consultation’ to ‘Participation as 
Control’. Their category ‘Participation as Standing’ assumes that members of the public can use 
administrative law to assert their role in decision-making and, in some cases, can overturn 
government decisions. Similarly, Walker et al (2006, p. 194) also consider the notion of standing, 
but formulate it rather differently: it refers to ‘demonstration of and assurance that stakeholder 
contributions are valued, respected, and honoured’. Standing is conceptualised along with access 
(having access to a process that offers an opportunity to be heard) and influence (meaningful 
participation that can affect outcomes), all of which, being interdependent, constitute ‘the trinity of 
voice’. They argue that ‘the trinity of voice’ can be provided through collaboration, which is different 
from the conventional methods of public participation (such as public hearing and commenting on 
applications). Instead, collaboration is 
‘less competitive, (2) it features mutual learning and fact-finding; (3) it allows underlying 
value differences to be explored, (4) it resembles principled negotiation, focusing on interests 
rather than positions, (5) it allocates the responsibility for implementation across many 
parties, (6) its conclusions are generated by participants through an interactive, iterative, and 
reflexive process, (7) it is often an ongoing process, and (8) it has the potential to build 
individual and community capacity in such areas as conflict management, leadership, 
decision-making, and communication’ (Walker et al 2006, p. 200).  
The above invites the discussion around the conditions for enhanced public participation. Senecah 
(2004) stresses the importance of preserving and enhancing trust in achievement of better 
environmental decisions, and asserts that the practices of access, standing and influence build and 
maintain such trust. Other authors expand on this, outlining the conditions such as empowerment, 
equity, and learning (Reed, 2008), and compromise, fairness, and effective communication (Hartley 
and Wood, 2005). Stewart and Sinclair (2007, p. 166) provide a comprehensive summary of the 




Figure 2.2. Essential elements of meaningful public participation. Source: Stewart and Sinclair 
(2007) 
 
It is evident that that idea of public participation is of significant importance for a just procedure. 
Yet, the idea of public participation has also been critiqued. Mansbridge (2003) questions the 
effectiveness of participatory democracy, outlining its paradox – while participation can increase 
one’s capacity to create successful democracy, those without the experience of participation may not 
have the capacity to do so. As Mansbridge (2003) puts it, what they need is what, because of their 
need, they cannot get. Echoing these concerns, some authors question whether public participation 
within current institutional constraints is effective at all. While many of the regulatory programmes 
have institutionalised mechanisms for public participation, Weinberg and Gould (1993) suggest that 
few individuals actively participate because such mechanisms are not adequate, and the majority of 
the public remains unmotivated; this statement invokes the idea of depoliticisation explored in the 
previous section. Previously discussed prioritisation of expert rather than public opinion also informs 
another public participation critique. Some authors (Rowe and Frewer, 2000; Lee and Abbot, 2003) 
suggest that environmental decisions should be made by experts rather than members of the public. 
This argument evokes the ages-old tension between technocracy and democracy; in simple terms, 
the former refers to regulation by experts (driven by logic, rationality, and evidence-based reasoning) 
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and the latter to democratic control (driven by political equality and public control) (Gilley, 2016). 
Admittedly, there exists a danger in creating a dichotomy between the two (Kinsella, 2004; Machin 
and Smith, 2014). While the complexity, risks, and uncertainties of policy-making have increased 
calling for technocratic policy criteria, promotion of participatory governance practices have also 
strengthened arguments for ‘deep democratisation’ (Gilley, 2016). Gilley (2016, p. 19) suggests that 
‘healthy democracy requires a healthy technocracy and vice versa’. Yet, a number of authors suggest 
that the appeal to ‘the experts’ may be prevailing over that to ‘the people’ and evidence the existence 
of ‘democratic forms but technocratic norms’ (Sam and Scherer, 2006; Edelenbos et al, 2010; Gaus 
et al, 2020). Consequently, democratic institutions still exist but political decision-making is moved 
to the realm of unaccountable corporate power, thus strengthening the inevitability of neoliberal 
capitalism (Bluhdorn, 2014). Moreover, with rationality being at its core, technocratic rule considers 
experts as bearers of reason and places the latter in opposition to emotion (Shammas, 2015). Being 
an antipode of reason, emotion is seen as something to be managed or suppressed, a source of 
instability (Mouffe, 2005). Yet, a number of authors suggest that emotion cannot be eradicated from 
politics; instead, it should be integrated into politics to challenge hegemonic power relations and 
promote debate about the alternatives to the consensus around neoliberal capitalism (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2001; Mouffe, 2005). 
2.4.2.2.3 Access to justice 
Finally, the third pillar of the Aarhus convention that underpins the examination of the environmental 
decision-making procedure in my thesis is access to justice. It safeguards ‘the right <…> to challenge 
public decisions that have been made without respecting the two aforementioned rights or 
environmental law in general’ (European Commission, n.d.). Access to justice can be provided in 
three contexts: to review procedures related to information requests; to review procedures related to 
specific decisions that are subject to public participation requirements; and to challenge violations of 
environmental law (UNECE, 1998). The third pillar is most connected to the judicial domain and, 
aside from the Aarhus convention, is represented by the Human Rights Act 1998, which can be 
interpreted as affording rights to individuals against the developments that can impact one’s health 
(Ellis, 2000). Lee and Abbot (2003) define the limitations pertaining to the UK architecture of access 
to justice. While a 'first party' (i.e. applicant or developer) right of appeal exists, a ‘third-party’ (i.e. 
objector) rights of appeal are not permitted, leaving objectors with the only option of judicial review, 
where action is limited. The absence of the third-party right of appeal will be further discussed in the 
next chapter in the Northern Irish context and its effect will be explored in Chapter 6.  
To sum up, the analysis of procedure of environmental decision-making in my thesis will be 
conducted through the consideration of access to information, public participation, and access to 
justice. It is also important to acknowledge that the three pillars that underpin the examination of the 
environmental decision-making procedure in my thesis exist in a broader context. Ellis (2002) posits 
that having rights in the process of environmental decision-making does not automatically result in 
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delivering justice, both in social and environmental terms. Instead, the exercise of such rights needs 
to be accompanied by a strategy that takes broader social, economic, and political issues into account.  
2.4.2.3 Capabilities  
As illustrated above, Schlosberg (2007) considers the notion of capabilities in his theorisation of 
environmental justice, which is also developed in my thesis. The capabilities approach is reported to 
be linked to the criticism of neoliberalism (Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010), which supports the 
radical inclinations of environmental justice as a movement. The capabilities approach has been 
developed by Sen (1985, 1999) and Nussbaum (1997, 2001, 2006). The broader notion of capabilities 
suggests that ‘each thing should be able to flourish as the thing it is’ (White 2014, p. 90) and refers 
to a range of conditions that allow to translate basic goods into the functioning of human life. Sen 
(1985) refers to functionings as doings (such as eating or reading) and beings (such as being well-
nourished or free from disease), while capabilities for him are the qualities that enable to have a fully 
functioning life. For example, if reading is a functioning, being educated is the capability necessary 
for that functioning, and a lack of education is unjust (Sen, 1985). Sen (1999) outlines such 
capabilities as political freedoms, economic facilities, transparency guarantees, etc. Therefore, the 
focus is not merely on the distribution of benefits and burdens but on how such distributions are 
converted into the flourishing of individuals and communities. The measure of justice, thus, depends 
on whether the existing capabilities and the ability to exercise them allow for a fully functioning life 
(Nussbaum 1997; Sen 1999; Schlosberg 2007). 
Nussbaum (2003, p. 35) supports Sen’s idea but claims that his formulation only gives ‘a 
general sense of what societies ought to be striving to achieve’, yet without formulating ‘which 
capabilities a society ought most centrally to pursue, <…> that guidance remains but an outline’.  As 
a result, she formulates (2001, 2003, 2006) a basic ‘capability set’ necessary for functioning, which 
includes life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical 
reason, affiliation, other species, play, and control over one’s environment. The capabilities of bodily 
health, play, affiliation, and other species are integral for my research. The capability of bodily health 
implies ‘being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; 
to have adequate shelter’; the capability of play implies ‘being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy 
recreational activities’; the capability of affiliation implies ‘being able to live with and toward others, 
to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social 
interaction, to be able to imagine the situation of another’; the capability of other species implies 
‘being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature’ 
(Nussbaum, 2003, p. 41-42).  
Yet, the capabilities approach as developed initially by Sen and Nussbaum is limited in its 
consideration of the natural environment’s value to human capabilities and does not address 
inequities in the distribution of environmental benefits and burdens fully (Holland, 2008). Sen (1999) 
only considers the relationship between capabilities and ecological sustainability through the 
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discussion of justice for future generations. As I showed above, Nussbaum (2001) considers animals, 
plants, and particular natural places as instrumentally valuable to one of the human capabilities but 
does not theorise further. To address this, it is suggested that ‘the capabilities approach, as a theory 
of justice, offers a level of breadth and specificity that is useful for identifying the environmental 
dimension of social justice and what justice therefore requires with respect to the distribution of 
environmental benefits and burdens’ (Holland, 2008, p. 320). Holland (2008) regards sustainable 
ecological capacity as a meta-capability necessary for all the capabilities. For instance, she suggests 
that Nussbaum’s (2011, p. 33) capability of emotions (‘being able to have attachments to things and 
people outside ourselves’) can involve the protection of particular ecosystems to create a ‘sense of 
place’. Overall, having sustainable ecological capacity as a meta-capability ‘involves being able to 
live one's life in the context of ecological conditions that can provide environmental resources and 
services that enable the current generation's range of capabilities; to have these conditions now and 
in the future’ (Holland, 2008, p. 324). Later, Schlosberg (2014, p. 78) also develops the idea of the 
environment being instrumental for one’s functioning, stating that environmental circumstances and 
the ability to flourish are intertwined and exposure to environmental harm negatively affects ‘a range 
of rights and capabilities necessary for our functioning, and so it creates injustice’. Therefore, 
considering that all of the central human capabilities are dependent on the natural environment, my 
research echoes Holland (2008) and Schlosberg (2014) in their regard of sustainable ecological 
capacity as a necessary meta-capability.  
Additionally, as stated above, control over one’s environment is also a capability necessary 
for human flourishing and should be delivered by the governments through safeguarding the right of 
political participation that should be premised on the notion of respect (Nussbaum 1997). Nussbaum 
(2003) differentiates between political and material control, and it is the former that is integral to my 
research. Political control over one’s environment implies ‘being able to participate effectively in 
political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free 
speech and association’ (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 42). Injustice in relation to the capabilities function of 
procedural justice occurs when this capability is limited (Schlosberg 2007). The notion of 
capabilities, thus, links distributional and procedural components of environmental justice, while 
considering a broader set of conditions necessary for a full human functioning (Schlosberg 2007).  
Consideration of capabilities supports the idea of justice pluralism (Edwards et al, 2016) as 
it implies the emergence of a multiplicity of voices, each striving for their own version of 
environmental justice. As a result, a conundrum of universality of justice (Walker and Bulkeley, 
2006) appears. Debbane and Keil (2004) proclaim that universality clashes with the diversity of 
notions of environmental justice and environmental justice movements. Conversely, Low and 
Gleeson (1998) state that diversity erodes the meaning of environmental justice. Nevertheless, 
Schlosberg (2004), using Harvey’s (1996) theorisations, suggests that a unified movement for 
environmental justice can be forged by challenging the realities of the global political project from 
different localities in different ways. One should bear in mind that a call for unity does not imply a 
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call for uniformity. In Schlosberg’s (2004, p. 534) words, ‘an insistence on uniformity will limit the 
diversity of stories of injustice, the multiple forms it takes and the variety of solutions it calls for’. 
2.4.3 Summary 
When industrial needs are prioritised above cultural and ecological needs, environmental injustice 
occurs (Kilbert, 2001). This statement demonstrates the relevance of the environmental justice 
paradigm when applied to the process of farming intensification in Northern Ireland and enables my 
research to follow Williams’ (2005) call to examine every aspect of the food system through the 
environmental justice lens. Before concluding this section, it is worth emphasising the benefits of 
including the environmental justice paradigm into my integrative theoretical framework. It has been 
argued that the environmental justice paradigm constitutes a political programme, ‘a vocabulary of 
political opportunity’ (Agyeman and Evans, 2004, p. 155), concerned with the underlying causes and 
dynamics of inequities at different scales. It embraces the plurality perspective, in which one should 
not be tempted to resort to causal oversimplifications about the source of injustice (Walker, 2012). 
Furthermore, Harrison (2011) suggests that the environmental justice paradigm adopts a role of an 
avid critic of the mainstream environmental movement. She concurs with Young’s position that in 
order to address the existing injustices, one must study them in their unique contexts, dissect 
institutional oppressions that underlie them, and challenge the oppressions to restructure the existing 
power relations. Additionally, the environmental justice paradigm seeks to re-orient one’s 
relationship with the natural environment (Pellow, 2016). It sees the environment ‘beyond the ‘place 
where we live, work and play’ to encompass a multidimensional materiality based on a consciousness 
of the innate inter-connection of existence on Earth and concomitant power relations’ (Temper and 
Del Bene, 2016, p. 42).    
This section unpacked the environmental justice paradigm and explained its role in my 
integrative theoretical framework. I have considered distributional environmental justice, justice as 
recognition, procedural environmental justice, and the role of capabilities in environmental justice. 
The environmental justice paradigm allows exploration of the idea that the populations who do not 
experience discrimination and are not considered minority can face environmental injustice, thus 
innovating the existing green criminological research. The environmental justice paradigm enables 
exploring the distribution of environmental harms from the ongoing pig farming intensification and 
their effect on human capabilities in Northern Ireland, thus developing green criminological research 
that connects intensive farming and environmental justice. Environmental justice paradigm is also 
the foundation for understanding the effectiveness of environmental decision-making process 
underpinned by the planning framework as a mechanism of control of farming intensification. The 
environmental justice paradigm provides explanations for how harm is catalysed in planning 
frameworks on the micro level through examining individual and community recognition, 
environmental decision-making procedure, and political capabilities in relation to farming 
intensification. As a result, the chosen conceptual paradigm subjects the under-researched procedural 
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dimension of environmental justice in green criminology to scrutiny and expands on the 
insufficiently discussed concept of capabilities in it.  
2.5 Conclusion 
The integrative theoretical framework discussed in this chapter provides a direction for data 
collection to answer the main question posed in my research: how does the process of pig farming 
intensification in Northern Ireland lead to environmental injustice? Each individual dimension of 
the proposed integrative theoretical framework contributes to answering the main research question.  
Green criminology provides an overarching frame for this research. Adherence to the socio-
legal approach enables scrutiny of the ordinary environmental and social harm embedded in intensive 
farming from a critical perspective. Furthermore, crimes of the powerful are of growing importance 
for twenty-first century criminologists and more understanding of such crimes is needed (Friedrichs 
and Rothe, 2014). The inclusion of the state-corporate scholarship into the integrative theoretical 
framework encourages the return to the political economic roots of green criminology (Lynch and 
Stretesky, 2014). My study endeavours to advance state-corporate crime research through the 
‘greening’ of criminology and consequently re-examine the integrated model of state-corporate crime 
through considerations of environmental harm. The framework enables a close examination of the 
motivation, opportunity structures and controls that underpin the process of farming intensification 
on the three levels of inquiry – international, national, and local. It also allows to integrate the concept 
of strain to demonstrate how the disjuncture between culturally, politically, and economically 
appropriate goals and means to achieve them may lead to harm. The state-corporate framework also 
illuminates multi-level power dynamics behind the normalised, yet harmful activity of farming 
intensification and reveals the complexity of symbiotic relationships between state and corporate 
farming industry actors that undergird this process, within the realm of the GfG strategy and beyond. 
The integrative theoretical framework presented here also considers cultural power – the production 
of consciousness – that normalises environmental and social harm.  Overall, it helps explaining how 
the ideological hegemony of neoliberal capitalism in meat production is secured and the alternatives 
to it are ruled out.   
Finally, the integrative theoretical framework includes an environmental justice perspective. 
Its inclusion responds to the calls of advancement of the environmental justice perspective within 
green criminology. In my research, the environmental justice perspective engages with the analysis 
of the distribution of environmental harms from the ongoing pig farming intensification in Northern 
Ireland, individual and community recognition, decision-making procedure, and the realm of 
capabilities.  Its application along with other components of the integrative theoretical framework 
allows to connect power relations that support and reinforce pig farming intensification on the three 
levels of inquiry to the micro level process of environmental decision-making. The analysis of the 
experience of environmental decision-making process underpinned by the planning framework 
enables understanding whether the latter serves as a mechanism of control or a catalyst for harm from 
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farming intensification; this understanding will inform the distribution of harm and affect the realm 
of capabilities. In sum, the integrative theoretical framework presented here allows analysing the 




























Chapter 3 – Context of research: Northern Ireland 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter demonstrates how a combination of the workings of the global political economy of 
neoliberal capitalism and national factors influence the farming industry in Northern Ireland and 
generate the conditions for environmental and social harm. The first section explores the legacy of 
an ethno-nationalist conflict, also known as the Troubles, and demonstrates its influence on the 
political economy and social development in the country. The first section also introduces the current 
administrative landscape of Northern Ireland and explains the planning framework in the country. 
An insight into planning and community participation helps to contextualise the empirical findings 
related to environmental decision-making discussed in Chapter 6. The second section provides an 
insight into the history and the current state of the farming industry in Northern Ireland. It details the 
earlier discussed GfG agri-food strategy and connects it to the dynamics of pig farming 
intensification and the current environmental impact of farming. It is suggested that the process of 
intensification will exacerbate the existing environmental harms from farming. Thus, the question of 
environmental regulation becomes more pressing; I proceed to provide a general context of 
environmental governance in Northern Ireland, linking it to the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism 
and the national context of Northern Ireland. This discussion provides an insight into the relations of 
power in environmental governance, which is explored further in relation to environmental regulation 
and planning frameworks in the context of farming. Finally, the last section discusses Brexit 
implications for both farming and environmental governance in Northern Ireland.   
3.2 Political economic and social development context 
3.2.1 Historic past and the legacy of the Troubles 
Northern Ireland is known to be divided on an ethno-national basis, with Catholic and Protestant 
cultures being polarised (Mcalister, 2010). Historically, protestant settlers from England and 
Scotland came to Northern Ireland more than 300 years ago and continue(d) to view Great Britain as 
their home, thus favouring Northern Ireland to be part of the United Kingdom (McEvoy, 2008). This 
view was (and is) in sharp contrast with the ‘native’ people of the Catholic Irish ancestry, who tended 
to identify with the Republic of Ireland (McEvoy, 2008).   
From 1921 to 1972, Northern Ireland was ruled by its own government in Stormont4. Yet, 
this rule was interrupted by the decades of bitter conflict between the Republican Irish Catholics and 
the Loyalist British Protestants that clouded Northern Ireland’s political, economic, and social 
development. Also known as the Troubles, the conflict began with a civil rights movement in the late 
1960s. The roots of the conflict are contentious – ethno-national tension, colonial ‘occupation’ by 
 
4 Parliament Buildings in Northern Ireland are often referred to as ‘Stormont’ due to their location in 
the Stormont Estate area of Belfast.  
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the British, structural inequalities experienced by nationalists, and religious divisions are all 
mentioned as the factors that contributed to fuelling of the conflict (Tonge, 2006).  Historic 
marginalisation of the Catholic population served as a background for the eruption of the civil rights 
movement (Hancock, 1998; Holloway, 2005). For instance, there were multiple revolts by the 
Catholics against their Protestant landlords (Hancock, 1998) after the British rule over Ireland 
tightened in the 16th century and land disputes remained an important issue until the 20th century. 
After the British Government implemented the Government of Ireland Bill in 1920, establishing 
Home Rule parliaments in both Southern and Northern Ireland (Holloway, 2005), marginalisation of 
the Catholic communities in the North continued and stemmed from  the issues around freedom, 
historical justice, rights, and security (Knobel, 2017).   
During the Troubles, Catholic and Protestant communities had divergent goals. Ending of 
the partition of Ireland, the removal of the British rule in Northern Ireland, and the establishment of 
an independent Irish Republic through ‘armed struggle’ were the goals of the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA). Similarly, Nationalists also advocated for a united Ireland but through peaceful means (Dixon 
and O’Kane, 2011, p.5). Loyalists, on the other hand, regarded themselves as politically, culturally, 
and religiously British and resorted to violent means to oppose Irish unity. Unionists also envisioned 
a pro-UK future and tended towards more moderate tactics to achieve this goal (Dixon and O’Kane, 
2011, p.5). The conflict resulted in 3,665 casualties.   
During the Troubles and until 2007, Northern Ireland was ruled by the UK government in 
Westminster. This period is commonly known as ‘Direct Rule’ (Mcalister, 2010). The Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA) signed and approved in 1998 aimed to accommodate Protestant and Catholic 
identities and addressed the ethno-national dimension of the conflict. Although the outbreak of 
violence ended, the ideological differences between Protestants and Catholics did not subside. 
Instead, the GFA guaranteed that the pursuit of different political, administrative, and cultural visions 
for the island of Ireland is organised in a diplomatic way, with power-sharing at its core.  
The GFA, thus, returned political power to Northern Ireland. The Agreement consolidated 
power-sharing between the two main political parties, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP — 
Unionist) and Sinn Fein (Nationalist) in the Northern Ireland Assembly (Mcalister, 2010). The 
Northern Ireland Assembly - the devolved legislature - also appeared as a result of the GFA in 1998. 
Although the UK Parliament retains absolute sovereignty, the Northern Ireland Assembly also has 
its own legislative powers. The Assembly has 90 members located in Belfast and has full legislative 
power over so-called ‘transferred matters’: education, employment, agriculture, social security, 
housing, economic development, local government, the environment, transport, and policing (Haase, 
2018). To facilitate the representation for all political parties, the regional government has been 
reorganised into departments, each with a minister in the new Executive (Mcalister, 2010). The new 
Executive consists of the Executive Office and eight departmental ministers. The Executive Office 
exercises executive authority on behalf of the Assembly, taking decisions on significant issues, and 
consists of the First Minister, deputy First Minister and two Junior Ministers. First Minister and 
deputy First Minister must represent different parties.  
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There are criticisms regarding post-GFA political development. Tonge (2006) claims that 
recognition and formalisation of unionist-nationalist divisions results in institutional chaos and 
greater polarisation. The current institutional climate has even been described as ‘more collectivised 
than Stalin’s Russia, more corporatist than Mussolini’s and more quango-ised than Wilson and 
Heath’s United Kingdom governments’ (Tonge, 2006, p. 213). Governmental departments are 
administratively and politically divided from one another as a result of prolonged demands of power 
sharing, which impedes the decision-making process and creates barriers for policy integration. 
Moreover, decision-making in general has a history of being closed and bureaucratic (Foord et al, 
2018).  
The recent government collapse evidences the political discord that exists in Northern 
Ireland. The country lacked a functioning government during the period of 2017 – 2020. The 
Assembly collapsed in January 2017. As was discussed earlier, the GFA demanded that political 
power must be shared. As a result of a green energy scheme scandal and ongoing disagreements 
between the DUP and Sinn Fein, the Deputy First Minister resigned, while the First Minister refused 
to step down. The scandal around the green energy scheme (Renewable Heat Incentive) emerged in 
2016 and its mismanagement had cost taxpayers £490 million (BBC News, 2016).  After the elections 
in March 2017, the DUP and Sinn Fein received the majority of votes but failed to reach an agreement 
to form a new government. In the absence of an Executive, the Northern Ireland Civil Service stepped 
in to take the responsibility for day-to-day administration in Northern Ireland (House of Commons, 
2018). However, the Civil Service could only make a limited amount of policy decisions in the 
absence of democratically accountable ministers (House of Commons, 2018). On January 10 2020, 
Sinn Fein and the DUP ministers have re-entered devolved government in Northern Ireland and 
supported a deal that seeks to restore Northern Irish political institutions. In the context of my 
research, the restoration of the Assembly is crucial for both the farming and environmental 
governance matters, as will be discussed later in this chapter.  
3.2.2 Administrative landscape, planning framework and public 
participation  
Northern Ireland is the smallest of the four countries that make up the UK, with a population over 
1.8 million in a total area of 14,155 km2. From an administrative perspective, the country is divided 
into eleven local government districts, which is the result of the local government reform of 2013 
(Quinlivan, 2014). The reform reduced the number of local councils from 26 to 11, which needed to 
be achieved by 2015. The respective eleven local councils are responsible for all areas of local 





Figure 3.1. Administrative geography of Northern Ireland. Source: AgendaNi (2010) 
Quinlivan (2014) suggests that the rationale behind the administrative reform was economic – it was 
believed that the reduction in the number of councils would lead to cost savings, greater efficiencies, 
and economies of scale. In addition to the economic rationale, the reform also addressed the legacy 
of the Troubles pertaining to social development. It is suggested that on the community level, mutual 
distrust and sectarianism persist (Tonge, 2006) as political reconciliation did not immediately 
translate into social reconciliation. The GFA is seen as an elite-driven compromise that did not 
achieve the much-needed shift in public attitudes (Dixon and O’Kane, 2011). Nevertheless, the desire 
to integrate the Protestant and Catholic population around more effective and accountable local 
service provision has been very strong since the restoration of the devolved government (Mcalister, 
2010). Planning is one of the areas that aimed to address the intersection of integration and effective 
service provision.  Additionally, planning is reported to play a major role in delivering sustainable 
development.  For example, planning should ensure that development (including its type, design, and 
location) achieves social, economic, and environmental goals (Friends of the Earth NI, 2006). The 
reconciliation of the three goals is particularly crucial in a society transitioning from peace to conflict 
(Blair et al, 2007).  For my research, planning presents the context where environmental decision-
making regarding the new pig farms plays out. Institutional arrangements related to planning in 
Northern Ireland differ from other parts of the UK.  
The main legislation document for planning is the Planning (Northern Ireland) Act 2011 
(2011 Planning Act) that was designed to manage development in a sustainable fashion and protect 
future economic and development needs. It divides the planning responsibilities between local 
councils and the Department for Infrastructure. Local councils are responsible for local and major 
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developments, while the Department is responsible for regionally significant developments, council 
oversight and planning legislation development. The reform intended that the local representatives 
would become the decision-makers on the majority of planning applications and develop their new 
local development plan functions (Department of the Environment, 2009). Indeed, according to the 
Planning Portal (n.d.), the councils are responsible for a wide range of issues, such as local 
development planning, development management, and planning enforcement. However, 
downloading responsibility to the local level also echoes the neoliberal shifting of the focus of 
responsibility from governments to communities (Novek, 2003), which begs the question of whether 
the local representatives are prepared for the responsibility given to them.   
The 2011 Planning Act also placed a significant emphasis on engaging communities in the 
planning system. The aim of Community Planning is to ensure that people and communities are 
genuinely engaged in decisions made about the public services which affect them (Cave, 2013) and 
possess the power to hold the government accountable for the provision of these services (Knox and 
Carmichael, 2015). According to Mcalister (2010), active promotion of public involvement in 
decision making is a relatively new phenomenon in Northern Ireland. During the Troubles, Direct 
Rule from Westminster did not incentivise citizen participation and participation was ‘largely defined 
in terms of a facility to react to technical plans produced by government officials’ (Mcalister 2010, 
p. 535). Community engagement is encapsulated in the Statement of Community Involvement that 
states that ‘engaging communities is an essential part of good spatial planning and for an effective 
and inclusive planning system overall’ (Department of the Environment, 2016). The most recent deal 
to restore devolved government in Northern Ireland also highlighted the importance of ‘the principles 
and practice of citizen and community engagement and co-design’ (UK Government and Irish 
Government, 2020, p. 26). Notably, citizen empowerment was identified as crucial for securing one’s 
wellbeing.  
Councils are expected to involve the community when preparing local development plans. 
Within the scope of Community Involvement, local individuals can make representations on planning 
applications and planning appeals, participate in the preparation of development plans and other 
policy documents, and report breaches of planning control (nidirect, 2018). Community members 
interested in a planning application and the supporting documents behind it can view them online on 
the Planning Portal. The Planning Portal allows anyone to comment on a planning application or 
object to the planning development, and the Statement of Community Involvement states that ‘all 
comments will be fully considered’ (Department of the Environment, 2016, p.9). Regionally 
significant developments and major developments are subject to consultation with the community, 
thus ensuring that the community is actively involved both at an early stage of development and 
throughout the process (Department of the Environment, 2014). For regionally significant 
development applications, a public local inquiry might be held (Department of the Environment, 
2016). For major developments, early stage community involvement is organised through pre-
application community consultation. Pre-application community consultation involves a public event 
advertised in the local press where local communities can learn more about the proposed 
61 
 
development. Applicants for major development projects are also advised to engage with local 
community and environmental groups, individual residents, businesses in the vicinity of the site, etc. 
(Department of the Environment, 2014). A community consultation process should ensure that 
people have access to information about a prospective development and ‘have an active role in 
developing proposals and options to ensure local knowledge and perspectives are taken into account’ 
(Department of the Environment, 2014, p. 2). The comments made by the community form the basis 
of the Pre-Application Community Consultation Report, where applicants for major development 
projects detail how they responded to the comments made by the community, including changes and 
mitigation measures to address community concerns. Additionally, the council engages with 
residents occupying buildings on land adjoining the application site boundary and residents within 
90 metres of the application site (Department of the Environment, 2016) – such residents can respond 
to neighbour notifications within 14 days.    
As shown in the previous chapter, meaningful consideration of the public views is an 
essential element of recognitional and procedural justice. Yet, consultation as a means towards it has 
been subject to critique (Lee and Abbot, 2003; Heydon, 2018). Walker et al. (2006) suggest that 
consultation does little for opening up decision space and addressing power inequalities. 
Furthermore, Morison (2017) even labels consultation anti-democratic (as it privileges one set of 
voices and excludes others) and anti-political (as the aggregative approach at its core does little to 
contribute to pluralist debate or disagreement). Bringing up Arnstein’s ladder of participation 
discussed in the previous chapter, Morison (2017) concludes that public consultation allows limited 
participation and safeguards the existing power imbalance without an assurance that any change will 
follow.  
Furthermore, lack of third-party right of appeal that allows community members to challenge 
a planning decision (Friends of the Earth NI, 2006; Northern Ireland Assembly, 2016) in Northern 
Ireland further reinforces the imbalance of power in the realm of public participation. After the 
decision is made, community members cannot appeal against it as only applicants have the right to 
appeal against a refusal of a planning permission, or against conditions which have been imposed on 
a planning permission.  In the case of the applicant appealing the negative decision, community 
members have the right to communicate their comments to the local Council. These comments must 
be taken into consideration by the Planning Appeals Commission (nidirect, n.d.). The only avenue 
of objection available to community members is a Judicial Review, which is a process of reviewing 
the lawfulness of a decision made or action taken by a public body in court. Judicial Reviews are 
reported to be very expensive in terms of costs and staff resources: while the Costs Protection (Aarhus 
Convention) Regulations (NI) 2013 reportedly makes it easier for individuals and communities to 
challenge decisions in environmental matters, protected costs orders recoverable from an applicant 
are nevertheless £5,000 if the applicant is an individual, and £10,000 in all other cases (Planning NI, 
n.d.). Judicial Reviews may take place on the grounds of unlawfulness, irrationality, and procedural 
impropriety/unfairness (Planning NI, n.d.). It is important to understand that a Judicial Review is not 
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an appeal: the court examines how a public body reached its decision rather than the merits of the 
actual decision itself (Public Interest Litigation Support, 2012).   
Mcalister (2010) suggests that community participation can be difficult to implement, 
considering the novelty of the terms such as inclusive and participatory democracy in the Northern 
Irish context. It is also reported that commitment to community involvement often appears to be a 
tokenistic gesture – Mcalister (2010) demonstrates that in the case of Northern Ireland the views of 
the public are often disregarded by the planning authorities and the members of the public risk being 
perceived either as passive observers or troublemakers. Even though communities are formally 
involved in planning, they might still feel marginalised in this process. The scholars analysing the 
implementation of community planning in Scotland and England echo Mcalister’s conclusions. 
Pemberton and Lloyd (2011) suggest that community involvement is much more complex in practice 
than in theory. Cowell (2004, p. 514) concurs, stating that involvement of local communities in 
planning ‘faces all of the long-standing challenges of participatory democracy – around 
representation, inclusion and empowerment – but with the added complication of a partnership 
governance setting’. Additionally, Sinclair (2011) echoes Morison’s (2017) concerns regarding 
public consultation outlined above and concludes that community engagement might not shift the 
balance of power, as it exists in tension with the practical demands of policymaking. The latter is 
particularly germane in the case of Northern Ireland where its economy, pressured by the challenges 
of global political economy of capitalism (Blair et al, 2007) demands that policymaking is oriented 
towards economic growth. These criticisms fit neatly with the above-discussed idea of sustainability 
in planning. Raco (2014, p. 42) suggests that inspirations for sustainability reproduce a wider set of 
agendas in capitalism; its promises of community empowerment masks the fact that government 
power ‘has been reduced and replace by hybrids of state regulators and private corporations’.  
This section introduced political economic and social development contexts in Northern 
Ireland and demonstrated the manner in which the ethno-nationalist conflict has affected and 
continues to affect all spheres of life. Having described the administrative landscape in the country, 
this section paid particular attention to the planning arrangements to contextualise environmental 
decision-making around new intensive pig farms. It critically analysed the idea of formal community 
participation, both in the light of the legacy of the Troubles and the country’s embeddedness in the 
political economy of capitalism, thus invoking the previously developed discussion around the 
marginalisation of individuals in the processes of decision-making.   The next section introduces a 
more detailed analysis of farming in Northern Ireland, especially in the context of the GfG strategy. 
3.3 Farming in Northern Ireland 
3.3.1 Historical and present context 
Continuing the discussion developed in Chapter 1, I discuss the historical significance of farming in 
Northern Ireland, the industry’s clout in policymaking, and the historical roots of the intensification 
trend. The current structure of policymaking in the sector is also discussed.   
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Haase (2018) asserts that the agricultural industry features among the main strengths of 
Northern Ireland. Indeed, agriculture and farming have been central to the Northern Irish economy 
since the inception of the state in 1921 (O’Kane, 2011). Ulster Farmers’ Union (UFU), currently the 
main industry lobbying body, was formed earlier in 1917 to represent the interests of farmers. Later, 
in 1929, the Young Farmers’ Club of Ulster was founded to foster young people’s interest in farming. 
Preceding the Second World War, almost half of the population lived in the countryside and 
agriculture was the largest and most economically successful industry. The end of the war heralded 
the rapid mechanisation, standardisation, and centralisation of farming, although farms remained 
small in scale and less well-equipped than those of the rest of the United Kingdom (Greer, 1996). 
The Ministry of Agriculture actively promoted the idea of farming as a business or an applied science, 
suggesting that ‘in business language, the land is the farmer’s factory, it must be maintained in a state 
of high efficiency if farming is to continue to be prosperous’ (O’Kane, 2011, p. 109). Intensive 
production in most sectors was applauded and actively supported. Many farmers were reluctant to 
embrace new changes and the UFU did not provide the support they needed. In the post-war period, 
the UFU, rather than being a farmer representation body, sided closely with the Unionist Party and 
its membership was strongest among Protestant farmers (Greer, 1996). Consequently, its interests 
often clashed with those not affiliated with the association. Nevertheless, the UFU played a ‘vital 
intermediary role in regulating rural society’ (Greer, 1996, p.123). The United Kingdom joined the 
European Community in 1973, which portended the transformation of agricultural policy. Farmers’ 
interests were further consolidated, and policy continued to be forged by a small number of 
institutions that favoured farmers (Greer, 1996). Expansionist policy that focused on intensive 
production prevailed (Greer, 1996). However, in 1983 public attitudes towards farming shifted, as 
more awareness about public, environmental and animal health was raised. Policymakers heeded the 
shift and attempted to put an end to agricultural expansion. Nevertheless, the ethos of expansionism 
persisted: restrictions in production did not bring the ‘reversal from high input/ high output, 
technology based, intensive farming’ (Greer, 1996, p. 33).   
Presently, Northern Ireland’s Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs 
(DAERA) is a department in the Northern Ireland Executive primarily responsible for agriculture, 
food, farming, and environmental and sustainability policy. It also assumes responsibility for rural 
development to administer the Rural Development Programme (Creamer et al, 2017). DAERA 
provides business development services, veterinary services for the administration of animal welfare 
and education services at the College of Agriculture, Food and Rural Enterprise (CAFRE) (DAERA, 
2019). DAERA is responsible to the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA) in Great Britain for the administration of schemes affecting the whole of the United 
Kingdom and oversees the application of European Union agricultural, environmental, fisheries and 
rural development policy in Northern Ireland (DAERA, 2019). The Northern Ireland Environment 
Agency (NIEA) carries out its work within the DAERA (the latter is crucial for environmental 
governance of farming and will be discussed later in this chapter). The next section details the GfG 
agri-food strategy to continue the discussion in Chapter 1. 
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3.3.2 Going for Growth 
In 2011-2015 Programme for Government, the Northern Irish Executive committed to developing a 
strategy for expanding the country’s agri-food sector in response to what was perceived as a growth 
in demand for Northern Irish food products (Attorp and McAreavey, 2020). Following that, what 
was formerly known as the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD), the 
Department of Trade and Investment (DETI), and Invest NI worked to set up an Agri-Food Strategy 
Board (AFSB) responsible for developing this strategy. The Board was appointed for an initial tenure 
of three years from 2012, which was extended for an additional two years in February 2015 (Attorp 
and McAreavey, 2020).  
The components of the GfG strategy were described in the 2013 report ‘Going for Growth: 
A Strategic Action Plan in Support of the Northern Ireland Agri-food Industry’ (AFSB, 2013). GfG 
aimed to expand supply, secure global markets and reduce costs by ‘industry, Government and the 
wider stakeholder base, working together’ (AFSB, 2013, p. 11). Its priorities included agri-food 
exports, with an intention to grow sales outside Northern Ireland by seventy-five percent (AFSB, 
2013, p. 11), and encouragement of economies of scale at producer and processor levels executed 
through government-led incentives. The latter implied incentivising ‘larger, more diversified farm 
units across Northern Ireland, with lower production costs, higher productivity and higher 
environmental and welfare standards, enabling the promotion of a stronger, more profitable 
product’ (Montgomery, 2015, p. 8). GfG demanded significant government action; out of 118 
recommendations, only 17 were the sole responsibility of industry and GfG authors asked for a 
government investment of £400 million over three years (in contrast with an industry investment of 
£1.3 million) (Attorp and McAreavey, 2020). 
The majority of the GfG report's recommendations benefitted corporate farming industry 
actors; GfG is reported to have concentrated power with corporate actors as many of its benefits were 
directed towards large corporations (in particular, food processing companies), rather than primary 
producers (Attorp and McAreavey, 2020). The composition of AFSB was emblematic of this power 
imbalance; it was chaired by then a Director at Moy Park (one of Europe's largest poultry producers) 
and other members included six representatives from some of NI's biggest agri-food businesses, two 
former presidents of the UFU, one representative from Invest NI, three government officials, and one 
accountant (AFSB, 2017). GfG placed an emphasis on growth within specific sectors, notably the 
pig and poultry. The next section discusses the trends in pig farming in Northern Ireland, both in the 
context of GfG and beyond.  
3.3.3 Trends in pig farming in Northern Ireland 
Pig production became more intensive in the post-war period, and up to 1972 it was the most 
important branch of the Northern Irish agricultural industry (Greer, 1996). Once the country entered 
the European Community, the number of pigs declined as the supplies of imported cheap feed were 
cut off (Greer, 1996). Another factor that significantly influenced pig production in Northern Ireland 
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in the 1990s was a fire in the country’s largest processing plant in 1998 that caused a recession in the 
pig market (AHDB, 2013). The recession caused a sharp decline in pig herd sizes. The chart below 
illustrates this: 
 
Figure 3.2. Northern Ireland pig numbers. Source: AHDB (2013) 
It might be assumed that the ambition behind the above described GfG agri-food strategy contributes 
to the desire to revive the pork industry after the recession of 1998. However, as mentioned before, 
the revival of the industry is organised through farm concentration and production intensification.   
To analyse farm concentration, it is essential to consider farm numbers and farm types. 
According to the Agricultural Census in Northern Ireland in 2019 (DAERA, 2020), the total number 
of farms was 24,827. The Census suggests that the overall trend is downward, with farm numbers 
having decreased by 10 percent over the 15-year period from 2004. A look at the earlier Census 
evidences the same downward trend – there used to be 40,724 farms in 1981 (DAERA, 2018). The 




















Figure 3.3. Number of farms 1981-2019. Source: DAERA (2020) 
In addition to an overall farm number decrease, there is a decrease in the number of small farms. Out 
of the total number of farms in 2019, 19,177 were very small and small farms5 (DAERA, 2020). The 
small size of farms is often presented as a challenge for farm profitability (Allen, 2016). DAERA 
(2020) attributes the decrease in the number of small farms to the encouragement of larger scale 
production to minimise costs and maintain farm income, which was epitomised in the GfG strategy. 
A closer scrutiny of the farm types in pigs farming reveals the same trend:  
 
 
Figure 3.4. Farm types in pig farming. Source: DAERA (2012, 2016, 2018, 2020)6 
 
5 Farms are classified into different sizes according to the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) 
workers. Very small farms have 0.5-1 FTE on a part-time basis, small farms have 1-2 FTE on a full-
time basis, medium farms have 2-3 FTE on a full-time basis, large farms have 3-5 FTE on a full-time 
basis, very large farms have more than 5 FTE on a full-time basis.  
6 It is important to emphasise that prior to 2011, the data regarding farm types combined pigs and 
poultry in one category; consequently, the number of very small/small/medium/large pig farms alone 










Year 2011 Year 2015 Year 2017 Year 2019
Farm types in pig farming
Very small farms Small farms Medium farms Large farms
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In 2011, there were 63 very small farms, 33 small farms, 31 medium farms and 57 large pig farms 
(DAERA, 2012); in 2015, there were 55 very small farms, 28 small farms, 37 medium farms and 65 
large pig farms (DAERA, 2016); in 2017, there were 54 very small farms, 24 small farms, 31 medium 
farms and 72 large pig farms (DAERA, 2018); finally, in 2019, there were 49 very small farms, 20 
small farms, 27 medium farms and 65 large pig farms (DAERA, 2020).  
Therefore, the number of very small and small farms is decreasing. The most recent Census 
confirms this sentiment, stating that most pigs are concentrated in relatively few farms (DAERA, 
2020). Moreover, it is emphasised that ‘a small number of large, highly productive businesses, drive 
most of the change in the [pig] sector’ (DAERA, 2018). Consequently, in addition to farm 
concentration, there is a trend for intensification of production. The chart below demonstrates that 
the average numbers of pigs on a farm have been gradually increasing:  
 
 
Figure 3.5. Average livestock numbers. Source: Playfair (2018) 
The upward trend is particularly visible since the adoption of the above-mentioned GfG strategy. The 
chart below demonstrates that the average size of pig farms in Northern Ireland has become much 




Figure 3.6. Average size of livestock enterprises. Source: Playfair (2018) 
The GfG strategy aimed to grow external sales by fifty-seven percent and sow herd numbers by forty 
percent up to 53,000 by 2020 (AFSB, 2013). While sow herd numbers are still far from this goal, 
total pig numbers have increased significantly: since its adoption in 2012, the total number of pigs 

















Figure 3.8. Total pigs 2015-2019. Source: DAERA (2020) 
The pig farming sector has been labelled as more efficient and profitable than other farming sectors. 
Farm income in Northern Ireland in some sectors of production is closely linked with direct support 
from subsidies. The Northern Ireland Affairs Committee publication from the UK Parliament states 
that farmers in Northern Ireland receive, on average, higher levels of direct support through the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) than farmers in other areas of the UK. Yet, the amount of support 
received varies in different sectors of production, and not all sectors are reliant on direct support 
(DAERA, 2018, p. 16). Pig farming, unlike other farming sectors, is not characterised by high 
reliance on Direct Payments administered through the CAP (Allen, 2016). In 2016/17, farm business 
incomes without direct payments amounted to £58,673 per farm, with direct payments constituting 
just a fraction - £14,387 (DAERA, 2018). DAERA’s figures show that, on average, Direct Payments 
to pig farms equate to just twenty-five percent of their Farm Business Income (DAERA, 2018, p. 
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16). In 2016/17, pig sector incomes were the highest among all sectors (excluding poultry) and its 
Farm Business Income increased by £42,617 from 2015/16, which is drastically higher than increases 
in other sectors (DAERA, 2018): 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Farm Business Income. Source: DAERA (2018) 
The latter might be related to the fact that the output (the total sales) increased due to better global 
prices for pork, while the costs of inputs (resources used in the production process) went down during 
that time. Observation of input/output ratios during the last decade below uses the data from Farm 




Figure 3.10. Pig farming: input-output-profit. Source: my own, using Farm Incomes in Northern 
Ireland 2004-2016 
 
As a result of their larger size, pig farms also require more capital to continue to function (£27,946 
per hectare in 2016/17) (DAERA, 2018), which is explained by the fact that pig farms operate an 
intensive enterprise on a small area of land. As a result, the level of investment in pig farms was also 
the highest among other sectors in 2016/17: £23,777 per farm (DAERA, 2018), which corresponds 
to the high levels of cash income in the sector mentioned above.  
To sum up, there is evidence of farm concentration and production intensification in pig 
farming and the sector’s economic success may be attributed to these trends. Pig farming is different 
to other meat production sectors in Northern Ireland: it is not dependent on the Direct Payments and 
is characterised by high levels of income. The trends for concentration and intensification are 
particularly observable since the adoption of the industry-led GfG agri-food strategy in 2012, which 
aimed to consolidate the ethos of economic growth in meat production and increase national pork 
production levels. Considering the sector’s successful development and importance for the GfG, pig 
farming provides a suitable case for analysing power relations that support and reinforce the 
environmentally harmful phenomenon of intensification. The next subsection considers the existing 
toll farming takes on the environment in Northern Ireland, which will likely be exacerbated as pig 
farming continues to intensify.  
3.3.4 Environmental impact of farming in Northern Ireland 
The Northern Irish environment boasts exceptional biodiversity (more than 20,000 different species 
of flora and fauna, with half of them found in the seas) and richness (more than 1,600 lakes, including 
the largest freshwater lake in the UK) (Cave, 2016). However, the Northern Irish landscape has also 
been described as ‘intensely farmed’, with only one percent of the land being organically managed 
(Purdy and Hjerp, 2016). As a result, some environmental problems can be attributed to the 
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farming industry has been expanding and the expansion is reported to have adverse environmental 
consequences. It is important to emphasise that the summary below does not focus solely on the 
impacts of pig farming but addresses the environmental impact of farming in general.   
Per capita average ammonia emissions for the country are over four times that of the other 
UK nations (DAERA, 2019). Twelve percent of total UK ammonia emissions originate in Northern 
Ireland. This is disproportionate to both Northern Ireland’s population (three percent of the UK total) 
and its land area (six percent of the UK total) (Friends of the Earth NI, 2018). Agriculture is the main 
culprit of ammonia emissions (ninety-three percent in 2016) (DAERA and NIEA, 2018). It is 
documented that emissions from livestock have increased by seven and four tenths percent since 
2001, which compares with a two and nine tenths percent decrease for the UK as a whole over the 
same period (DAERA and NIEA, 2018). Ammonium in particle form is also a transboundary 
pollutant, meaning that it can travel between countries and have an impact beyond Northern Ireland. 
To comply with the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution and the National 
Emissions Ceilings Directive, reductions in ammonia levels are urgently needed:   
 
 
Figure 3.11. Ammonia reductions required. Source: DAERA (2018) 
 
It is reported that in Northern Ireland ammonia emissions are geographically clustered around areas 
with high densities of intensive livestock farms (Friends of the Earth NI, 2018). Ammonia emitted 
into the air is subsequently deposited as nitrogen onto land and water. According to DAERA (2019), 
most of Northern Ireland, including designated sites and other priority habitats, has levels of nitrogen 
which are significantly above their ‘critical load’, i.e. the concentration at which significant 
ecological damage occurs. For instance, critical levels of ammonia from animal manure are exceeded 
at ninety percent of the protected habitats in Northern Ireland (DAERA, 2019). Excessive nitrogen 
can lead to significant biodiversity loss – it is estimated that forty-five percent of the plant species 
extinctions occurring in the UK between 1987 and 1999 were associated with increased nitrogen 
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availability (DAERA, 2019). Grasslands, heathlands, bogs, and dune systems are particularly 
sensitive to excessive nitrogen (DAERA, 2019).    
Nutrient loading and subsequent water pollution present another problem associated with 
farming expansion. If nitrogen is deposited in large amounts, soils, streams, and lakes become acidic 
and aquatic biodiversity can be adversely affected (Friends of the Earth NI, 2019). According to the 
NIEA’s 2016 Northern Ireland Nitrates Article 10 Report, agriculture is the largest source of nitrogen 
discharges to surface water. The latest available data concerning the state of water bodies in Northern 
Ireland is from 2015.  According to it, just one third of monitored river waterbodies were of at least 
a good standard in 2015 and only five out of 21 lakes achieved a good standard in 2015 (DAERA 
and NIEA, 2018). In contrast, in 2005-07, seventy-five percent of river water bodies in Northern 
Ireland were classified as ‘good’ or ‘very good’ in terms of chemical indicators of ecological river 
quality and ten out of twenty-one lakes were in good condition in 2004 (this number went down to 
six in 2007) (Department of the Environment, 2009). The rest of the water bodies were classified as 
eutrophic or hypertrophic. Eutrophication is the process of enrichment of waters by inorganic 
nutrients that results in the increased production of algae and/or other aquatic plants, affecting the 
quality of the water and disturbing the ecological state of water systems (DAERA, 2019). Nutrients 
include substances such as phosphorous and nitrogen and can be found in farm inputs such as 
fertilisers and animal feed. According to Friends of the Earth NI (2018), the amount of nitrogen 
contained in animal feed had also increased, by ten percent from 2011. Pollution from nutrients 
presents a long-term concern, as many factors affect their travelling speed from the initial release 
into groundwater, and occasionally it can be decades before they discharge into freshwater (Northern 
Ireland Fresh Water Taskforce, 2018).   
Manure storage and manure land application present another concern. Forty-four percent of 
ammonia emissions in Northern Ireland originate from manure spreading (thirty-four percent) and 
manure storage (ten percent). For the pig sector specifically, if the GfG strategy’s target to have 
53,000 sows in Northern Ireland by 2020 materialised, it would have resulted in 1,100,000 tonnes of 
slurry per year (Farms Not Factories, 2018). As I stated in Chapter 1, manure land application results 
in odour and produces microbes that can negatively affect human health and wellbeing. 
Additionally, ammonia emitted from the livestock manure mixes with other pollutants in the 
atmosphere, creating small particles known as particulate matter. Particulate matter is associated with 
human health impacts – it can be harmful to the lungs when inhaled (DAERA, 2019). According to 
the recent investigation from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (2019), halving ammonia 
emissions in the UK could prevent at least 3,000 premature deaths from air pollution a year. 
To summarise, the existing environmental challenges in Northern Ireland are substantial and 
it can be assumed that a rising number of intensive pig farms will further exacerbate these 
environmental harms. Therefore, the question of environmental regulation becomes yet more 
important; below I analyse the general context of environmental governance in Northern Ireland and 




3.4 Environmental governance in Northern Ireland 
3.4.1 Legacy of the Troubles 
Before discussing environmental governance, it is important to highlight the impact of the 
Troubles for environmental regulation. The relationship between environmental degradation and 
violent conflicts has been receiving more criminological attention (Brisman, 2007; Lasslett, 2014; 
Leebaw, 2014). Transition to peace is characterised by internal divisions, widespread perceptions of 
illegitimacy and can also direct the majority of resources into peace-making initiatives. Moreover, 
regulatory and accountability mechanisms designed to protect the environment and social wellbeing 
may be absent or in their infancy, making transition regimes more likely to support criminogenic 
patterns (Loewenstein, 2017).  Echoing Loewenstein’s conclusion, environmental protection has 
been consistently de-prioritised in Northern Ireland in comparison with the issues of security and 
criminal justice (Barry, 2009). Yet, considering the rich natural heritage of the country, concerns 
about environmental governance have been ever present. In 1990, the House of Commons 
Environment Select Committee shone the spotlight on environmental degradation and encouraged 
reforms (Purdy and Hjerp, 2016). However, the termination of the Troubles did not make such 
reforms a priority and the belief that the violent past somehow justifies substandard environmental 
protection regulation became more entrenched (Birnie and Hitchens, 1998). Yet, the apathy about 
environmental governance is becoming rather difficult to justify twenty years after the end of the 
Troubles (Brennan et al, 2017).  
The Northern Ireland Act of 1998 did not oblige the Northern Ireland Executive to promote 
sustainable development or consider all policy in relation to its impact on sustainable development. 
Reports demanding the urgent recalibration of environmental governance appeared (Macrory, 2004; 
Purdy and Hjerp, 2016). Moreover, there have been repeated calls from the government to put 
environmental affairs on the agenda as multiple investigations have been conducted stressing the 
problems with environmental governance in the country since the early 1990s (Brennan et al, 2019)7. 
Despite this, environmental governance in Northern Ireland remains problematic and is affected by 
deeper structural problems, which creates a favourable climate for environmental and social harm. 
Further elaboration is needed on the regulatory contexts of environmental regulation in Northern 
Ireland to discuss these structural problems.   
3.4.2 Environmental regulation – general context 
As a result of the Stormont House Agreement in 2014, the functions delivered by the Department of 
the Environment have been transferred to the Department for Communities (DfC), Department for 
Infrastructure (DfI) and Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA). As I 
 
7 For instance, the former Environment Minister remarked that the Environment Agency was not fit 
for purpose (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2013) and later another Environment Minister advocated 
for a radical review of environmental governance models (Moore, 2015). 
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stated before, the Northern Ireland Environment Agency (NIEA) carries out the bulk of regulatory 
activities relating to the environment as an executive agency within a central government department, 
DAERA (Brennan et al, 2017; Purdy and Hjerp, 2016). NIEA aims ‘to create prosperity and well-
being through effective environment and heritage management and regulation’ (Purdy and Hjerp, 
2016, p. 46). Its key objectives are to deliver effective compliance with and implementation of 
legislation and international obligations; improve understanding and appreciation of the 
environment; support a sustainable economy; and deliver reformed and effective planning.  
However, some authors claim that the environment is at risk in Northern Ireland (Purdy and 
Hjerp, 2016). Policy decisions made by the Northern Irish government are reported to have had a 
negative environmental impact, including issues such as ‘resistance to making political commitments 
relating to climate change, ineffective policy-making surrounding mineral extraction, policies that 
have failed to protect important natural resources, policy proposals with the potential to erode public 
participation in environmental decision-making and planning decisions that have resulted in damage 
to important natural (and cultural) heritage sites’ (Brennan et al, 2017, p. 131).  
The existing environmental regulation frameworks are disjointed and outdated and there 
exists no overarching strategy regarding the environment (Brennan et al, 2017). The absence of the 
overarching strategy might be linked to the lack of political leadership with regards to environmental 
governance (Purdy and Hjerp, 2016; Foord et al, 2018). As it was mentioned above, the Department 
of the Environment was dissolved and decision-making over the environment was transferred to other 
departments. Claims have been made that those departments currently responsible for environmental 
regulation possess no specialist expertise in environmental affairs (Purdy and Hjerp, 2016). 
Additionally, there are concerns that as a result of the dissolution of the Department of the 
Environment, environmental affairs will be eclipsed by agricultural interests; Simila (2017) suggests 
that if an environment authority is merged with an agricultural authority, the outcome may be that 
the promotion of agricultural production becomes dominant and environmental interest subordinate. 
The dissolution paints a distorted picture of environmental affairs as a predominantly rural issue 
(Turner, 2007). As a result, as the next section will show, environmental enforcement is known to be 
notoriously weak in the regulation of agricultural activities (Purdy and Hjerp, 2016).  
The challenges in the political context described in the beginning of the chapter also have an 
impact on environmental governance (Turner, 2007). The culture of high centralisation and 
unaccountability during the conflict caused a sharp drop in the public levels of trust in the government 
and its ability to regulate key environmental matters (Turner, 2007). Moreover, compared to other 
devolved governments, the Northern Ireland Assembly remains less concerned about environmental 
justice (Barry, 2009). Environmental justice appears to be very relevant in the Northern Irish context 
because of the implications of the Troubles (Turner, 2007).  The legacy of the conflict explains high 
levels of social deprivation. The solution to it is problematic as the country’s frantic efforts to rebuild 
the economy and identify GDP boosts other than agriculture diminish the importance of economic 
development’s distribution of harms and benefits (Turner, 2007).  
76 
 
In addition to environmental affairs not being a policy-making priority, it has also been 
claimed that compliance with environmental regulations has been persistently weak in Northern 
Ireland (Purdy and Hjerp, 2016). As a result of the Troubles, the Northern Irish legislature has been 
pressured to keep up-to-speed with the EU environmental standards. Yet, Northern Ireland lacks a 
legislative framework for environmental protection designed specifically for the country’s context, 
which complicates the implementation of the EU legislation and its subsequent practice (Brennan et 
al, 2017). While environmental protection legislation has been gradually introduced, it happened 
belatedly. Cumbersome decision-making processes affected the implementation of a backlog of 
environmental EU directives (Barry, 2009). Brennan et al (2018, p.17) suggest that the devolved 
government in Northern Ireland ‘has seemed impervious to the background political pressure exerted 
via EU membership to deliver effective environmental protection’.  
Moreover, concerns have been raised that Northern Ireland may be breaching four EU 
environmental directives - the Nitrates Directive, Safe Storage of Metallic Mercury Wastes Directive, 
Wild Birds Directive, and Marine Strategy Framework Directive, and also might not be complying 
with several of the air pollution directives (Purdy and Hjerp, 2016). The country has also struggled 
with the correct application of certain environment laws, which is apparent in the six ongoing cases 
brought by the European Commission on the grounds of breaches of EU environmental legislation: 
Water Framework Directive, Waste Framework Directive, Habitats Directive, Strategic 
Environmental Assessment Directive, Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and Urban Waste 
Water Treatment Directive (Purdy and Hjerp, 2016).   
The current environmental enforcer, NIEA, has a catalogue of enforcement failures, 
compromising its reputation.  Criticism revolves around its fragmented internal structure, the lack of 
internal legal team, and problems related to the prosecution of environmental crime (Brennan et al, 
2017). Lack of an integrated approach and communications between different NIEA teams creates a 
scenario where grave harms slip through the cracks of regulation (Brennan et al, 2017).  Additionally, 
NIEA does not have many strong links with other agencies and its insularity might affect the level 
of priority currently given to the environmental issues. Lack of in-house lawyers is also not in line 
with NIEA’s strategic objectives and is in sharp contrast with other UK countries. NIEA’s 
positioning within DAERA is not beneficial for that – DAERA also lacks a legal core, resulting in 
insufficient embedding of regulation into the departmental culture (Brennan et al, 2017). 
Consequently, NIEA’s enforcement role is diminished.   
NIEA’s approach to prosecutions of environmental crime has also been called into question. 
Brennan (2013) demonstrates that NIEA opts for ‘easy wins’ and does not always prosecute when it 
should. However, when NIEA does decide to prosecute, sentences tend to fall far below the 
maximum penalties and far below the penalties imposed in other countries in the UK (Brennan, 
2013). Currently the penalties imposed do not provide an adequate deterrent for environmental 
misconduct and the sanctions are too weak. As a result, Northern Ireland is characterised by a culture 
whereby it is acceptable to ‘cut corners’ and ‘bend the rules’ (Purdy and Hjerp, 2016, p. 30). Northern 
Ireland is well behind the rest of the UK in its ability to have an effective programme of 
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environmental sanctions (Purdy and Hjerp, 2016). Penalties are applied through the criminal justice 
framework, while other countries in the UK have experimented with a wider range of sanctions. 
Finally, Northern Irish courts are out of touch with environmental justice principles such as the 
‘polluter pays’ principle because of the continuous focus on the civil disorder in the past (Turner, 
2007).  
The above may be partly explained by the fact that Northern Ireland has a general disregard 
towards bodies that monitor environmental performance (Brennan et al, 2017). The epitome of this 
disregard is the above-mentioned absence of an independent environmental protection agency 
(IEPA). One of the rationales behind an IEPA (which is in place in all other parts of the UK and 
Ireland) is to prevent political interference in regulatory decision-making and have a regulatory body 
whose decision-making is motivated by environmental protection rather than other factors (Brennan 
et al, 2017). Yet, Purdy and Hjerp (2016) point at the evidence of political interference in 
environmental decision-making in Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland’s largest political party - the 
DUP - has persistently halted debates around the issue of an IEPA. Their focus on economic 
development and the need to appease their electorate benefitting from lax regulation are suggested 
to be the reasons for their anti-IEPA stance (Brennan et al, 2017). Loewenstein (2017) and Spapens 
et al (2018) state that post-conflict countries often employ discourses of economic development and 
reconstruction. The government is more likely to support business than environmental legislation 
when the economy is doing poorly (Kamieniecki, 2006), therefore putting environmental integrity 
and wellbeing of local communities in peril. Additionally, the farming community have been strongly 
opposed to the creation of the independent agency because of fears of a stricter regulatory style and 
beliefs that such an agency will profit from fines for environmental misconduct (Purdy and Hjerp, 
2016). As I will demonstrate later in my thesis, lack of state intervention in regulation results in the 
economic actors’ efforts to ‘own the problem’ and advocate for self-regulation (White, 2008). This 
instance of what is labelled as the neoliberal assault on environmental regulation (Faber, 2008; 
Czarnezki and Fiedler, 2016) is premised on the ability of the industry to gain control over the 
political actors and therefore have the authority over environmental agencies and environmental 
regulation.  
With the recent arrival of a deal to restore devolved government in Northern Ireland, the 
position on the IEPA appears to be shifting. There is a proposal to establish an IEPA to oversee the 
work in relation to the strategic approach to climate change (UK Government and Irish Government, 
2020). It is yet to be seen how these propositions will be acted upon by the newly restored Assembly. 
For instance, the Agriculture and Environment Minister appeared lukewarm on the idea of an IEPA, 
claiming that there already existed a significant degree of independence in the current NIEA (BBC 
News, 2020).  
To conclude, it is evident that environmental governance in Northern Ireland is flawed. The 
environment is not a policy-making priority and policy decisions take place in the context where the 
environment is largely regarded as an obstacle on the way to a more productive and prosperous 
economy (Purdy and Hjerp, 2016), thus exacerbating tension between growth-oriented capitalist 
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economy and transformation towards sustainable ecology (White, 2011). Furthermore, 
environmental regulation is compromised due to the evidence of non-compliance and weak 
enforcement. Both the lack of an IEPA and political interference in environmental decision-making 
provide an insight into the relations of power in the environmental governance context. Resistance 
against the environmental regulation illustrates how the state shapes an institutional framework that 
economic actors advocating for market fundamentalism ultimately rely on to guarantee an 
uninterrupted continuation of the neoliberal project (Slobodian, 2018). The weakness of 
environmental legislation and marginalisation of environmental affairs create a ‘perfect landscape 
for neoliberalism and economic activities’ (Barak, 2015, p. 8); the adoption of GfG and the ongoing 
farming intensification are embedded in this landscape. The next subsection scrutinises the 
environmental regulation of farming in Northern Ireland.   
3.4.3 Environmental regulation of farming 
The regulation of the farming sector is reported to be more lax in Northern Ireland because of the 
industry’s substantial financial contributions to the country’s economy (Purdy and Hjerp, 2016). 
Moreover, environmental regulation of the farming sector has been criticised for its lack of an 
integrated, cross-sector approach: it is suggested that policies are formulated without consideration 
of their interrelationship or their unintended consequences, and that better coordination is needed 
(Northern Ireland Fresh Water Taskforce, 2018). A number of regulatory measures on the EU, 
national, and local levels, and their effectiveness in addressing the environmental impacts of farming 
are reviewed below.   
3.4.3.1 EU level 
On the farmer level, pollution regulation is closely bound to the distribution of Direct Payments. 
Subsidy recipients are required to meet the EU-set requirements of Cross-Compliance and subsidies 
can be revoked if inspections find any problems. Cross-Compliance Requirements include two 
aspects: compliance with the environment, climate change, public health, animal health, plant health, 
and animal welfare regulatory requirements (Statutory Management Requirements (SMRs)) and a 
requirement to maintain land in Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition (GAEC).  The 
Northern Ireland GAEC Measures address the issues of protection and management of water, 
protection of soil and carbon stock and avoiding the deterioration of habitats (DAERA, 2018).  
Purdy and Hjerp (2016) stress that a large amount of Cross-Compliance breaches in Northern 
Ireland are linked to nitrate pollution or non-compliance with good agricultural and environmental 
practices. Although beneficial in theory, Cross-Compliance is more arcane in practice. NIEA officers 
are authorised to carry out farm inspections for Cross-Compliance and a range of environmental 
legislation (DAERA and NIEA, 2015). Yet only a small percentage of farms in Northern Ireland are 
inspected each year (Purdy and Hjerp, 2016). According to DAERA (2017), only 1,471 farms out of 
23,395 received a Cross-Compliance Inspection in 2017. The figures about how many farms are 
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annually subject to penalties in Northern Ireland are also lacking, other than data from 
whistleblowing, according to which penalties have been issued in 782 cases between 2011 and 2016 
(Purdy and Hjerp, 2016). Moreover, recently the NIEA has been seeking permission from the EU to 
allow farmers who cause low-level pollution to avoid the inspection and receive a fixed penalty 
notice or mandatory training course instead (Brennan, 2017). While this measure can alleviate 
tension between the NIEA and the farming community, it ignores cumulative impacts of pollution; 
minor incidents can add up and cause a grave problem on the national level.   
As it was shown above, eutrophication is one of the major issues for water quality in 
Northern Ireland, particularly in relation to freshwater (DAERA, 2018). While Cross-Compliance 
covers protection of water, a separate directive, the Water Framework Directive, requires Member 
States to prevent any further deterioration to the status of water bodies (DAERA, 2018). However, 
as it was also stated earlier, only a small percentage of water bodies meet the Water Framework 
Directive target of Good Ecological Status (Friends of the Earth NI, 2018).  
The Nitrates Directive, one of the earliest pieces of EU legislation for controlling pollution, 
also aims to improve water quality and promote better management of animal manures, nitrogen 
fertilizers and other nitrogen containing materials spread onto land. The Nitrates Action Programme 
(NAP) Regulations were introduced to meet the requirements of the Directive, improve the use of 
nutrients on farms and as a result improve water quality throughout Northern Ireland. All farms in 
Northern Ireland are required by law to comply with The Nitrates Action Programme Regulations 
(Northern Ireland) 2014 as well as The Phosphorus (Use in Agriculture) Regulations (Northern 
Ireland) 2014. Member States must report every four years to the European Commission on the status 
of water quality and the impact of action programmes on water quality and agricultural practices. 
Protective action within the NAP can take one of two forms. The first is designation of Nitrate 
Vulnerable Zones and the establishment of an action programme of protective measures which 
applies within the zones. The second is establishment of a ‘total territory’ approach and the 
application of an action programme to the whole of a national territory. Given the level of nutrient 
enrichment in the Northern Irish waters, and the extent of the agricultural contribution to the elevated 
nutrient concentrations, DAERA have agreed to adopt a ‘total territory’ approach to the 
implementation of the Nitrates Directive, which means that the NAP applies to all farms across 
Northern Ireland (DAERA, 2018). The action programme requires farmers to observe the rules to 
reduce nitrogen and phosphorus pollution, which include measures on storing manure and periods 
when spreading of manure and manufactured fertilizer to land is not allowed (DAERA, 2018).   
However, it is suggested that Northern Ireland offered very little support to farmers on 
nitrates, compared to England and Scotland and, as it was stated above, it is suggested that Northern 
Ireland might be breaching the Nitrates Directive (Purdy and Hjerp, 2016). According to Friends of 
the Earth NI (2018, p.9), ‘the Nitrates Action Programme has been ineffective in reducing nitrates 
emissions as it is based on ‘self-reporting’ by the potential polluter to the enforcement agency. There 
is no independent verification of the data submitted in Nutrient Management Plans in terms of neither 
the nutrient status of the soils nor the nutrient status of the organic fertiliser’. The monitoring 
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inspections by the NIEA, as it was shown above, also prove to be ineffective in ensuring compliance. 
Moreover, the new NAP for 2019-2022 increased the threshold of manure nitrogen production per 
year from 10,000 kg to 20,000 kg (DAERA, 2019), meaning that more manure can be spread on land, 
resulting in the ammonia emissions increase.   
Finally, another EU measure is the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) 
regulatory system. It employs an integrated approach to control the environmental impacts of certain 
industrial activities, including intensive farming of pigs and poultry. Its aim is to apply Best Available 
Techniques (BAT) to prevent, or reduce, emissions from these activities. In Northern Ireland, the 
IPPC Directive is implemented through the Pollution Prevention and Control Regulations (Northern 
Ireland) 2003 (‘the PPC Regulations’). PPC Regulations address issues such as ammonia emissions, 
nutrients and metals in manure/litter/slurry, effluent discharges, dust, odour, and noise. Yet, not all 
farms in Northern Ireland have to comply with the PPC Regulations, as it will be shown later in the 
Local level subsection. 
3.4.3.2 National level 
Water (NI) Order 1999 is used to deal with incidents of pollution from farming. In 2016, there were 
1,027 substantiated (confirmed) water pollution incidents, out of which 139 were of high and medium 
severity (DAERA, NIEA, 2018). Under the terms of the Water Order, NIEA may issue Notices (a 
Prevention Notice, an Enforcement Notice, a Prohibition Notice, an Anti-Pollution Works Notice) 
after which a Court Order can be applied. If enforcement action is taken, prosecution and court 
procedures are initiated. For instance, in the case of breaking the Nitrates Directive Regulations, the 
fine is up to £5,000. It is explicitly emphasised that NIEA seeks to work with farmers in a cooperative 
manner and enforcement action is seen as the last resort (DAERA, NIEA, 2015). Such approach 
echoes GfG’s calls for compliance with regulations to be enacted as partnership rather than 
prosecution (AFSB, 2013).  
As a result, a series of recommendations have been introduced to address pollution concerns. 
Pollution concerns have been featured in the Sustainable Agricultural Land Management Strategy 
for Northern Ireland that was developed in 2016, to address land management considerations related 
to the GfG. The main aim of the strategy was to identify where agricultural output can be increased 
without damaging ecosystem services delivery (DAERA, 2016). With its focus on soil management 
and improving the soil health, the strategy also shone the spotlight on the issue of agricultural 
ammonia in the Making Ammonia Visible report. The report confirmed the ammonia pollution 
concerns outlined above and introduced a series of measures to address spiking ammonia emissions: 
monitoring and communication, filling ammonia knowledge gaps, implementation of mitigation, and 
achieving behavioural change in farmers through education. However, the report explicitly stated 
that addressing of ammonia emissions will take place without contracting the size of the agriculture 
sector and identified the private sector as crucial for creating better environmental performance. The 
report thus was slanted in favour of the farming sector. Sustainable Agricultural Land Management 
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Strategy for Northern Ireland is infused with a similar spirit: its main aim is to demonstrate that farm 
incomes and environmental sustainability can be reconciled. This approach was considered to be a 
rather modest proposal that did not address the structural deficiencies of the inherently unsustainable 
agricultural growth model (Barry, 2009).  
Additionally, technological solutions are put forward for mitigation of environmental 
impacts of farming. Anaerobic digestion (AD) is one of them. AD is a process in which organic 
matter (pig or cattle slurry, poultry litter, energy crops such as grass silage, and food waste) is broken 
down by micro-organisms in an oxygen-free environment to make biogas and digestate. Biogas can 
power on-farm operations while the digestate can be applied straight to land as a replacement for 
artificial fertiliser. From 2017 to 2019, there were 103 anaerobic digestion sites either under 
construction, or with planning applications approved or submitted in Northern Ireland (Northern 
Ireland Fresh Water Taskforce, 2018). Anaerobic digestion sites are eligible for the Renewable 
Obligation Certificates (ROCs) subsidy support scheme. ROCs are certificates issued to those 
accredited to generate renewable energy. As the number of AD plants increases, many farmers use 
the income derived from ROCs to subsidise other parts of their farming enterprise (Martin, 2017). A 
500Kw capacity plant is reported to bring up to half a million pounds a year in subsidy (BBC News, 
2018). While the pollution potential of the digestate is less than that of the original feedstock, it is 
still very high (Northern Ireland Fresh Water Taskforce, 2018). As a result, AD plants, while creating 
renewable energy, are reported to increase ammonia emissions in Northern Ireland, primarily through 
the storage of feedstock and digestate, and the land spreading of the latter (Bell et al, 2016). It is 
calculated that 1,869,300 tonnes of digestate will be generated by the 103 AD plants (Friends of the 
Earth NI, 2018). Provided that this digestate will be disposed of by land spreading, it will result in 
1,551,519 kg of ammonia (Friends of the Earth NI, 2018). Moreover, AD plants are not regarded as 
waste-treatment facilities as, according to NIEA AD Quality Protocol, the digestate ceases to be a 
waste product. Therefore, no Waste Management License is required (Friends of the Earth NI, 2018). 
The License, however, ensures that waste management facilities do not cause pollution of the 
environment or harm to human health. Therefore, anaerobic digestion seems like a dubious solution 
for addressing the ammonia pollution issues.  
3.4.3.3 Local level  
As stated earlier, planning has a significant role to play for delivering sustainable development. 
Planning permission regulations also contribute to the mitigation of environmental impact of farming 
(DAERA, 2018). If a planning application has significant effects on the environment, an 
Environmental Impact Assessment is necessary to identify the risks and ensure their mitigation. It 
had been emphasised (DAERA, 2018) that individual permit or planning applications should each 
be subject to environmental assessments to ensure there will be no adverse impact on the 
environment. However, Purdy and Hjerp (2016) emphasise a lack of a strategic approach to spatial 
planning and suggest that there is also evidence of a lack of environmental consideration. 
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Environmental Impact Assessments are considered to be of substandard quality and the Environment 
Agency is not providing a sufficient amount of input into them (Purdy and Hjerp, 2016).  
It has also been suggested that the planning system in Northern Ireland has a presumption in 
favour of development (Friends of the Earth NI, 2006), which is particularly resonant in the case of 
planning decisions in farming. Intensive livestock units over a certain threshold must obtain a permit 
to operate. Under the earlier mentioned IPPC Directive, the threshold is 40,000 bird places for poultry 
and 750 sows or 2000 production pigs over 30 kg (DAERA, 2018). As a response to this, GfG 
strategy recommended remodelling the supply chain to place sow and rearing units on separate sites 
to ‘facilitate growth while complying with IPPC requirements on environmental and welfare 
compliance along with improved disease control’ (AFSB, 2013).  
Certain developments are also deemed ‘permitted developments’, and some of them belong 
to the category of farming and agriculture. The Planning (General permitted Development) Order 
(Northern Ireland) 2015 grants planning permission for certain types of permitted development, such 
as agricultural buildings (chicken and other livestock sheds, sheds for hay and straw, storage and 
maintenance of agricultural machinery and plant, milking parlours, slurry storage tanks). The size of 
the building that does not require a planning application can be up to 500 m2 – this benchmark has 
been increased from 300m2 in 2015. When the amended legislation was implemented, the then 
Environment Minister Alex Attwood stated that  
‘these proposals, which are the most generous in these islands, will eliminate unnecessary 
red tape to enable agriculture to grow in a challenging economic climate. I want to help 
expand our agri-food business by 40% in the next few years. That is what producers tell me 
they hope to achieve – these changes can help the industry to do so. <…> Increasing the 
range of agricultural development that no longer needs planning permission will make it 
easier for farmers to undertake development’ (Department for Infrastructure, 2012). 
Therefore, the change in the planning clause on ‘permitted developments’ can be seen as encouraging 
growth of the farming industry at the time when its environmental regulation is lagging behind.   
To conclude, having analysed the mechanisms for addressing the environmental impacts of 
farming in Northern Ireland, this section demonstrates the inadequacies of environmental regulation 
of the sector. Environmental regulation of farming reflects the broader regulatory deficiencies in 
relation to the environment in the country. This analysis also reveals how the broader political 
economy of neoliberal capitalism with its emphasis on growth and deregulation intermeshes with 
power relations of state and economic actors on the national level. While the relational aspect of 
power in regulation will be examined in more detail in Chapter 5, this section lays the foundation for 
that analysis, evidencing a significant degree of influence of the farming industry over the regulatory 
bodies. Such influence manifests primarily in advocating for advice rather than punishment 
(recommendations rather than enforcement), self-regulation (which also involves ‘owning’ 
environmental problems by relying on technological solutions) and interfering with the unfavourable 
regulation; these examples echo a neoliberal approach towards regulation (White, 2008). A brief 
consideration of the local level regulation of farming also indicates how a presumption in favour of 
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development in planning favours the interests of the farming industry rather than the health of the 
environment.  
The last two sections demonstrate that the EU has a major impact on both farming and 
environmental regulation in the country. The referendum on the membership of the UK in the EU 
was held on 23 June 2016. Although the majority (fifty-two percent) voted to break away from the 
EU, the Northern Irish majority voted to remain. Since the restoration of the Executive, the UK 
government has guaranteed to consult Stormont where Northern Ireland’s interests are implicated, 
yet it remains to be seen how far Northern Ireland’s politicians will be able to influence the process.  
The next section reviews the impact of Brexit on farming and environmental governance in the 
country.   
3.5 Brexit, farming, and environmental governance in Northern Ireland 
3.5.1 Brexit implications for farming 
First, Brexit will have an impact on Direct Payments to farmers and funding to protect the rural 
environment. The UK will be designing its own scheme of farmer support and the new Government’s 
Agriculture Bill intends to move away from a system of farming subsidies towards a scheme of 
‘public money for public goods’. Under this proposal, farmers would be supported to deliver 
specified outcomes, which could include ‘managing the natural environment, protecting animal 
welfare, improving agricultural productivity, and preserving public access to the countryside’ (House 
of Commons, 2018, p. 9). It is also suggested that ‘direct payments can hinder productivity growth 
by undermining incentives to adopt best practice and by encouraging suboptimal investments that 
impact profitability’ (DEFRA, 2018, p.4). The Bill sees Direct Payments as reducing market focus 
and an obstacle for farmers who are keen to expand (DEFRA, 2018, p. 28). Therefore, the Bill 
predicts that allowing Direct Payments to cease may encourage structural change where less efficient 
farmers decide to leave the sector. However, there are concerns that some aspects of the proposal 
would not be appropriate if applied to Northern Ireland (House of Commons, 2018, p. 11-12). It is 
suggested that moving away from Direct Payments could ‘threaten the continuing viability of small 
farms and impact negatively on the development of rural areas’ (House of Commons, 2018, p.25). 
As a result, the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee proposed that the definition of public goods 
should include the survival of small farms as ‘essential rural assets’ (House of Commons, 2018, 
p.26).   
Second, animal health and welfare might come under pressure after leaving the EU. Farmers 
receiving direct support from the EU have to comply with EU rules on maintaining necessary animal 
health standards. The Health and Harmony policy paper suggests that the current regulatory system 
is burdensome for farmers (DEFRA, 2018), yet its simplification comes in conflict with the need to 
maintain high animal welfare standards. DAERA might have to bear extra costs for control and 
eradication of diseases in animals – currently the regulation and financial assistance for prevention 
and eradication of disease are derived from a series of EU Directives and Regulations (Allen, 2016).  
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Trade is another point of concern as the UK’s trade relations are determined by its 
membership in the EU to a large extent (House of Commons, 2018). Northern Ireland currently 
exports 70% of its agricultural produce (Foord et al, 2018). The UK as a whole relies less on 
agriculture, and Northern Irish interests in negotiations might be side-lined in favour of financial or 
other services (Allen, 2016). Moreover, farmers remain concerned about the post-Brexit movement 
of goods across the border with the Republic of Ireland as many agri-food businesses operate on an 
all-island basis (House of Commons, 2018). Northern Ireland exported £899.5 million worth of food 
and live animals to the Republic in 2017 and 33% of its total exports to the country (House of 
Commons, 2018). Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, the UK as a whole, and the EU will each 
be in a disadvantaged position if cross-border trade is interrupted (House of Commons, 2018).   
The agricultural industry also heavily depends on a workforce from EU countries. The 
Northern Ireland Food and Drink Association (NIFDA) estimates that around 48% of workers 
employed in the agri-food sector are EU nationals (House of Commons, 2018). In Northern Ireland, 
there is a greater demand for skilled roles and less demand for seasonal labour than in the rest of the 
UK (House of Commons, 2018), and the need to employ workers from outside the UK is crucial after 
Brexit. One of the solutions to a dwindling workforce can be automation and mechanisation that, 
according to some, also changes the structure of the industry pushing for larger businesses (House 
of Commons, 2018). Overall, Brexit will prove to be disruptive for the farming industry, impacting 
the areas such as financial wellbeing of small farmers, animal welfare regulations, trade, and labour 
supply.  
3.5.2 Brexit implications for environmental governance  
It is predicted that Brexit is likely to lead to a reduction in cooperation to tackle environmental 
challenges (Brennan et al, 2018) and that environmental protections that stretch beyond product 
standards or trade may be weakened because of regulatory divergence (Burns et al, 2018). Brennan 
(2017) goes as far as suggesting that environmental law and policy framework will not only stagnate, 
but decay in a post-Brexit scenario. Current environmental governance is based on the shared right 
to decide and make laws between the EU and its Member States and, through devolution, Northern 
Ireland. The EU provides an extensive environmental law base, supports formulation of new policies, 
and performs enforcement and accountability functions (Brennan et al, 2018). These functions are 
threatened by Brexit. Considering the above described problematic history of enforcement of 
environmental regulations in Northern Ireland, Brexit may potentially destabilise environmental 
governance in the country (Brennan et al, 2018).   
First, compliance and accountability need to be considered. The EU enforcement 
mechanisms are not flawless, yet they helped to pressure the devolved government to comply through 
the threat of infraction fines (Dobbs et al, 2018). The latter are imposed by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) if the EU Directives have not been implemented correctly or applied 
properly, and it is the devolved government rather than Westminster that is liable for financial 
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sanctions payment (Brennan et al, 2018). In the absence of the CJEU, there are proposals to have a 
new watchdog8 to replace it, yet its capacity and degree of independence are not determined (Brennan 
et al, 2018). The latter is particularly challenging in the Northern Irish context, given its faults of 
environmental governance and delays in implementation, and it appears that little effort is being 
made to address the previous governance weaknesses (Gravey et al, 2018).  
Second, Brennan et al (2018) raise a number of questions on the implementation of common 
EU frameworks by the devolved governments, such as whether the UK frameworks will replace EU 
frameworks in some/all cases; which policy areas will be concerned; how the new frameworks will 
be agreed upon; governance and enforcement of the new frameworks; the degree of differentiation 
to be allowed for each devolved government. The developments sketching out what the common 
frameworks may be so far focus on protecting a UK single market and safeguarding trade, leaving a 
large environmental gap. Brennan et al (2019) evidence that transboundary issues such as water, air 
quality and biodiversity are either considered as not requiring a common framework (water) or 
requiring a political agreement only (air quality and biodiversity). Furthermore, the current 
development around the common frameworks are Westminster-focused and less considerate of the 
needs of devolved governments (Brennan et al, 2019), which is particularly problematic in light of 
the distinctive environmental governance challenges that Northern Ireland faces9.  
The unique position of Northern Ireland in terms of sharing a border with the Republic of 
Ireland brings further challenges for environmental governance. The Irish border has featured 
extensively in Brexit negotiations so far, but little has been said about Northern Ireland’s extensive 
cooperation with Ireland on environmental issues (Gravey et al, 2018; Burns et al, 2018). Its scope 
can be seen below:   
 
8 Judicial review has been suggested as an alternative to a new watchdog, yet a number of problems 
has been highlighted in relation to it: prohibitive cost, its suitability, its ability to fill the 
accountability gap, the clash between ‘the ‘political’ nature of environmental law and the legal focus 
of judicial review’’ (Brennan et al, 2018,  p.21).  
9 They include sharing a border with a non-UK country, the involvement of groups with paramilitary 
links in environmental crime, dealing with the legacy of past neglects and political disinterest in 





Figure 3.12. Cross-border cooperation. Source: Northern Ireland Environment Link (2017) 
It is predicted that regulatory alignment may be lost, enforced cooperation regarding water bodies 
and nature protection may disappear and there may be no mechanisms for cross-border decision-
making and litigation (Brennan et al, 2019).   
Furthermore, it needs to be specified that EU environment policy is infused with the ethos 
of environmental protection, and rests on the principles such as prevention, precaution, polluter pays, 
proximity and integration (Fact Sheets on the European Union, 2019). The earlier discussed Aarhus 
principles regarding access to environmental information, public participation in environmental 
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters are also applicable to the EU and all 
Member States and play an essential role in good environmental governance (Brennan et al, 2019). 
It is suggested that if left to its own devices, Northern Ireland’s devolved government may be 
unwilling or unable to maintain, implement and enforce environmental standards post-Brexit 
(Brennan et al, 2019). To summarise, it is evident that Brexit may have negative implications for 
both the farming industry and environmental governance in Northern Ireland.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provided the background information on Northern Ireland and set the context in which 
the findings in my research are embedded. Northern Ireland is integrated in the globalised neoliberal 
capitalist political economy driven by economic growth fetishism (Kramer and Michalowski, 2012). 
This global political economic paradigm shapes national policy realities (Ban, 2016) and determines 
the choices made by individual actors. This chapter demonstrated how global political economic 
setting, in its interaction with the national realms and the legacy of the Troubles, furnishes conditions 
for environmental harm embodied by the adoption of GfG agri-food strategy and the process of pig 
farming intensification.     
The political economic context is marked by institutional instability and divisions within 
governmental departments, which culminated in the recent absence of the Executive. Social 
development has also been affected by the Troubles as the conflict complicates the implementation 
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of the policies aimed to consolidate participatory democracy. Although the ethos of participatory 
democracy is strong, its practical application is reported to resemble democratic window-dressing, 
which is emblematic of the previously discussed elimination of the political under neoliberal 
capitalism. The ideology of neoliberal capitalism also pervades the farming industry in the country. 
This chapter showed that farming has a particular historical significance in Northern Ireland and 
remains a powerful industry today. Yet, the country’s long-lived devotion to small-scale farming is 
changing and the adoption of the industry-led GfG agri-food strategy in 2012 is a testimony to that. 
Pig farming is an exemplification of the trends of farm concentration and production intensification, 
which have been particularly evident since the implementation of GfG. This development takes place 
in the context where environmental impacts from farming are already concerning and it can be 
assumed that a rising number of intensive pig farms will further exacerbate them. The rise in intensive 
pig farms exposes the communities living in close proximity to such farms to a disproportionate 
amount of environmental burdens and the ineffectiveness of planning in preventing and controlling 
such harms through environmental decision-making forums is concerning in this context.  
In addition to that, environmental regulation appears to be flawed. The Troubles guaranteed 
prolonged de-prioritisation of environmental matters and influenced the lack of political will towards 
this subject. Additionally, the global direction of leaving environmental governance and regulation 
in the hands of the market actors to remove the barriers for incessant economic growth (Harvey, 
2010) is integrated into domestic policy milieus (Hall, 1989). Environmental regulation of farming 
is an example of that. This chapter revealed the dynamics of power relations in relation to 
environmental regulation, whereby the farming industry possesses a significant degree of influence 
over the regulatory bodies. Moreover, it showed that the planning policy is dominated by a 
presumption in favour of development, thus also favouring the economic interests of the farming 
industry rather than the health of the environment. Lastly, this chapter reviewed the impact of Brexit 
on farming and environmental governance in the country, revealing the potential detrimental effects 












Chapter 4 – Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines and details the methodological approach adopted to collect and analyse primary 
and secondary data concerning pig farming intensification and environmental injustice in Northern 
Ireland. The chosen methodological approach is used to provide answers to the research questions 
outlined in Chapter 1. To reiterate, the main question in my research is: how does the process of pig 
farming intensification in Northern Ireland lead to environmental injustice? To answer the main 
question, three sub-questions have been formulated:    
  
1. How does the process of pig farming intensification take place in Northern Ireland and how 
do power relations that support and reinforce it operate on the three levels of inquiry: macro 
(international), meso (national) and micro (local)?  
2. What is the current distribution of harms from farming in the studied area and what effect 
does it have on the realm of capabilities?   
3. How does the process of environmental decision-making regarding the new farms in the 
studied area take place and what are the dynamics of power within it? What are its 
effects on the distribution of future harms associated with farming intensification?  
 
This chapter starts by detailing the ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin my 
research. It proceeds to explain why the case study method is suitable as the methodological approach 
in the context of my epistemological assumptions and specifies the case study in my research. 
Following that, this chapter details the literature review process that preceded data collection. The 
chapter also elaborates on the techniques used for data collection, including primary and secondary 
sources of data. Afterwards, the data analysis process is explained, as well as ethical issues and 
limitations pertaining to my research. Finally, my positionality as a researcher is discussed.   
4.2 Ontology and epistemology  
The ontological position adopted in my research is critical realism, which allows movement beyond 
the constructivism/positivism dichotomy (Carolan, 2005). Reality in critical realism ‘is constituted 
not only by experiences and the course of actual events, but also by structures, powers, mechanisms 
and tendencies – by aspects of reality that underpin, generate or facilitate the actual phenomena that 
we may (or may not) experience’ (Bhaskar and Lawson, 1998, p.5). This conceptualisation of reality 
is underpinned by the three overlapping domains: the empirical, the actual and the real (Bhaskar, 
2008). The empirical consists of the events as one experiences them; the actual consists of the events 
that happen regardless of whether one experiences them or not, since what happens in the world may 
not be the same as what is observed; the real consists of the mechanisms that produce events in the 
world (Bhaskar, 2008). While my research considers the empirical dimension of pig farming 
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intensification and environmental injustice, it uses this observable event as ‘a springboard or gateway 
to understand the complex, layered, and contingent processes or structures’ which cause it (Archer 
et al, 2016, p.6). They exist in the domain of the real.   
Critical realist research employs retroduction as a ‘mode of inference in which events are 
explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of producing them’ (Sayer, 
1992, p.107), therefore asking what must be true to make events possible (Easton, 2010). 
Furthermore, generative mechanisms can be considered at the three levels: micro, meso and macro. 
Each of them consists of powers such as ‘causes, motives, considerations, choices, and social 
interaction’ (Blom and Moren, 2011, p. 64). Such mode of inference is essential for examining the 
generative mechanisms behind farming intensification through the lens of state-farming industry 
relations on the macro and meso levels and their effects on the micro level in the realm of 
environmental justice.  
Critical realist ontology also posits that generative mechanisms are contextually conditioned 
(Blom and Moren, 2011; Bygstad et al, 2015). Bhaskar (2010) suggests that contexts influence 
generative mechanisms rather than determine them. Nevertheless, the two cannot be examined 
separately, as the mechanism’s action depends on its context – what Bhaskar (2010, p. 8) calls ‘the 
effective generative dyad in social life’. For my research, it means examining the Northern Irish 
historical, political economic, social, and regulatory contexts (discussed in Chapter 3) and 
subsequently grounding the identified generative mechanisms in those contexts. Moreover, 
contextual dependency of generative mechanisms implies that under certain contextual 
circumstances the empirical effects do not take place (Blom and Moren, 2011; Bygstad et al, 2015). 
In my research, the effects of farming intensification can be observed in the micro level context of 
communities living in close proximity to farms, coupled with the context that shapes environmental 
decision-making.   
Ontological realism’s stance that the world exists independently of our constructions of it 
leaves room for epistemological interpretivism (Bhaskar, 1998; Easton, 2010). As Frazer and Lacey 
posit (1993, p. 182), ‘even if one is a realist at the ontological level, one could be an epistemological 
interpretivist <…> our knowledge of the real world is inevitably interpretive and provisional rather 
than straightforwardly representational’. Thus, one’s understanding of the world is a construction 
from their own perspective. Such distinction between the nature of reality and the experience of it 
allows to avoid what Bhaskar (1978) calls an epistemic fallacy of bundling together ‘being’ and one’s 
knowledge or experience of being. Such distinction allows for ‘the speaking of things that cannot be 
directly observed (and are thus, beyond the level of the empirical), but which are real nevertheless’ 
(Carolan, 2005, p. 395), such a larger biophysical whole that serves as a reference point to social 
constructions. As Bhaskar (2008) states, the anthropocentric bias of classical philosophy invalidated 
the concept of the ontological realm. The anthropocentric bias obscures the reality of the biophysical 
whole, the natural world, thus eroding the basis for environmental politics; yet, addressing this bias 
is crucial for the project of green criminology. Thus, in my research the combination of ontological 
realism and epistemological interpretivism allows analysing the objective realities of the impact of 
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global capitalism and its anthropocentric bias on the natural world, along with the variety of 
subjective experiences of humans operating and living within these objective realities.  
An interpretivist position is concerned with understanding a phenomenon from an 
individual’s perspective (Bryman, 2012). The role of the interpretivist researcher is to capture this 
process of interpretation from the participants’ points of view (Blumer, 1969) and understand what 
lies behind it. Adopting an interpretivist epistemology in my research implies understanding the 
phenomenon of farming intensification and environmental harm from different perspectives, such as 
the farming industry, the government, and individuals living in close proximity to farms. A crucial 
aspect of my research is to acknowledge that different actors can perceive the same instance of harm 
differently and those perceptions should be studied and explained using their own terms and contexts.  
Moreover, the interpretivist position also accommodates a critical inquiry. A critical inquiry 
aims to find a social power structure (Lincoln et al, 2018), where certain groups of society are 
privileged over others and aim to exert control. The issue of power runs through the integrative 
theoretical framework in my research; exploration of the role of power is crucial because of its ability 
to influence the processes of social construction of reality for both state and farming industry actors 
and those being exposed to environmental harms from farming intensification. Opening one’s 
knowledge claims to criticism and further improvement is an essential part of the critical realist 
project (Carolan, 2005) as it acknowledges that some approximations of reality are more valid than 
others (Carolan, 2005). Interpretivist researchers analyse the social lives of others according to their 
own sets of meanings (Saunders et al, 2007) and I need to acknowledge that my preference of certain 
approximations of reality over others will be influenced by my values and beliefs. A further 
elaboration on this is provided in the Positionality section later in this chapter.  
4.3 Research design – case study 
The previous chapter outlined the context of my research and showed why Northern Ireland is an 
appropriate case for intersecting pig farming intensification and environmental injustice. Below I 
justify the choice of a case study approach in my research.  
A case study approach enables a holistic understanding of a particular phenomenon, 
investigating how actors engage in certain acts over a particular time in a particular space (Feagin 
and Sjoberg, 1991). It is suitable for research questions that are explanatory in nature, which is the 
case for my study. In social sciences, a case study is used as a foundation for data collection and 
analysis (Burton, 2000) and can be defined as an empirical enquiry that analyses a contemporary 
phenomenon in a particular context (Yin, 2003). Case studies are known for their internal validity, 
as a causal relationship is more easily established in a single case than for a larger set of cases 
(Gerring, 2007). As it was stated earlier, my research is informed by the green criminological 
perspective. Green criminologists have employed a variety of research designs to collect their data 
(Brisman and South, 2016), and a case study is one of them. Heckenberg and White (2013) posit that 
the analysis of evolving harms and crimes invites a case study approach that brings together 
91 
 
descriptive information and contemporary facts and figures. Rothe and Kauzlarich (2016) concur, 
stating that the case study approach is suitable for qualitative criminological research. Moreover, the 
case study approach is also suitable for the critical realist ontological position: ‘it justifies the study 
of any situation, regardless of the numbers of research units involved, but only if the process involves 
thoughtful in-depth research with the objective of understanding why things are as they are’ (Easton, 
2010, p. 119). A case study approach recognises the importance of context (Harding, 2013) and 
allows its in-depth analysis. The chosen research design, thus, provides a holistic understanding of 
pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland and allows explaining its link to environmental 
injustice.   
Additionally, as it was specified in Chapter 2, the integrative theoretical framework for my 
research incorporates crimes of the powerful scholarship to understand workings of power in the 
context of intensive farming. Rothe and Kauzlarich (2016) emphasise that the case study approach 
is particularly useful for crimes of the powerful research given the ambiguity of links and 
relationships. A case study approach also allows to discern the dynamics of power in the processes 
of environmental decision-making on the local level, considering the power wielded by the farming 
industry and their close relationship with the government (McAreavey and Foord, 2016). Finally, a 
case study approach is also suitable for events that deal with operational links that need to be traced 
over time (Yin, 2014). Intensification of pig farming is a long-term process, rather than an incident, 
and has its roots in history. Yet, despite its significant history, it can be seen as a contemporary event, 
over which the researcher has little or no control; the combination of these two factors also invite a 
case study approach (Yin, 2014).  
A case study approach is not without criticism. It is still deemed to be a less desirable design 
than an experiment or a survey (Yin, 2014). Generalisation is a big concern regarding case studies 
(Bryman, 2012): Gerring (2007) claims that a case study approach is not representative enough as it 
includes only a small amount of cases of a more general phenomenon. However, it has been noted 
that the issue of generalisation is predominantly a concern for quantitative researchers (Harding, 
2013). Rather than generalising, case studies aim to contribute to theory (Yin, 2003). Some 
criminologists also contest the generalisation criticism, asserting that specific case studies of harm 
can be transferred to other industry domains (Heckenberg and White, 2013). While examining 
particular contextual specificities, such studies contribute to the broader research frontier and are 
valid in their own right. Therefore, this case study of pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland 
also aims to contribute to the broader frontier of criminological research, both theoretically and 
empirically. Having justified my research design, the next section will outline the techniques used 
for sampling of the literature in my research.  
4.4 Primary and grey literature review 
The literature in my research included both the academic literature as well as legislation and policy 
documents. Sampling of the academic literature was conducted primarily through Northumbria 
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University library. Platforms such as Google Scholar, Library Genesis and Sci-Hub were also used 
to locate the work that could not be found in the University Library. Only peer-reviewed sources 
written in English were considered.   
Legislation and policy documents were found online once the research topic was determined. 
They included documents from Northern Ireland Assembly10, legislation and policy documents 
related to farming, planning, environmental regulation (in general and of farming). Documentation 
specifically from the Committee for Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs was reviewed, 
including Briefing Papers, Research Papers (2016-2017) and Minutes of Evidence (2014-2015 and 
2016-2017). Unavailability of records after 2017 might be explained by the absence of the 
functioning Assembly at that time. These documents provided an insight into the government 
strategy in regard to farming and their concerns about the future of the sector. Policy documents 
related to the GfG strategy were also examined. The text of the strategy Going for Growth. A 
Strategic Action Plan In Support Of The Northern Ireland Agri-Food Industry was read to understand 
the context behind the strategy, its goals, and the means of achieving these goals. Documents related 
to the strategy, such as the NI Executive action plan in response to the Going for Growth strategy 
and the strategy’s progress updates were reviewed to triangulate the farming industry participants’ 
answers. Similarly, annual reports from the UFU (specifically sections on the pork production and 
the environment) were examined with a similar intention. More generally, publications on the pork 
sector from the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board (AHDB) were used to identify the 
trends in research in the pig industry and application of innovative technologies for the mitigation of 
environmental impacts from pig farming. Documents under the categories of ‘environment’ and 
‘research and innovation’ were selected for this purpose.  
Planning documents and planning legislation were also studied. Documents associated with 
pig farm planning applications11 such as environmental impact assessments, consultation responses, 
neighbour notifications, planning decisions, etc. were deemed to be relevant for my research. They 
allowed a better understanding of the planning system in relation to farming developments in 
Northern Ireland. The issue of public participation in planning decision-making emerged during 
primary data collection and it was decided that planning legislation should also be examined to 
understand the role of Northern Irish citizens in shaping environmental decision-making. 
Consequently, the Planning Act (Northern Ireland) 2011, The Planning (General Permitted 
Development) Order (Northern Ireland) 2015 and The Planning (Statement of Community 
Involvement) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015 were analysed. The Planning Portal was 
instrumental for understanding the formal nature of public participation in environmental decision-
making. 
 
10 To identify the relevant documents from Northern Ireland Assembly, the website of the Assembly 
was searched using the key words ‘farming’, ‘intensive farming’, ‘pig farming’, ‘ammonia 
emissions’, ‘animal waste’, ‘environment’, ‘environmental justice’, ‘public participation’, ‘planning 
community involvement’, ‘access to justice’, ‘third-party right of appeal’.  




Furthermore, understanding of environmental regulation was essential to establish a 
benchmark of what farmers have to comply with to subsequently compare it with the status quo in 
Northern Ireland. The DAERA website was the first point of reference and the topics of ‘Pollution’, 
‘Protect the environment’, ‘Water’ were browsed to identify the relevant control mechanisms in 
place. Moreover, since the bulk of national environmental regulation has its roots in the EU 
regulation, documents related to environmental regulation of farming on the EU level were also 
examined, including Cross-Compliance Statutory Management Requirements, the Nitrates Directive, 
Water Framework Directive, Pollution Prevention and Control (PPC) licensing, Waste Management 
licensing and Animal By-Product legislation. I also reviewed the documents that allow an insight 
into relations in regulation and advance my understanding of the regulatory processes that apply to 
farming in the country. Ulster Farmers' Union & NIEA Memorandum of Understanding presents an 
example of that and illustrates how farming lobbying groups interact with the government to shape 
environmental legislation. Briefing Papers from Northern Ireland Assembly were also reviewed on 
the subject of evaluating the impact of Brexit on environmental governance in the country.  
Having detailed the process of primary and grey literature review in my research, the next 
section will discuss the process of primary, secondary and media data collection.   
4.5 Data collection  
Prior to the fieldwork, an ethics form was completed and approved. The ethical risk was identified 
as medium and all the necessary documentation was prepared to make sure that ethical guidelines 
are maintained in research. Before explaining the process of data collection, my sampling strategy 
needs to be clarified.  
4.5.1 Sampling strategy  
A systematic approach to data collection in qualitative research is determined by two factors: having 
a case to investigate and determining the framework of a particular sample (Flick, 2014). I have 
shown that Northern Ireland provides a suitable case for studying pig farming intensification. 
Therefore, sampling techniques in my research will be discussed here.   
My study revolves around three levels of inquiry – international, national, and local. To 
understand the specifics of pig farming intensification on the national level, Belfast was chosen as 
the main research location, considering that the majority of government and industry participants are 
based there. The same participants were able to provide a sufficient insight into the international 
level of inquiry, as they discussed the link between global trends in pig farming and intensification 
in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, a location needed to be chosen in order to provide a local level 
insight into the phenomenon of pig farming intensification. My research used non-probability 
sampling, as it constructs a sample that can yield the most valuable insights into the study’s focus 
(Yin, 2014). Within a non-probability sampling framework, purposive sampling was used, looking 
at the case that might not be representative of a wider population, but represented an example of the 
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community where farming intensification was taking place. The figure below displays the dynamics 
of factory pig farming in Northern Ireland. It is evident that the number of animals reared intensively 
is smaller in County Antrim than in other areas. Yet, planning permission for a pig farm that would 
house 15,000 animals was granted in 2016 in Antrim and Newtownabbey district12, and another 
planning application (for a farm producing more than 50,000 pigs per year13) in the same area was 
under consideration at the beginning of my research14. Antrim and Newtownabbey district, thus, can 
provide an insight into intensification as a process rather than an existing phenomenon. Moreover, 
the area already has a farm that houses around 9,000 animals, which made it suitable for the research 
on the existing distribution of harms from intensive farming on the environment and society. Based 
on this, Antrim and Newtownabbey district was selected as the research site for data collection on 
the local level.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Dynamics of factory pig farming in Northern Ireland. Source: Compassion in World 
Farming (2017) 
In addition to sampling of the context, sampling of the participants is also a crucial part of sampling 
(Bryman, 2012). For sampling of the participants, snowball sampling was employed: as the key 
informants provided more information on the local context, other potential informants were 




13 Based on the assumption that 2,755 sows (as described in the planning application) will average 
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knowledge and/or experience needed for this research (either of the farming industry in Northern 
Ireland or of the effects of farming intensification); they were capable of reflection; and they had 
time to be interviewed and were willing to take part in this research (Flick, 2014). The sample of 
participants was diverse to make sure that the case is made up of as many facets as possible (Flick, 
2014). Four categories of participants are described below in Table 4.1.:  
Participant category Justification for inclusion 
Local residents Those residing in the area where pig farming 
intensification is taking place. Alkon et al 
(2013) claim that getting an insight into the 
community perspective is essential for 
providing support for those affected by 
environmental inequalities. The research 
considered the perspectives of those actively 
opposing large-scale farm projects in the area as 
well as those not actively contributing to 
decision-making around such projects.  
Government  Both local and national levels of government, 
including participants that are directly or 
indirectly engaged in policymaking or decision-
making around farming in Northern Ireland: 
local councillors, local Members of the 
Legislative Assembly (MLAs), participants 
from the DAERA and Invest NI (regional 
business development agency that constitutes 
part of the Department for the Economy).  
Farming industry  -Local farmers - both large-scale and small-
scale pig farmers with an insider knowledge of 
the industry.  
-Corporate participants (Agri-Food Strategy 
Board members involved in the creation of the 
GfG agri-food strategy and participants 
involved in pork procurement on the retail 
level). 
-Lobbying groups (UFU participants 
representing the interests of farmers in Northern 
Ireland). 
NGO actors and public-spirited citizens  
 
NGO participants providing an alternative 
perspective on regulatory environments 
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(Kauzlarich and Matthews, 2006) and 
participants involved in campaigning beyond 
the local level. 
 
Having described the details of location and participant sampling, the next section will outline the 
process of data collection in my research.  
4.5.2 Primary data  
Primary data collection included semi-structured interviews. An empirical research project drawing 
on critical realism can, according to Archer (2003), use interviews to capture individuals’ 
interpretations of social structures in which they exist. This approach fits with the theoretical 
framework of my research; Kauzlarich and Matthews (2006) suggest that state-corporate crime 
researchers need to place a more detailed focus on individual-level analysis as internal dynamics of 
organisations and their connection to the broader political economy have garnered most of the 
scholarly attention thus far. They assert that the 'lived reality' (2006, p. 241) of state-corporate crime 
can be understood through the perspectives of actors and victims associated with harmful activities. 
Therefore, it was assumed that an analysis of pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland can be 
conducted by interviewing the individuals that shape this phenomenon, while an analysis of 
environmental injustice can be conducted by interviewing the individuals that experience its effects 
and shape environmental decision-making processes.  
Moreover, a further clarification is needed of the choice of semi-structured, rather than 
structured or unstructured interviews. Galetta and Cross (2013) suggest that semi-structured 
interviews address specific research questions, but simultaneously leave space to bring in new 
findings into research. Considering my outsider perspective, semi-structured interviews allowed the 
participants to introduce me to the new facets of the studied topic. Semi-structured interviews are 
characterised by their flexibility (Bryman, 2012). Considering my positionality (which will be 
described later), the topic of pig farming intensification could appear controversial to some 
participants (such as the farming industry or government participants). As semi-structured interviews 
provide a greater leeway in how to reply to participants, they were chosen as the preferred mode of 
interviewing. However, any kind of interview can bring some challenges that are beyond a 
researcher’s control. They include issues surrounding subjectivity, interviewee and interviewer bias, 
interpretation of interviews, explorative rather than hypothesis testing nature of interviews, their 
generalisation and validity (Kvale, 1996). The issue of bias is pertinent to my research. The 
interviewer bias will be explained later in the Positionality section. In terms of interviewee bias, 
participants’ responses might be influenced by their idea of what the interviewer might require 
(Gomm, 2004). In my research, it was assumed that the farming industry participants would stress 
their environmental and animal welfare responsibilities, while local residents would respond at length 
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to the questions about the effects of intensification. Both assumptions proved to be true and were 
recognised during interview transcription and data analysis.  
A detailed fieldwork plan was formulated prior to going to Northern Ireland and a database 
of all potential participants was made. Participants were put in one of the four categories (as outlined 
above), their contact details were recorded, and their status was defined (contacted on <date>, contact 
again on <date>, interview scheduled, unavailable). Twenty-nine semi-structured interviews were 
conducted between November 2018 and January 2019 with eight local residents, seven government 
participants (two local councillors, two MLAs, one participant from the DAERA, two participants 
from Invest NI), nine farming industry participants (three local farmers, two participants from the 
AFSB, one participant involved in pork procurement on the retail level, three participants from the 
UFU), four NGO participants and one public-spirited citizen. Further details of the semi-structured 
interviews (including the date, participant category and the code that will be used in the following 
chapters to communicate information provided by the corresponding interviewee) can be found in 
the Appendix 1.    
The decision to finish primary data collection in January 2019 was motivated by several 
factors. First, limitations of access precluded me from interviewing some participants (this aspect 
will be discussed later in this chapter). Second, while the concept of saturation was not applied in my 
research as there is always potential for new information to emerge (Mason, 2010), it was decided 
that a sufficient amount of data was collected to answer the main research questions and new 
information obtained made little contribution to the overall purpose of research (Mason, 2010). 
Indeed, the participants interviewed were ‘the ‘right persons’ to study’ (Brannen, 2012, p.16) and 
were crucial to my particular case study.   
Semi-structured interviews incorporate both open-ended and more theoretically driven 
questions, thus producing data from the personal experience of the participant as well as data steered 
by theoretical foundations of the discipline within which one is conducting research (Galetta and 
Cross, 2013). The initial interview guides were based on the initial research questions and the 
theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 2. For instance, for the farming industry actors, the 
questions were organised around the themes of motivation, opportunities, and controls for 
intensification while the questions for the local residents concerned the distribution of environmental 
benefits and burdens, recognition of their views regarding the intensification, and participation in 
environmental decision-making. The focus of each interview was adjusted depending on the category 
of the participant, as described in Table 4.2.:  
 
Local residents -Their views on pig farming intensification in 
the area, both positive and negative aspects of it. 
-The impact of pig farming on the local area, the 




-Their participation in the decision-making 
process around new farm developments and the 
recognition of their views in that process. 
-Their diets and the way they source their meat. 
Government -Local councillors and MLAs: planning 
process in Northern Ireland and their 
engagement with local residents on the matters 
related to environmental decision-making 
around farming intensification. 
-DAERA: the context of the GfG strategy and 
their engagement with the farming industry, 
environmental and social implications of 
farming intensification in Northern Ireland and 
the future of pig farming in the country.  
-Invest NI: the importance of pork exports, the 
role of globalisation for the industry, and global 
trends in pork production and their influence on 
the local production. 
Farming industry -Local farmers: their farming businesses and 
the history of their farming businesses, 
environmental regulation in farming and 
mitigation of the existing effects of 
intensification. 
For small farmers: their views on 
intensification, the factors behind it and the 
components of a successful pig farming 
business today. For large farmers: the role of 
GfG in the intensification, the role of 
globalisation, the relations in the supply chain 
(both in terms of production and consumption) 
and the role of technology in farming 
intensification. 
-Corporate participants: the context of GfG, 
the support behind it and the application of GfG 
to pig farming. For participants involved in pork 
procurement on the retail level: the relations in 




-Lobbying groups: their engagement with the 
government, the background of the GfG 
strategy, the current trends in pig farming in the 
country, environmental regulation of farming 
and the effectiveness of the existing mitigation 
practices (including the technology solutions). 
NGO actors and public-spirited citizens -The opportunity structures for pig farming 
intensification and their effects. 
-The state of environmental regulation in 
Northern Ireland. 
-The structure of the planning system and 
opportunities for public participation in 
environmental decision-making.  
 
The location for interviews was chosen based on the respondents’ preference; most interviews with 
government, farming industry and NGO participants took place in their offices, while interviews with 
residents and farmers took place at their homes. Eight interviews were conducted on the phone. 
Telephone interviewing is reported to be effective for addressing sensitive questions, since 
participants might feel more at ease, with the interviewer not being physically present (Bryman, 
2012). Several farming industry participants were interviewed on the phone and the context of 
telephone interviewing helped to ease tension when the topic of the effects of intensification was 
brought up. While Irvine et al (2013) found that face-to-face interviews resulted in longer and more 
detailed interviews, it was not the case for my research. The quality of interviews, their length and 
depth were similar for both face-to-face and telephone interviews, which, according to Bryman 
(2012) can indeed be the case. Characteristics of face-to-face interviews, such as body language, the 
setting of the interview were not considered to be relevant for my research, which made telephone 
interviews a convenient choice in a number of cases. Moreover, a short time gap between telephone 
interviews and the trip to Northern Ireland allowed me to prepare new interview guides to ensure that 
findings that emerged from telephone interviews were discussed in face-to-face interviews. New 
interview guides for the industry participants prioritised the history of pig farming in Northern 
Ireland to obtain a better understanding of the evolution of intensification and aimed to get an insight 
into the vertical integration of the pig sector. Furthermore, the role of technology in intensification 
and issues surrounding animal welfare became more prominent in the new interview guides. For the 
local residents, flaws and industry influence in the planning system were included in new interview 
guides as it was assumed that these issues needed further clarification.   
Each interview lasted from forty-five minutes to two hours as most participants were keen 
to engage with the research topic. The nature of the research topic and the significance of the effects 
of intensification on the environment and society to my research led to a prediction that farming 
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industry participants would not engage with the topic enthusiastically (this aspect will be covered in 
more detail in Challenges and limitations section). Therefore, the manner in which the research was 
presented upon making the first contact with certain participants was crucial. Brisman and South 
(2016) claim that the question of transparency of research aims for the powerful and influential 
participants has become a debate in criminological methodology. As a result, the research 
information sheet and the research consent form featured a more neutral term ‘farming expansion’ 
rather than ‘farming intensification’. A strong focus was placed on the need to engage with both the 
farming industry and the local resident participants to guarantee a balanced outcome. Recruitment 
letters and emails were customised for all categories of participants, and each of them emphasised 
the aspects of the research most relevant to each participant group. Furthermore, my status as the 
researcher was made clear from the outset; I believe that my association with a university, rather than 
an NGO or a governmental organisation facilitated access to the farming industry actors. During the 
interviews, I followed Kvale’s (1996) criteria of a successful interviewer. I demonstrated my 
knowledge of the discussed subject and was open to the introduction of new topics. I made sure I had 
a clear plan for the interview, introducing the purpose of the interview in the beginning, explaining 
the ethical guidelines, and allowing time for additional comments or clarification questions in the 
end. The questions were also formulated in an easy, open-ended way to allow participants to engage 
with the subject of each question. I believe that I was a gentle, easy-going interviewer, listened 
actively to what was said and took opportunities to interpret some of the responses, for them to be 
either confirmed or disconfirmed by participants. Kvale (1996) also includes ‘critical’ in his criteria 
of a successful interviewer. This aspect proved to be challenging when dealing with the farming 
industry participants. According to Kvale, being critical entails questioning the reliability and 
validity of participants’ responses. Despite the presence of inconsistencies in some responses, I 
decided not to challenge my interviewees because of my concern that criticism might result in 
discontinuation of an interview, withdrawal from research or blocking access to other participants. 
In several cases, my decision not to adopt an antagonistic approach resulted in a successful 
application of snowball sampling. The influence of some of my interviewees led to me being 
introduced to other participants, and these introductions would not have taken place otherwise. Thus, 
semi-structured interviews provided primary data for this research. The role of secondary data and 
media data will be discussed below.   
4.5.3 Secondary data 
Documents and official statistics serve as a vehicle for making sense of the organisational practices 
and constitute readings of social events and social settings (Flick, 2014). The following sources of 
secondary data were used: official statistics related to farming in Northern Ireland and media data.  
4.5.3.1 Official statistics related to farming and the state of the environment 
in Northern Ireland 
101 
 
This section of my secondary data provided a comprehensive insight into the Northern Irish farming 
industry. The trends in pig farming were of particular relevance, and the general direction of the 
country’s farming industry was also explored. Official statistics were obtained from the DAERA 
website. First, historical figures were examined to get a clear picture of the farming industry in 
Northern Ireland. They included: historical livestock data (1847-2017), farm numbers (1981-2017), 
historical labour data (1912-2017), historical enterprise data (1981-2017), and pig populations (1981-
2017). Statistical reports containing statistics on the agricultural economy, livestock numbers, farm 
structure, incomes at farm level, agri-food sector performance, the rural economy, animal health and 
welfare, and the agri-environment, were analysed. They included documents of The Statistical 
Review of Northern Ireland Agriculture from 2007 to 2017, The Agricultural Census in Northern 
Ireland from 2000 to 2019, Farm Business Data (only the most recent report was available for the 
year 2018). Comparing older and more current numbers from the industry allowed me to document 
structural changes of farming in Northern Ireland and reflect on the information that was obtained 
from the primary data.   
Environmental statistics were also reviewed to examine the state of the country’s 
environment and cross-check the concerns that were voiced during the semi-structured interviews. 
The Northern Ireland Environmental Statistics Reports was downloaded from the DAERA website 
(from 2009 to 2018) to analyse the change in environmental quality that happened during that period. 
Particular attention was paid to air, water, and soil quality as well as to the trends in biodiversity. 
However, Lynch and Stretesky (2003) suggest that reliance on the information provided by the 
official sources might not provide the full picture. They recommend utilising other evidence, 
including the information from environmental protection organisations. Consequently, documents 
on the subject of the state of the environment and farming intensification in Northern Ireland 
produced by Friends of the Earth Northern Ireland were also examined.  
4.5.3.2 Media data  
Media data in my research included online newspaper articles, social media data, and film data. 
Media data provided a deeper insight into the context of farming in Northern Ireland. The abundance 
of farming-related newspapers demonstrated the importance of the industry in the country. I 
subscribed to email updates from the major newspapers such as Farming Life, Irish Farmers Journal, 
and AgriLand to stay informed about the recent developments in the industry. The latter is the largest 
farming news portal in the whole of Ireland, therefore only the articles relevant for Northern Ireland 
were read. Newspaper articles were also instrumental for understanding the business-like 
environment in farming and thus triangulating the information obtained from the primary data 
sources.   
Furthermore, social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter were used to obtain a 
better understanding of the views of the local residents regarding intensification of farming in their 
area. For this purpose, Facebook groups and Twitter accounts created to amplify local residents’ 
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voice (such as Stop the Newtownabbey Pig Factories, Stop the Limavady Pig Factory) and the related 
Twitter accounts were identified and monitored on a regular basis. These groups were also used to 
recruit some of the research participants. However, the biased nature of the information posted and 
shared online was considered.  
Another source of media data in my research was the film about the intensification of pig 
farming in Northern Ireland titled Pig Business in Northern Ireland15. Visual representations reflect 
problematic cultural and social experiences (Flick, 2014). In this case, the film was produced by the 
NGOs Friends of the Earth Northern Ireland and Farms Not Factories in 2018 to discuss the impact 
of pig factory farming on local residents’ lives. It features interviews with an ex-Minister for 
Agriculture, an ex-planning committee member, several Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, 
small-scale pig farmers as well as residents protesting against intensification of farming (Farms Not 
Factories, 2018). The film was helpful in outlining the context of the fieldwork location as well as 
expanding the understanding of residents’ and officials’ views on farming intensification. However, 
it is also important to remember that any film creates its particular version of truth (Flick, 2014), and 
the anti-industry bias of the narrative of Pig Business in Northern Ireland was subsequently 
considered.  
4.6 Data analysis  
The analysis of the qualitative data was performed through thematic analysis in combination with 
comparative analysis. Thematic analysis refers to ‘a process of identifying themes in the data which 
capture meaning that is relevant to a research question, and perhaps also to making links between 
such themes’ (Willig, 2013, p. 147). Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 87) detail the steps of the thematic 
analysis, which I took in my research: 
 
Figure 4.2. Thematic analysis steps. Source: Braun and Clarke (2006) 
 
Policy documents related to farming in Northern Ireland and some secondary data (statistics related 
to farming) were examined prior to the primary data collection to create a general idea of the farming 
 




industry in general and pig farming in particular in Northern Ireland. The following questions were 
asked when reviewing policy documents and secondary sources of data: “What kind of reality is the 
document creating? How is the document accomplishing this task?” (Flick, 2014, p. 371). 
Furthermore, social media data was examined to detect the themes in the local residents’ experience 
of environmental harm.  
As mentioned, seven phone interviews were conducted in November 2018 before the trip to 
Northern Ireland, which was crucial for capturing new themes that were developed further during in-
person interviews. These themes were also matched with the themes identified in grey literature and 
secondary data. The collection and the analysis of planning documents and planning legislation and 
other secondary data pertaining to regulation of the environment and farming in Northern Ireland 
was thus undertaken to expand the understanding of the new themes. A project drawing on critical 
realism searches for tendencies that can be identified through trends and patterns in empirical data, 
which are known as ‘demi-regularities’ (Fletcher, 2017). The latter were revealed through qualitative 
data coding, which was done during the second stage of data analysis.   
The second stage of analysis took place after the fieldwork in December 2018 and phone 
interviews in January 2019. This stage of analysis resulted in the majority of the key findings. 
Multiple readings of data helped capturing the meaning of the data (Silver and Lewins, 2014). All 
interviews were transcribed and then read ‘vertically’ (Silver and Lewins, 2014) – in the 
chronological order of their collection. Afterwards, the interviews were coded – coding was 
organised separately for the different categories of participants. Individual phrases, sentences or 
paragraphs that were considered relevant to the main research question were given a code. All codes 
were recorded in an Excel sheet and a definition was given to each code to ensure its consistent use 
throughout the interview data. Afterwards, the interviews were read horizontally (Silver and Lewins, 
2014) by code, to assess the internal cohesiveness of the identified codes. Inconsistencies were 
identified and the second wave of coding took place to rectify these inconsistencies. The process was 
repeated until it was made sure that the coding is consistent throughout all interviews. Grey literature 
and secondary data resources were also analysed to validate the findings (including NGO reports, 
documents from the Northern Ireland Assembly, documents related to planning and public 
participation, and policy documents from the farming industry).  
Following that, interrelationships between codes were built to organise them into broader 
themes. It was very important to keep taking notes during the coding process as some links started 
to emerge early in the process. I read the stream of codes both separately as well as together with the 
primary data, which was helpful in identifying interrelationships between the codes. It was also 
decided at this point of data analysis that interpretation of some of the findings can be organised 
around three levels of inquiry: international, national, and local. Linkages between the codes and 
themes were visualised on paper and two diagrams were designed: one detailing the findings for 
those supporting and reinforcing pig farming intensification and the other demonstrating the coded 
and categorised view of those living in close proximity to farms. The two diagrams can be seen in 
the Appendix 2. Lewis (2003) asserts that comparative analysis explores the differences in how the 
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research issue is experienced and enables analysis of the reasons behind these variations. Although 
my research is based on a single case study, the comparison of the two perspectives illuminates the 
contexts in which the participants are embedded and facilitates the analysis of the power relations 
dynamics (with the latter being of crucial importance for critical criminologists). At the final stage 
of analysis, all interview transcripts were read again to make sure that the findings correspond with 
the contents of the interviews.    
Member checking was organised in September-October 2019 to explore the credibility of 
the themes that emerged during analysis. Member checking is considered a validation technique (Birt 
et al, 2016) and is seen as a measure of more rigorous qualitative research (Lincoln et al, 2018). It 
addresses the idea of co-construction of knowledge and provides participants with an opportunity to 
engage in the process of data analysis several months after the interview (Thomas, 2017). One of the 
methods of member checking is sharing synthesised analysed data with participants (Creswell and 
Miller, 2000; Birt et al, 2016), which aims to ensure that the findings as interpreted by the researcher 
paint an accurate picture of the realities experienced by participants (Thomas, 2017). In my research, 
several participants were selected for member checking – COM002, COM005, COM006, COM007, 
COM008, COU001, COU002, NGO002. All of them were provided with a summary of findings that 
emerged from their interviews in a form of a report. Birt et al (2016) suggest that data selected for 
member checking needs to be presented in an accessible way. For this reason, certain segments of 
the report were highlighted and clarified, and I attempted avoiding academic jargon. The selected 
participants were asked to provide general feedback on the findings as well as specific feedback on 
the parts about which I had some specific queries. Additionally, they were asked whether the 
conclusions drawn in the report are a fair representation of their realities. Birt et al (2016) suggest 
that one of the ethical challenges arising in this process is confirming that participants are able and 
willing to participate in member checking after several months since the interview. One of the 
participants – COU001 – did not engage in member checking. Nevertheless, the feedback I received 
from the rest of the participants was very positive and confirmed the credibility of the themes that 
emerged in the analysis.  
Additionally, it is worth elaborating on the grounding of my findings in theory. Merriam and 
Tisdell (2016, p. 88) suggest that a researcher’s interpretation of the data is influenced by the 
theoretical framework of the study and the analysis will ‘reflect the constructs, concepts, language, 
models and theories that structured the study in the first place’. Going further, Merriam (2009) posits 
that every part of any research is informed by its theoretical framework, regardless of the latter being 
explicit or implicit. While Chapter 2 outlined the integrative theoretical framework in my study, its 
underpinnings were further consolidated in the beginning of this chapter where my ontological and 
epistemological positions were discussed. Mutual interdependence between interpretivist 
epistemology and the broader theories that inform my research needs to be made explicit (Collins 
and Stockton, 2018). Understanding the process of social construction of an activity through 
participants’ own interpretations resonates with the critical theoretical frames that explain crimes of 
the powerful. For my research, it means discovering the motivations, opportunity structures, and 
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controls for farming intensification through the perspectives of the participants and grounding these 
findings in the broader political economic context, on the global, national, and local levels. 
Interpretivist epistemology can also accommodate broader theories of justice that support the 
environmental justice paradigm. With environmental justice having its roots in a social movement, 
participants’ own interpretations of the lived realities are particularly relevant if one aims to 
understand the injustices in recognitional and procedural realms.   
The above begs the question of the effects of the integrative theoretical framework in my 
research on the findings (Anfara and Mertz, 2006). Maxwell (2005) described the advantages of the 
theoretical framework by using two metaphors. Theory as a coat closet provides a framework for 
organising and connecting data. In my research, the integrated framework of state-corporate crime 
was instrumental for the initial structuring of the themes that emerged from the interviews with the 
farming industry participants and building links between them. The structure of the integrated 
framework of state-corporate crime sheds light on the three levels of inquiry and illuminates the 
relationship between them. The environmental justice paradigm, on the other hand, allowed for 
organising the themes around the impacts of farming on the participants and environmental decision-
making. Maxwell (2005) also uses the metaphor of theory as a spotlight, where it can illuminate the 
findings that otherwise might go unnoticed. In my case, the environmental justice paradigm captured 
not only the distribution of environmental burdens and its effect on the realm of capabilities, but also 
acknowledged the role of recognition and participation in environmental decision-making.  
4.7 Ethics, challenges, and limitations 
All PhD researchers conducting research at Northumbria University have to comply with ethical 
standards to ensure good research practice. As I mentioned above, an ethical approval was obtained 
prior to primary data collection. During interviewing, I adhered to the principle of informed consent. 
In some cases, an information sheet explaining the nature of research, the interview procedure, 
benefits, and disadvantages of taking part (for all participant categories), personal data-related issues 
and participant rights was distributed prior to meeting in person. In other cases, participants were 
presented with the information sheet before the start of the interview. Additionally, participants were 
asked to sign a consent form. One of the clauses on the consent form included participants’ agreement 
to audio-record the interview to avoid any risk of misquotation. Two participants chose not to record 
the interview, in which case detailed hand-written notes of the conversation were taken instead. After 
the interview was completed, I provided participants with a debrief sheet further explaining the nature 
of the research, how participants can find out about the results of this research, and how they could 
withdraw their data if they wished. I also adhered to the principle of confidentiality. During interview 
transcription, data analysis and research write-up, personal details of all participants were codified. 
Each participant was given a code number (see Appendix 1) and participants’ names were not written 
on the recorded interviews, or on the typed-up versions of discussions from the interview. The 
consent forms signed by participants were stored separately from other data. In terms of data storage, 
106 
 
all paper data and consent forms were kept in locked storage in a lockable office.  All electronic data, 
including the recordings from interviews and interview transcriptions were stored on my personal 
laptop on the University U drive, which is password protected. In accordance with Northumbria 
University Research Records Retention Schedule, the data obtained during this research will be 
stored up to the completion of this study and three years after the completion.  
In regard to challenges, elite status of some respondents (such as government and farming 
industry participants) evokes particular methodological concerns. Welch et al (2002) outline the 
challenges that permeate the fabric of elite interviewing. They define elites as a ‘group in society 
considered to be superior because of the power, talent, privileges etc. of its members’ (Welch et al, 
2002,  p. 613). Issues such as obtaining access to participants, power dynamics between the 
researcher and the researched, and openness and frankness that the researcher can expect from the 
participants can be challenging when engaging with elite participants. Desmond (2004) concurs, 
identifying power asymmetries as the main obstacle when engaging with the elites.   
To mitigate such challenges, I adopted a number of strategies. In terms of access, assuming 
the role of an informed outsider is a suggested strategy for approaching the elites (Welch et al., 2002). 
As it was mentioned above, my researcher status was emphasised when participants were contacted 
and my university affiliation facilitated the recruitment of participants. To address the challenge of 
power dynamics and differences in professional values, participants were encouraged to see the 
interview as a stimulating intellectual discussion, in which academic neutrality and empathy towards 
the respondent play the key role, helping to achieve maximum openness and frankness (Welch et al., 
2002). I endeavoured to remain friendly and polite in my email correspondence and during all my 
interviews, aiming to establish a good rapport with the interviewees. Most of the elite respondents 
proved to be very friendly and engaging, despite their social status and the topic of the research. It is 
believed that the manner in which the research was presented (as it was discussed in the Data 
Collection section) helped to ease tension during interviewing.   
However, some of my interview requests were declined and many were not answered after 
repeated reminders and phone calls. The first participant recruitment email or letter was usually 
followed by a reminder within two weeks if no response was received. If the second invitation to 
participate was ignored, the third reminder was sent, after which the participant was marked as 
‘unavailable’ in the interview database. Some interview requests were declined on the grounds of 
commercial sensitivities, as farming industry participants requested that I obtain appropriate non-
disclosure agreements to interview them. The latter was not possible in the scope of this research. 
Some participants (such as the government) used the formal protocol – directing my questions to the 
press office – as a strategy to side-line my invitations to participate in this research. Despite multiple 
requests to clarify the status of my questions, no formal response was obtained from most of the 
DAERA participants and all NIEA participants. Additionally, one government participant did not 
attend the interview after it was scheduled and ignored the requests to re-schedule it. It was assumed 
that the controversial nature of the topic might have dissuaded government officials from engaging 
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with this research. Moreover, prioritisation of Brexit agendas might have impeded some government 
officials’ response. 
The challenge of access in my research resulted in one of its limitations. The scope of 
participants turned out to be narrower than was initially planned. Most significantly, the primary data 
from the national government is underrepresented for reasons outlined above. One DAERA 
participant that agreed to be interviewed may have been biased against the GfG strategy, and this 
bias needs to be taken into consideration. During the analysis, their opinion was not considered 
representative of the general stance of the DAERA. To fill this gap, secondary data produced by the 
DAERA and the NIEA were reviewed and it is believed that these documents helped to reflect the 
governmental position on farming intensification in the country. It was also expected that other 
corporate farming industry participants, such as meat processors, may make a valuable contribution 
to my research, yet none of the participants in that category who were contacted agreed to participate. 
To address this gap, secondary data such as newspaper articles and meat processors’ websites were 
studied on the subject of the role of processors in the meat supply chain. In addition, other industry 
participants were asked about the role of meat processors in the supply chain.  
Another potential limitation is related to the distribution of local resident participants. Most 
local residents interviewed were opposed to farming intensification in the area. Yet, two participants 
did not actively participate in environmental decision-making in relation to farming, which 
diversified the pool of local participants. Moreover, the predominance of the respondents who did 
express their concerns regarding the intensification allowed a deeper insight into recognitional and 
procedural environmental injustices in Northern Ireland. Finally, a case study method can also have 
its limitations. The issue of generalisation of case studies was discussed earlier in this chapter and it 
is worth reiterating that findings from the local level of inquiry do not purport to represent the 
dynamics of intensification in the whole of Northern Ireland. However, to increase the validity of the 
findings obtained from Antrim and Newtownabbey district residents, one local resident and one 
public-minded citizen from county Derry (Londonderry) were also interviewed. Moreover, 
secondary media data (Pig Business in Northern Ireland film) was also used to validate the case study 
findings.  
4.8 Positionality 
Sultana (2007) suggests that it is crucial to pay attention to positionality to undertake ethical research. 
Positionality is of particular importance in green criminological research; Natali (2013) proclaims 
that researcher’s theoretical, philosophical, and political-economic perspective determines whether 
an event or group of events are defined as ‘green crime’. Positionality refers to both the researcher’s 
worldview and the position adopted by the researcher in relation to a specific research task (Howell 
Major and Savin Baden, 2012). Both aspects of positionality in my research are explained below.   
In an attempt to understand how my presence and actions influence my study, I analysed the 
relevance of my own identity in this research (Wetherell, 2001). The researcher’s worldview, as 
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suggested earlier in the Ontology and epistemology section, is influenced by their values and beliefs. 
It is necessary that the researcher’s values always be declared so that readers can assess the 
procedures of the research and its outcomes (Sollund 2017). Consequently, no inquiry is value-free 
(Shrader-Frechette, 2002). Identity influences the selection of the topic (Wetherell, 2001). My values 
as a vegetarian had a profound impact on the choice of the topic for my research. My values also 
shaped my negative attitude towards intensive farming and its impacts on the environment and the 
lives of non-human animals. Moreover, the intensive mode of meat production is intertwined with 
the capitalist mode of production, and it needs to be emphasised that I remain critical of the latter as 
well. These values and beliefs shaped the design of the integrative theoretical framework for my 
study and shaped my formulation of the research questions whereby I assumed from the outset that 
intensive farming led to environmental injustice.  
Researcher identity also influences the data collection. Therefore, my influence on 
participants and the way they presented information in interviews needs to be considered (Wetherell 
2001). My political allegiance and religion did not influence the course of my research because of 
my ‘outsider’ researcher status and me having no Northern Irish background. Yet, my geographical 
location might have impacted my interviewees’ perspectives – my institutional affiliation with an 
English university might have influenced some of the responses: England was mentioned rather 
frequently, in both positive and negative contexts. Moreover, me not having any background in 
farming (which was also mentioned on several occasions) might have influenced some responses as 
participants might have chosen not to use technical terms related to the industry to facilitate my 
understanding of the topic.  
Thirdly, data analysis reflects the theoretical, epistemological, and ontological assumptions 
of the researcher (Schally 2018) and research findings are inseparable from the researcher’s 
positionality. The findings chapters intend to describe phenomena as they are, avoiding the 
presentation based on perception or wishful thinking (Howell Major and Savin Baden, 2012). 
However, the bottom line of my research is to regard intensive farming as a harmful practice, 
critically evaluate the processes that shape it and establish how it leads to environmental injustice. 
The question of taking sides is perennial in criminology (Brisman and South, 2016) and the fact that 
intensive farming is seen as a harmful practice might imply that I am not ‘siding’ with the corporate 
actors in the farming industry. Yet, as it was stated above, no research in social sciences can be value-
free, and the process of taking sides is seen as inevitable.   
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the methodological approach adopted in my research. It described the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions in it – critical realism and interpretivism, justified the 
choice of the case study method and discussed how the fieldwork location and participants for this 
research were chosen. For the macro level of analysis, the capital of Northern Ireland was chosen as 
the research location. For the micro level of analysis, the choice of Antrim and Newtownabbey 
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district was justified by the opportunity to study the process of pig farming intensification, the harms 
from existing farms, and the process of environmental decision-making around new farms. This 
chapter also detailed methods of data collection, which included semi-structured interviews and the 
analysis of secondary data. Furthermore, the process of thematic analysis in combination with 
comparative analysis employed to analyse data in this research was explained, which was followed 
by the discussion of ethics in my research, as well as of the challenges and limitations that my 
research encountered. Finally, my positionality as a researcher was explained to clarify my stance in 
























Chapter 5 – The political economy of pig farming intensification in 
Northern Ireland 
5.1 Introduction  
The first findings chapter provides an analysis of pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland, and 
power relations that support and reinforce it, in particular in the context of the GfG agri-food strategy. 
For that, a detailed look at the political economy of farming intensification is needed. This chapter 
is structured around the three levels of inquiry that originated from the thematic analysis in my 
research. First, the chapter analyses the political economic arrangements on the international level of 
meat production. It demonstrates how macro level arrangements shape the ambition for growth 
consolidated by the GfG in Northern Ireland. The chapter demonstrates how a ‘regime of permission’ 
(Bernat and Whyte, 2017, p. 71) for intensification was and continues to be established by analysing 
the catalysts for harm – motivation, opportunity structures and operationality of control – on the 
national level. The chapter demonstrates how state-industry symbiotic relations work to eliminate 
the alternatives to a market-oriented, profit-driven model of farming.  Finally, the chapter analyses 
how both the international and national arrangements encourage farming intensification on the local 
level. It concludes by critically analysing political economic linkages between international, national, 
and local levels of meat production and highlighting how the pursuit of the intensification 
agenda protects the hegemony of the dominant capitalist order.  
5.2 Macro level political economic arrangements  
This section subjects the findings related to international political economic arrangements for meat 
production to a critical analysis and concludes by identifying how these arrangements might 
influence the decisions made on the national level in Northern Ireland. The analysis of global trends 
provides an insight into ‘larger-scale political economic arrangements that define the particular 
relationship between capital and the national state and shape the opportunities and rewards’ (Kramer 
and Michalowski, 2012, p. 77) for harmful activities, which in my case is intensification of pig 
farming.   
Nearly all interviewees emphasised the dominance of a market rule ideology, as evidenced 
by one of the quotes: ‘The market is the market, and we have to accept that; we can’t change it’ 
(AFSB001). The prevailing perception was of the market as a rational entity that determines global 
economic development and drives progress. The market was perceived as an unknowable machine 
that operates by the rules beyond human control, which cannot be challenged or questioned, thus 
echoing Slobodian’s (2018) thinking. This opinion reflects the logic of capitalist political economic 
order where market systems are regarded to be the only rational way in which production can be 
organised (Pearce and Tombs, 1998). Related to market rationality is the ability of the market to 
allocate production resources in the most efficient way (Peine and McMichael, 2005). One of the 
examples of this characteristic of the global market is animal feed production:  
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‘Then you look at the big cost of [a pig farming] business – animal feed. You are working in 
a global supply chain so there’s volatility in feed prices. Soya comes from North America or 
Brazil. You can also use canola – it comes from Canada; you can also use rapeseed from the 
EU but it’s not as efficient as soya. [It can be a challenge] but the market finds a way, and it 
finds a way that is most efficient. And it is most efficient to bring it from all over the world 
than grow it locally. The market drives efficiency. We can’t produce it as cheaply as 
they can’ (UFU002). 
The global market rule eliminates geographical barriers (Slobodian, 2018) as it is more profitable to 
import animal feed than produce it nationally. It is evident that motivation of profit seeps into the 
discourse of market rationality in relation to its ability to allocate production resources. Yet, capitalist 
commitment to profit (Pearce, 1976) achieved through the allegedly efficient use of resources is 
characterised by the uneven distribution of benefits and burdens from the global circulation of capital 
and goods. As I showed in Chapter 3, the rise in pork prices since 2004 went hand in hand with the 
rise in animal feed prices. While the prices for animal feed are rising, the costs of its production 
remain low (Friends of the Earth, 2008). This dynamic, stemming from the internationalisation of 
production (Bonanno and Busch, 2015) where resources are allocated ‘efficiently’ by the free market, 
privileges corporate actors involved in feed production (Peine and McMichael, 2005) at the expense 
of other actors (such as local communities and small farmers) involved (Brisman et al, 2014). 
Furthermore, the discourse of market rationality obscures power relations behind it that aim to 
produce ‘the image of the market as ‘the state of nature’’ (Neveu, 2018, p. 365). One of the examples 
of power relations concealment is the subsidy support, which is provided for animal feed and animal 
products (Stoll-Kleemann and Schmidt, 2015). Policies on the EU level have continuously 
guaranteed the availability of cheap animal feed, maintained the competitive level of meat prices on 
the international market and also regulated the market internally (Greenpeace, 2019).  
Finally, the environmental toll of market rationality in animal feed production needs to be 
considered. As one respondent articulated it, ‘you are wiping out land in South America to grow the 
feed, it gets shipped over here to feed the animals here and pork is exported’ (NGO002). This 
globalisation of monoculture agribusiness (soya monoculture, in this case) driven by food production 
corporations (Goyes and South, 2016) leads to biodiversity loss, deforestation, soil erosion, and 
desertification (Wyatt, 2014). Thus, it is challenging to acknowledge market rationality in its 
allocation of resources, as this model tends to privilege a small number of its advocates who extract 
economic value while creating uneven geographical development (Harvey, 2000), where profit is 
made at the expense of the integrity of the global environment.  Thus, the idea of rationality in market 
rule ideology serves the needs of profit accumulation while posing risks of harming the environment.  
Market rule ideology is underpinned by the forces of demand and supply. According to the 
industry respondents, the global market is characterised by an increasing demand for pork: 
‘The phenomenon we’re witnessing at the moment is the emerging developing economies. 
Opportunities to meet their demand are endless. We are guilty of navel-gazing in the UK and 
not realising that bigger opportunities exist outside the borders’ (AFSB001).  
The context of the global market presents ample opportunities to maximise profits: ‘When you see 
demand, it’s an opportunity for price increases and margin increases. So, the industry is told that it’s 
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a demand that needs to be supplied’ (UFU002). Industry respondents employed the argument of 
market rationality once again, presenting national pork production increases in Northern Ireland as a 
sensible response towards the international demand for meat. It cannot be denied that social context 
is an important element of the political economic background of farming intensification in Northern 
Ireland, as meat consumers continue to support the treadmill of production. While simply 
reproducing their social practices, they become locked into ‘a treadmill of consumption’ (Curran, 
2017, p. 32). Within the treadmill of consumption, there exists demand for low-cost pork, which was 
emphasised particularly by the GfG strategy authors, large-scale farmers and UFU respondents 
(AFSB001; FAR001; UFU001; UFU002) who identified the need to meet this demand.  
Yet, this argument once again presents a depoliticised image of the global market and the 
economic sphere (Slobodian, 2018) where the majority of the industry and political actors disembed 
themselves from influencing the global demand for pork. The argument of the primal role of 
consumption masks power relations that underpin globalised capitalist political economy (Gould et 
al, 2003), which was demonstrated by a government respondent: ‘If we cannot produce the demand, 
someone somewhere else in the world will produce it’ (DAERA001). Ultimately, production takes 
place before consumption and producers have the capacity to construct consumer desires and needs 
(Gould et al, 2003) due to their control of the decisions around production. The above-mentioned 
environmental externalities of low-cost production are masked as Northern Irish producers use the 
image of environmentally-friendly farming and emphasise meat quality associated with it to sell their 
foods on the global market: 
 
‘We have a lot of small companies, small family farms and it’s good for Northern Ireland 
because they do create that image that people do like to see’ (AFSB002). 
‘The thrust of the work Invest NI do would be ‘pure natural quality’. Invest NI would be 
selling Northern Irish food on the basis of that at events and exhibitions: traceability of food, 
food fortress, farm traceability is probably the best in the world, and the quality of food – 
it’s coming from Northern Ireland, from the best grass-fed cattle’ (InvestNI001).  
Producers’ meaning of ‘green’ (Lynch and Stretesky, 2003) is used for economic ends and this 
agenda downplays the environmental damage associated with intensive meat production on the 
national level. It is production, rather than consumption, which is in a direct relationship with 
ecosystems through resource extraction (Gould et al, 2003). Consumers have little influence over the 
ecological impacts of production decisions and can do little to reverse the harmful nature of the 
dominant manner of meat production (Emel and Neo, 2015), which Northern Ireland seeks to 
emulate. Therefore, the argument of global demand for pork being presented as unquestionable 
masks the power of meat producers over demand manipulation, thus guaranteeing perpetuation of 
the current capitalist model of meat production based on profit accumulation.  
Furthermore, global demand for pork opens opportunities for production export. Opening 
new export markets is seen as a progressive step, as advocates of free trade regard mobility as 
synonymous with progress (Morris, 2001). Northern Ireland is under pressure to make the most of 
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its export returns to succeed on the global arena where markers of a successful economy are defined 
in economic terms: 
 
‘But as a relatively small country that does not have many resources, Northern Ireland has 
to focus on the countries that provide best returns. So Northern Ireland sees real growth 
opportunities in the Middle East and Far East. <…> It becomes a premium product and 
commands a much higher price <…>’ (InvestNI001). 
‘Because we do not have a big market on our doorstep (NI is a small country), the demand 
isn’t here to meet the supply that we can produce. So, we are forced to sell externally, over 
70% of animal products produced in NI are sold outside NI. I think growing export markets 
is our only option, we either sell more to GB or to export markets’ (DAERA001). 
The comments above demonstrate that Northern Ireland’s decision to open new export markets 
particularly in the Middle East and Far East is a response to a strain caused by limited opportunities 
to maximise profit domestically. Both Merton (1937) and, later, Agnew (2001) argue that when 
profit-making becomes the core goal, a strain to achieve it results in deviance. In my case, the goal 
of profit-making is the dominant goal within the globalised political economy of neoliberal 
capitalism; structural barriers on the national level in Northern Ireland that prevent both farming 
industry and state actors from achieving this goal lead to an environmentally harmful intensification 
of production that serves to meet the demand from the export markets. This idea needs to be explored 
further. 
Embeddedness in the profit-driven competitive global market rule ideology determines the 
rules of pork production. Faber (2008) claims that in order to compete on the global market, the 
business needs to stay efficient. Ultimately, if efficiency of production is improved, growth will occur 
faster (Schnaiberg, 1980). Efficiency was emphasised by the vast majority of the Northern Irish 
farming industry and state actors (AFSB001; AFSB002; FAR001; InvestNI001; InvestNI002; 
UFU003): ‘It is what the society wants frankly – producers will end up producing what the market 
wants. If that is what the market wants, it’s our job to produce it as efficiently as we can’ (UFU002). 
Efficiency, from the perspective of the political economy of capitalism, encompasses two interrelated 
dimensions. Its first dimension is lowering of production costs to maximise profit (Faber, 2008; 
Schnaiberg, 1980) and, therefore, economic efficiency (Tudge, 2003): ‘<…> you want to be 
efficient, you want to drive down costs and increase your margin out of a more profitable industry 
<…>’ (InvestNI001). However, this comment ignores the fact that profitability of the industry 
depends on unsustainable and environmentally harmful forms of production, and intensive farming 
is an example of this. Its harmful nature is related to the scale of production, another dimension of 
efficiency. Lower costs of production can be achieved by increasing production (Duffy, 2009). It has 
been claimed that in large, high-capacity, high-technology pig farms production costs were 25 
percent lower than in a small, low-technology farms (Neo and Emel, 2017). Some Northern Irish 
farming industry respondents acknowledged that large-scale production is more conducive to 
efficiency: ‘A big unit could be the most efficient, best way to produce food’ (AFSB001).  
The motivation to produce pork more efficiently on a larger scale is amplified by the pressure 
to compete internationally, which resonates with the comments above. Some respondents lamented 
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the structural reality of farming in Northern Ireland, identifying the predominance of small farms as 
a barrier for competition on the global market (InvestNI001). They voiced the need to ‘catch up 
quickly’ (UFU002) through organising production more efficiently and reaping the benefits that 
come with a larger scale of production (UFU002; InvestNI002): ‘In Northern Ireland most of our pig 
farms are very small – in China they can have one farm with 36,000 sows. So, in order to compete, 
you have to keep up’ (UFU002). The realities of the global political economy promote a 
criminogenic idea of efficiency by normalising lower production costs and a larger scale of 
production, thus setting unrealistic goals for the Northern Irish farming industry: ‘If you have other 
parts of the world that are moving to larger farms and better economies of scale, there’s no doubt 
that [small farms in Northern Ireland] would become more of a challenge’ (InvestNI001). The 
discrepancy between the global goals for meat production and the difficulty in achieving these goals 
in Northern Ireland due to its predominance of small-scale farming create a strain. In response to the 
strain (Merton, 1938), the GfG strategy was developed by the major corporate actors in the farming 
industry, encouraging growth through the pursuit of environmentally and socially harmful farming 
intensification.  
5.2.1 Summary 
To summarise, this section demonstrated that macro level political economic arrangements for meat 
production are structured in accordance with the neoliberal market rule ideology aimed at 
accumulation of capital. Market rule ideology has turned profit into the global ethic (Findlay, 1999; 
Ruggiero and South, 2013; Rothe and Friedrichs, 2015) and those abiding by this ideology take 
advantage of ‘anything that will increase profits’ (Stretesky et al, 2013, p. 97).  
Embeddedness in the frameworks of the global capitalist market builds up pressures on 
individual countries since material goals of success become the primary focus (Merton, 1938; Cheng, 
2011). The globalisation of markets results in an ‘acceleration’ of the treadmill of production (Gould 
et al, 1996) on the national level. My respondents frequently emphasised the discrepancy between 
the need to meet the global pressures and the structural opportunities that exist to meet them; the 
dominant mode of meat production in Northern Ireland characterised by small farms is not equipped 
to meet such pressures. This discrepancy is associated with strain (Merton, 1938), as Northern Irish 
corporate farming industry actors were frustrated with the availability of the means to realise the 
overarching goal of economic success in meat production. The GfG strategy, focused on growth 
through intensification, consolidated this ambition. While embeddedness in the global market system 
creates pressure to compete on the global arena, it also opens up new opportunities for profit-making. 
In my case, the latter included opening new export markets justified by a global demand for pork. 
Thus, the triad of profit, growth, and efficiency (Passas, 1990) dominates the global organisation of 
meat production. 
The logic of the global market is also essential for a successful dissemination of common 
sense in farming. In the case of the ordinary harm of intensive meat production, contrary to 
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rationalising deviant behaviour, where ‘actors convince themselves that in their particular 
circumstances an exception is acceptable’ (Passas, 2000, p. 20), the ideas of common sense centre 
on why the Northern Irish farming industry should be fitting the global norm. Therefore, ‘it is not 
deviance from, but adherence to, legal norms that presents itself as problematic…’ (Halsey, 1997, p. 
225). The discourse of market rationality was presented as common sense and disseminated as part 
of an ongoing process of securing the hegemony of market-driven production (Whyte, 2016). Part of 
the discourse of market rationality included an increasing demand for pork globally, which diverted 
the attention from the profit-oriented ethos of the capitalist market economy. The authors of the GfG 
strategy and other industry respondents framed meat consumption as a normal and even necessary 
act. Social context and contemporary meat consumption do provide the integral support for the 
treadmill of meat production. In my case, social context served as a vital part of disseminating 
common-sense ideas where the industry actors could absolve themselves of the responsibility for 
meat production increase. Instead, they transferred the responsibility to the global and national meat 
consumers, creating a semblance of consumer agency. While meat consumption can be interpreted 
as an ‘ordinary harm’ that contributes to ecocide (Agnew, 2013), I also demonstrated that consumer 
power in influencing the processes of production is rather limited (Gould et al, 2003).   
Global political economic arrangements thus normalise the neoliberal, productivist agenda 
(Cheshire and Lawrence, 2005) in farming, fostering adaptations to global economic expectations 
and pressures (Passas, 1990) and simultaneously providing its legitimacy on the national level in the 
country. Yet, this agenda also demonstrates the association between capitalism and environmental 
harm (Lynch et al, 2016). The next section will demonstrate how state and industry actors respond 
to the political economic arrangements on the macro level, ultimately increasing the likelihood of 
environmental and social harm from embracing a more intensive model of pig farming geared 
towards capital accumulation.  
5.3 Meso level political economic arrangements  
Transformations on the national level cannot be seen in isolation from the global arrangements (Aas, 
2013). As the previous section demonstrated, national meat production is firmly embedded in the 
global context. This section analyses the workings of power relations that supported and reinforced 
the pursuit of the goal of profit-making through efficient pig meat production on the national level 
in Northern Ireland. It unpacks and analyses the first catalyst for harm – motivation behind farming 
intensification in the context of the GfG agri-food strategy, proceeding to analyse the second catalyst 
for harm – the opportunity structure shaping farming intensification. It subsequently analyses the 
third catalyst for harm – operationality of control in relation to farming intensification, both in the 





5.3.1 Motivation  
Embeddedness in the context of the globalised capitalist market, with a high emphasis on the goal of 
financial success incentivises more efficient meat production, with intensification being at its core. 
Such dynamics influenced the development of the GfG strategy, and the goals set by its authors – the 
AFSB. The latter are analysed below.  
The dominance of the market rule ideology on the macro level was reflected in the responses, 
as they revealed the goal of organising farming efficiently as a priority. According to both the AFSB 
members and other farming industry actors, an efficient industry organises production in line with 
the rules of supply and demand. The goal of efficiency also implied competitiveness, a characteristic 
visible on the macro level: ‘If you’re going full-on capitalist, the inefficient fall away, only the 
competitive are left’ (UFU002). More intensive production was seen as more efficient and as a 
standard to aspire to for some respondents (AFSB002; UFU002):  
‘Do we need to intensify, or do we need to make our farms more efficient? Those are two 
things that are not necessarily mutually exclusive. <…> It’s a matter of driving efficiencies 
- on a land mass of our size, do we need 25,000 farms?’ (InvestNI002).  
 
The goal of efficiency was also associated with the introduction of automation and new technologies 
on farms (InvestNI002; AFSB001; AFSB002; UFU001): ‘The industry needs to become 
more efficient and that happens if automation is increased’ (InvestNI001). Technological innovation 
was presented as a value neutral (Borgmann, 2017) element of efficiency. Such argument conceals 
the fact that introduction of automation and new technologies may be linked to intensification of 
production (AFSB002; FAR001; UFU002; UFU003):  
‘With a sensible application of technology you could solve any challenges in Northern 
Ireland easily. But that means that we have to get a lot of people to agree, and with 20,000 
farmers…’ (AFSB002).  
 
The goal of efficiency was applied to the animals as some respondents (AFSB002; UFU002; 
UFU003) suggested that the use of livestock genetics should be promoted to result in more ‘efficient 
animals’: ‘<…> it’s not only about faster growing pigs but about the pigs that suit the system, that 
are more efficient’ (AFSB001). Efficiency in animals is linked to profitability of the industry and 
animal bodies become an accumulation strategy (Harvey, 2006). The desire for profit creates an 
environment where the development of efficient animals is no longer perceived as abuse, but instead 
becomes an appropriate means of driving capital accumulation (Nurse, 2013). Thus, the global push 
for economic success in the organisation of meat production placed a greater emphasis on the 
attainment of the goal of efficiency in Northern Ireland. The latter was reflected in the GfG strategy’s 
ambition for a more intensive production that relied on technological and research innovation.   
Additionally, the goal of efficiency was interlinked with the goal of professionalism in 
farming. The goal of professionalism was seen as essential for the industry to stay competitive 
(AFSB001, AFSB002; UFU001). ‘Professional’ farmers were identified to be those driving the 
industry’s profitability and its ability to respond to the needs of the market (AFSB001; UFU001; 
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UFU002; InvestNI001); in other words, those in tune with the macro level political economic 
arrangements for meat production. A more professional industry was seen as more likely to organise 
its production efficiently. As efficient production was associated with the introduction of 
technological innovation, and so was professional farming, as defined by some respondents. As a 
result, a generational divide in farming was considered to be problematic and the need to enhance 
the skills of the existing older generation of farmers and attract younger people to agriculture was 
identified as a priority (UFU001). The need to attract younger farmers was perceived as particularly 
acute since younger farmers were perceived as more willing to take professional risks (UFU002) and 
develop as entrepreneurial farmers. 
As I showed in the previous section, the discourse of market rationality on the macro level 
was frequently used to present the goals of introducing a more intensive and concentrated model of 
farming as common sense. Similarly, on the meso level the dissemination of common sense was done 
to provide consent (Gramsci, 1971) to the changing model of farming. It was done by disseminating 
a moral argument that suggested that changes in meat production needed to happen in Northern 
Ireland among other places as Northern Irish producers have higher standards of production 
(UFU001; UFU003): ‘There’s clearly a need to produce food, this is an opportunity for us and do it 
properly, the best way we can’ (AFSB002). By appealing to higher loyalties (Sykes and Matza, 
1957), farming industry actors justified the pursuit of the goals of efficiency and professionalism and 
removed potential feelings of guilt that can arise during the later evaluation of the environmental and 
animal welfare impact of farming intensification (Mackenzie and Yates, 2015). 
Moreover, the idea of intensifying production domestically for the greater good of not 
‘exporting our challenges to the parts of the world where they can’t mitigate them as well as we 
can’ (AFSB002) and not ‘shifting the problem’ of production elsewhere (DAERA001), also justified 
the pursuit of the goals of efficiency and professionalism. The idea of not wanting to shift the problem 
of production elsewhere because Northern Ireland is able to mitigate the production risks better 
reveals the dependency of capitalist political economy on the fictional discrepancy between the 
modern and wealthy west, and the backward and poor ‘other’ (Blaney and Inayatullah, 2010). 
Northern Irish farming industry actors presented their actions as philanthropic, suggesting that their 
decision to intensify production domestically may benefit others rather than themselves and thus 
detracted the attention from the harmful nature of this endeavour. The above-mentioned ideas of 
common sense were presented in a manner that showed that it was in the national interest of Northern 
Ireland to increase meat production through intensification. Yet, the ‘national interest’ can be 
confused with private business interests (White and Kramer, 2015), working to secure their 
hegemony. In my case, economic interests of the corporate farming industry actors (such as the 
AFSB) carried considerable economic and political clout and were prioritised over the interests of 
the population and the environment.  
To conclude, the first catalyst for the environmentally harmful pig farming intensification 
included the goals formulated by the AFSB within the GfG strategy; they reflected the macro level 
motivation where increases in production are sought to drive financial success, the main ambition of 
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capitalism (Pearce, 1976). The AFSB employed the argument of the market rule to formulate the 
goals of efficiency in meat production and professionalism of the farming industry. Yet, the 
implications of pursuing this trajectory are far-reaching. The goal of professionalism encourages 
farmers to prioritise economic sustainability and strive to achieve economic efficiency in farming. 
The latter is characterised by competitiveness rather than cooperation, intensive and technology- and 
automation-dominated production with a utilitarian approach to animals. It has been suggested that 
‘pressure for profits’ is the most compelling factor behind crime and harm (Kramer, 1982, p. 81). 
The motivation and the subsequent goals set out by the authors of the GfG strategy ignore the 
environmental externalities arising from the lawful activity of meat production intensification and 
downplay social harms related to intensification. Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) claim that the means 
that are most effective in achieving the set goals are likely to be selected. The next subsection 
discusses the opportunity structure constructed by the GfG authors with the state support to achieve 
the above discussed goals.  
5.3.2 Opportunity structure  
5.3.2.1 Goal of efficient farming   
In the context of strain, opportunities must be available for crime and harm to happen (Vaughan, 
2002). In this subsection, I start the discussion of the second catalyst for environmentally harmful 
farming intensification – the opportunity structure created to achieve the above discussed goals. The 
opportunity structure to achieve the goal of efficiency in meat production included propagating the 
discourse against small-scale farms, providing material support for technological innovation and 
research into efficient production.    
5.3.2.1.1 Discourse against small-scale farms 
The discourse against small-scale farms appeared within the GfG strategy and found resonance 
among the corporate farming industry respondents. Considering that growth within the farming 
industry has come mainly from pig and poultry production (DAERA, 2020) in the last decade, the 
strategy encouraged further intensification of both sectors. While the strategy presented small farms 
as ‘a major element of our economy’, it stated that ‘they also present a significant challenge in terms 
of long-term sustainability’ (AFSB, 2013, p. 23). Moreover, the GfG Chair also suggested to the 
Agriculture and Environment Committee that only 6000 farmers were needed for food production 
(Macauley, 2016). In my interviews, a significant number of respondents also dismissed small-scale 
farming in favour of large-scale, more intensive farms (AFSB002, UFU001, UFU002, UFU003):  
 
‘A big unit could be the most efficient, best way to produce food. Small farming looks nice 
in practice but if those small farmers can’t make enough money to educate their kids, have a 
car, buy things, they won’t be there’ (AFSB001). 
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‘Most small farmers in NI say that they’re quite happy with their small farms, they have a 
huge connection with their land because that land was handed down through generations. 
The question is then that it increasingly becomes unviable’ (InvestNI001). 
The comments above demonstrate how a consensus around efficient farming is created; the latter 
secures the hegemony of the dominant capitalist order (Gramsci, 1971). The discourse of dismissal 
of small-scale farms translated into tangible actions that served to catalyse harmful farming 
intensification. The GfG strategy offered little support to small family farms (Attorp and McAreavey, 
2020), as I will also demonstrate later. Its focus on expanding intensive farming served to eliminate 
the alternatives to the market-oriented profit-driven model of farming, which was exemplified by the 
critique of subsidies that provide support for small-scale farms; the latter were seen as an antithesis 
of efficiency by my respondents (UFU001; UFU002): ‘You can say that the subsidy in the past 
encouraged the way of farming that isn’t efficient enough’ (UFU003). While this scepticism 
regarding the role of the state resonates with the neoliberal ethos of expanding markets and shrinking 
of the state (Whyte, 2016), this particular instance of the neoliberal rollback of the state (Glassman, 
2007) disadvantages small-scale farms that are supported by the subsidy:  
 
‘<…> they are getting 87% of their income from the subsidy. If you want to encourage 
keeping smaller businesses, you are going down the socialist model, but it isn’t good from 
the efficiency point of view’ (UFU002). 
 
Efficiency is intolerant of government intervention if the latter stands in the way of profit-making. 
In my case, the idea against government intervention overlapped with the idea against small-scale 
farms. The state actors reproduced the same idea: ‘I’m not that keen on supporting the industry with 
funding at all. I’d rather see the market drive demand’ (DAERA001). Propagation of the discourse 
against small-scale farms results in the institutionalisation of the ideas of efficient production in 
practice (Jackson, 1989), and the post-Brexit Agriculture Bill exemplifies that. As Chapter 3 showed, 
the Post-Brexit Agriculture Bill aims to replace the current system of the CAP Direct Payments to 
encourage less efficient farmers to leave the sector16. Aspirations to withdraw state support and revert 
to market support may result in a further decrease of small farms and an increase in more intensive 
production.  
The first element of the opportunity structure to achieve the goal of efficiency – the discourse 
directed against small-scale farms – was perpetuated by the GfG strategy authors and validated 
intensification by reproducing the relations of domination of large-scale, intensive farming 
 
16 This is not to suggest that the CAP subsidy is immune from controversy. It has been claimed that 
the majority of agricultural subsidies today are received by the wealthiest (Carolan, 2012). As a 
result, the CAP direct payments based on the area of land in production have been criticised for their 
disproportionate favouring of large-scale producers and marginalisation of smallholder farmers 
(Kay, 2016) and their promotion of farming industrialisation (Greenpeace, 2019). However, Northern 
Ireland has higher levels of the CAP direct support since a large proportion of its farms are located 
in the Less Favoured Areas (LFAs) and the majority of such farms are small-scale (House of 




businesses over small-scale farms. As the discourse against small-scale farms achieved what Gramsci 
(1971) would identify as the ‘common sense’ status, it generated, in Bourdieu’s (1990) words, 
‘common-sense’ behaviour, encouraging large-scale production. The discourse resonated with the 
state actors; through withdrawing subsidy support for small-scale farmers, the state contributed to 
shaping the ‘regime of permission’ (Whyte, 2014, p. 241) for more efficient farming and 
consolidating a ‘deeper architecture of power in which states guarantee corporations various 
privileges and infrastructural capacities’.  
5.3.2.1.2 Material support for technological innovation 
The opportunity structure also includes material support that addresses mechanisation and 
technological innovation of production to achieve the goal of efficiency, thus echoing Schnaiberg’s 
(1980, p. 130) statement that ‘technological investment is the most efficient path to growth’. Some 
of that material support was provided within the framework of the GfG strategy. The strategy authors 
pronounced it ‘essential that Government seeks to support technologies complementary to 
agricultural production rather than in competition with it’ (AFSB, 2013, p. 35), as evidenced by one 
of the comments: ‘the principle was that equipment and technology was needed to manage the 
land and that would then be supported by the programmes from the government’ (AFSB002). Under 
GfG, £250 million of the government funding was initially expected (AFSB, 2013) for the Farm 
Business Improvement Scheme, eventually amounting to £60 million instead (AFSB002):  
‘We put capital support in place with significant grants so that farmers could buy equipment. 
We were pretty prescriptive about what kind of equipment we wanted them to buy. Lots of 
farmers did not want to buy what is called abatement equipment because they saw it as a 
threat rather than an opportunity to do it better. And that is the dynamic you face. It is easier 
to do it with big farms – there are not that many of them and you can have a much greater 
effect than trying to do it with 10,000 smaller farms’ (AFSB002).  
This quote demonstrates that within GfG material support was provided for specific types of farm 
equipment that mitigates the environmental impact of farming. Nearly all industry actors mentioned 
the environmental concerns and underscored the importance of environmental sustainability in 
farming, thus echoing the environmental challenges described in Chapter 3 (AFSB001; AFSB002; 
FAR001; RET001; UFU001; UFU002; UFU003). Similarly, the text of the GfG strategy (AFSB, 
2013) referred to environmental activities. An independent Expert Working Group established in 
201417 to produce a strategy reconciling the ambitions of GfG with the interests of the environment 
claimed that low-emission slurry-spreading equipment can be effective in some cases for mitigating 
the ammonia emissions (Expert Working Group on Sustainable Agricultural Land Management for 
N. Ireland, 2016; Davies, 2019). Yet, this technological innovation may be promoting intensification 
of production; as the above comment demonstrates, material support for technological innovation 
may be logistically easier to provide for larger farms. Furthermore, technological innovation support 
 
17 It is worth noting that the Chair of the Group is Director of Agriculture and Sustainability at a 
livestock nutrition company.  
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may also result in the concentration of capital in the large-scale farms (Greenberg, 1981) as they 
invest in the equipment that small-scale farms cannot afford. As evidenced by one of the respondents, 
‘all these [abatement] technologies become increasingly expensive and if you want to be a business 
that can carry that cost, you need to be a bigger business’ (UFU002). This discrepancy in capital 
concentration reproduces inequalities that are essential for the capitalist order to thrive (Henry, 1991).  
Technological innovation was perceived as a solution for environmental crisis in Northern 
Ireland. However, endowing technology with significant powers (Bonds and Downey, 2012) while 
intensifying production at the same time continues ecological disorganisation by polluting the 
environment (Lynch and Stretesky, 2014). Justification for material support provision for 
technological innovation was formulated by portraying small-scale farms as backward and 
environmentally unfriendly:  
 
‘We have many small farms that don’t have any rules and we have a planning system that 
once you go over a certain size, you have to do all sorts of things, everybody works to strain 
people who want to go big. That means that you do not have to invest in technology to abate 
it. <…> our agenda has been to make these farms bigger but to invest in technology to have 
as little impact on the environment as possible’ (AFSB002).  
To reiterate, technological innovation exonerates the economic dimension of a large-scale production 
increase; the latter was portrayed as environmentally friendly and sustainable, while the stigma was 
placed on small-scale producers by portraying them as backward and environmentally unfriendly. 
This juxtaposition guaranteed that the proponents of large-scale production could also claim that 
their interests in protecting the environment fit into the broader social context and therefore are 
benign rather than environmentally and socially harmful.  
Opportunity structure for technological innovation support included the anaerobic digestion 
(AD) subsidy previously discussed in Chapter 3. One of the recommendations of the GfG authors 
was to fast-track a solution for turning animal waste into energy and ‘remove a key uncertainty over 
the growth of the agri-food industry in Northern Ireland’ (AFSB, 2013, p.36); AD technology that 
turns animal waste into renewable energy was proposed as such a solution and AD sites were eligible 
for a subsidy support scheme. It was reported that the major meat processing companies lobbied the 
government for increased material support for AD, as a strategy to circumvent the European Union’s 
Nitrates Directive discussed in Chapter 3 and pursue goals of expansion articulated in the GfG 
(Source Material, 2018).The government created a team of officials to help one of the poultry 
companies, Moy Park (whose then director also chaired the GfG’s AFSB) expand its 
operations and simultaneously meet its EU obligations (Source Material, 2018; Gannon, 
2019). Between September 2014 and April 2017 there were 14 meetings between the corporate 
farming industry actors and the DAERA officials in which anaerobic digestion was discussed as a 
strategy for meeting the EU obligations (Source Material, 2018). Moreover, in 2015, the major meat 
processing companies successfully lobbied the government to keep subsidies at the top level, by 
which time they were four times higher than anywhere else in the UK (Source Material, 2018). 
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The economic clout exercised by the industry ‘makes them potent claimants on the public 
trough and potent influencers on the list of public expenditures’ (Schnaiberg, 1980, p. 246). At the 
same time, the state also plays a crucial role of a backer and regulator of technological innovation 
(Pechlaner, 2012). The move to increase the subsidy level can be seen as economic growth support 
(Schnaiberg, 1980) masqueraded as a strategy to address environmental problems (De Geus, 2004). 
Both the government (DAERA and NIEA, 2016) and the bodies associated with the government 
expressed support for anaerobic digestion:  
‘Animal waste used to be considered a problem 10 years ago but now with anaerobic 
digestion it is seen as an asset. People used to want to get rid of waste but now they see value 
in it. But there were some issues with planning around AD, but still it needs to be looked at 
as an asset’ (InvestNI001). 
 
This quote demonstrates that while in the past environmental externalities were problematic, they 
now are ‘increasingly coming to be viewed as assets that can be addressed and solved by market-
based solutions’ (Lang and Klein, 2015, p. 197). Provision of subsidies for AD not only eliminates 
barriers that stall production expansion; it reinforces economic relationships within capitalism 
(Kramer and Michalowski, 2012) by turning the final product of the AD cycle into a commercial 
asset valued in monetary terms. Moreover, since efficiency can also equal economic growth 
(Schnaiberg, 1980), the subsidy support scheme also fulfils the goal of efficient farming: ‘You turn 
what is a problem into a resource, you’re making it more efficient’ (UFU002).  
Similarly to other forms of support for technological innovation, material support for AD 
technology can result in subsidy concentration in the hands of larger farmers and promote a more 
intensive form of production. AD plants in Northern Ireland range from 180kW to 500kW 
capacity. The subsidy mechanism offers the biggest returns for 500kW digesters (BBC News, 2018), 
and the latter are not suitable for the small farms. This sentiment was expressed by the UFU’s Senior 
Policy Officer: ‘tariffs were stacked in favour of largest installations. From the outset, the UFU felt 
that small scale should have been closer to 30kW and below’ (Farming Life, 2017). Therefore, lack 
of consideration of the needs of smaller farmers in relation to AD once again 
consolidated the dominance of larger-scale farms.   
To conclude, the opportunity structure to achieve the goal of efficiency in farming through 
technological innovation (in relation to both farm equipment and AD technology) becomes a 
condition for continued expansion of capitalism. It proves William Jevons’ conclusion (1865; Clark 
and Foster, 2001) that technology serves to increase production efficiency, not establish resource 
conservation, and consequently does not resolve the conflict between the environment and the 
economy (Lynch et al, 2017). This subsection also explored the role of the state in the project of 
neoliberal capitalism further, proving that the state remains vital to the market rule (Peine and 
McMichael, 2005; Slobodian, 2018). Meat production organised under the umbrella of neoliberal 
capitalism, thus, necessitates both ‘state rollback and state rollout’ (Glassman, 2007, p. 96). Industry-
state relations behind this part of the opportunity structure demonstrate how collaboration between 
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government and capital at both an institutional and an individual level works to facilitate the 
motivation of economic success in farming and results in state-corporate environmental harm.    
5.3.2.1.3 Material support for research into efficient production  
The opportunity structure that catalyses harm also includes material support for research to increase 
production efficiency. Scientific research shapes the environment in which the decisions are made 
by the economic and the state actors (Griffin and Spillane, 2016). Therefore, research can serve as a 
mechanism that further consolidates the market-oriented and profit-driven approach in farming. 
Industry actors were keen to recognise the importance of research (AFSB002):  
 
‘There is a perception of what some people describe as factory farms being worse from 
animal welfare and environmental points of view. It’s probably the reverse, it’s 
probably better but you’re probably quite early in that journey that haven’t got research to 
show it’ (UFU002).  
 
The production of knowledge is organised through growing academia-industry collaboration, where 
the state also plays an active role. The latter was particularly emphasised by the GfG authors as they 
suggested that ‘Government must commission research into measureable, best practice systems for 
sustainable intensification on-farm’ (AFSB, 2013, p. 36). As a result, several collaborations have 
been developed. The Agri-Food and Biosciences Institute (AFBI), for instance, is sponsored by the 
DAERA and was running 63 projects in 2017 with industry co-funding (AFBI, 2017). Some of the 
AFBI’s work in the pig sector supports increased efficiency (AFBI, 2015). One of the research 
projects on pig feed efficiency funded by the DAERA promises to ‘yield an extra performance value 
of at least £1m, if applied across the NI pig industry’ (Ley, 2018). Some of the pork industry funders 
include Pig Regen, John Thompson and Sons Ltd, Devenish Nutrition, JMW Farms Ltd and Rektify 
Ltd (AFBI, 2015). The nature of the projects sponsored by the industry echoes the goals that help 
responding to the broader political economic arrangements in meat production. Pig Regen fund 
research on efficient diets for pigs, feed efficiency and improving technical efficiency of pig 
production (Magowan and Ball, 2013). John Thompson and Sons Ltd and Devenish Nutrition provide 
funding on the efficient use of feed (Devenish Nutrition, 2019), while JMW Farms Ltd and Rektify 
Ltd fund research on practical management and nutrition (AFBI, 2017).  
It may be suggested that research into efficient farming is used as an instrument in achieving 
the overarching goal of driving the farming industry’s profitability. It, thus, becomes a form of, in 
Bourdieu’s (1990) terms, symbolic capital, which legitimises the economic ambition. Other 
initiatives positioned at the nexus of the farming industry and scientific research in Northern Ireland 
also address the broader capitalist discourse of profitability that underpins efficiency. For instance, 
the Institute for Global Food Security at Queen’s University Belfast aims to ‘develop a range of 
paradigm shifts in agricultural practices to enhance profitability and sustainability without 
compromising biodiversity and ecological stability’ (QUB, 2015) and secures large amounts of 
funding (£2m in 2017) (McKeown, 2017) by bringing together the agri-food industry needs and 
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scientific expertise. The Institute also hosts the Agri-Food Quest Competence Centre that was 
launched in 2015 (DAERA, 2016) under the auspices of the GfG strategy. The centre ‘is focused on 
increasing the level of collaborative research activity to support the agri-food industry growth 
strategy and help its competitiveness’ (Agri-Food Quest, 2020). Agri-Food Quest regards industry-
academia collaboration as crucial in helping the Northern Irish producers to withstand the 
competition in the global markets and grow ‘a sustainable, profitable, integrated agrifood supply 
chain’ (QUB, 2015). It was set up as a collaborative government-industry effort, with Invest NI 
providing £5m of research and development assistance and industry partners allocating £1.7m of 
investment (DAERA, 2016).  
To conclude, the knowledge base around efficient production reflects the dominant power 
interests and serves to generate consensus around the farming model that is needed in Northern 
Ireland. It serves as a ‘theoretical mirror’ and a theoretical validation (Althusser, 1971, p. 52) for 
pursuing an efficient model of farming. Through research, ‘cost-effective strategies’ (Snider, 2000) 
of meat production are reinforced, which ultimately serves the purpose of profit-making under 
neoliberal capitalism. Academic knowledge is suggested to play an important role in giving 
legitimacy to the powerful actors (Bittle et al, 2018). As Snider (2001, 2002) argues, some knowledge 
claims are more powerful because of their link to the structural dominance of capital. It is evident 
that the state plays an important role in co-shaping the opportunity structure for advancing research 
into efficient farming. The actions of the state are ‘subordinate’ to capital but not ‘dictated’ by it 
(Barak, 2015, p. 2). State-industry symbiosis through research emerges as an effective way ‘to help 
realise the dominant goals of profit and growth’ (Pearce, 1976, p. 102) in farming in the long run, 
thus reinforcing the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism.  
5.3.2.2 Goal of professionalism   
This subsection discusses the opportunity structure constructed to achieve the goal of professionalism 
in farming. As the GfG strategy suggests, ‘the achievement of our growth targets depends on 
innovation, entrepreneurship, and skills’ (AFSB, 2013, p. 37). The opportunity structure to achieve 
the goal of professionalism in farming includes education of farmers and organisation of business 
development groups, which are essential for ‘professionalising’ the industry and ensuring that it 
embraces efficient production to respond to the needs of the market.  
5.3.2.2.1 Education of farmers  
The respondents saw education of farmers as an important context for shaping the level of 
professionalism and cultivating the knowledge that farming should be treated as a business (Martin, 
1995), rather than as a vocation (Gray, 2019). The content of education conformed to the demands 
of the political economy of capitalism: ‘In the agricultural college I was always told that as a farmer 
you need to specialise and professionalise your industry, focus on your core strength’ (AFSB001). 
The idea of farming-as-a-business was also evident in the curriculum of one of the colleges providing 
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training in agriculture in Northern Ireland - College of Agriculture, Food and Rural Enterprise 
(CAFRE). It states that those considering a career in agriculture should be capable of availing of 
market opportunities; the courses in CAFRE are designed to be practical and ‘focused on the 
application of business, economic and scientific principles’ (CAFRE, 2020).  
The broader culture within educational institutions that embraces the realities of the political 
economy of capitalism may encourage deviant behaviour (Kramer and Michalowski, 2012) in 
relation to the environment by promoting large-scale farming:  
 
‘As an industry agriculture is fascinating because you get people who left school at 16 but 
you also get people who have a master’s in agriculture and agribusiness. Those who studied 
business are much more business-minded, they feel much more comfortable taking those big 
risks; they understand it more than those who did not get the education. They are more 
willing to jump from a small farm to a large enterprise’ (UFU002).  
 
The process of learning allows an individual to justify and neutralise their behaviour (Piquero et al, 
2005) and thus frame their chosen mode of meat production as progressive rather than harmful. In 
addition to education, another part of the opportunity structure to professionalise farming included 
business development groups. In 2016, over 3,000 farmers joined Business Development Groups 
under the auspices of the GfG strategy (AFSB, 2016). Similarly to education, the discourse of 
farming-as-a-business was the defining direction taken by business development groups. Business 
development groups offered a clear development plan for a farming business, an opportunity to 
improve farm profitability and keep up to date with the latest technologies (CAFRE, 2020). One of 
the authors of GfG also illustrated it: ‘We had business development groups for farmers 
to come together and we taught certain subjects. It is like an education programme. You have to tell 
them without telling them’ (AFSB002). This remark in particular demonstrates the power element in 
the development of an ‘entrepreneurial’ farmer (Martin, 1995) as corporate actors in the farming 
industry, driven by the global prescription for economic success, shape the consciousness of 
individual farmers. This comment demonstrates the manner in which power is exercised through 
consensus rather than coercion (Gramsci, 1971) as the entrepreneurial spirit in farmers is cultivated 
through the use of education as an instrument of soft power.  
Similarly to the opportunity structure for the goal of efficiency, the opportunity structure to 
achieve the goal of farming professionalism is co-constructed by the industry and the government. 
The respondents pointed out that ‘[the] government was prepared to give capital support and to put 
out mechanisms to improve education, training. So it is both this support but also the industry itself 
growing and investing in itself, making sure that there is a return on their investment’ (AFSB001). 
Indeed, CAFRE is funded by the DAERA and the total investment in skills development programmes 
within the framework of the GfG agri-food strategy totalled £18 million (DAERA, 2016). Therefore, 
‘institutions of economic production’ pursue a goal of professionalising farming in cooperation with 
‘institutions of political governance’ (Michalowski and Kramer, 2006, p. 15).  Education 
programmes and business development groups shape the environment that ultimately affects the 
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structure of farming businesses and the strategies that Northern Irish farmers pursue . The opportunity 
structure also provides a normative support (Vaughan, 1999) for individual farmers’ actions. The 
opportunity structure for the goal of professionalism shapes what Bourdieu (1990) refers to as 
‘cultural capital’ through education and training of farmers, thus attuning them to the goals of 
political economy of capitalism (Passas, 1990; Martin, 1995) and making them more inclined to 
organise their production in an efficient manner to meet the demands of the market.  
5.3.2.3 Summary 
The opportunity structure described above has been developed to pursue the motivation of profit-
making through efficient professionalised pig meat production in the context of the GfG agri-food 
strategy; it presents the second catalyst for environmentally harmful pig farming intensification in 
Northern Ireland. The opportunity structure catalyses harm by responding to the global ambitions of 
meat production. The discourse against small-scale farms as inefficient validates farming 
intensification and results in changing the structural conditions around the subsidy mechanism that 
supports small-scale farms. The propagation of this discourse by the GfG authors and the state works 
to eliminate the alternatives to the market-oriented profit-driven model of farming, thus reinforcing 
the hegemony of the dominant capitalist order. Material support for technological innovation also 
works in favour of large-scale farms and encourages intensification, simultaneously limiting the 
opportunities for small-scale farms. It vindicates the economic activity of large-scale production 
increase through portraying technological innovation as environmentally friendly. Material support 
for research into efficient production is employed as a tool that simultaneously seeks ways to increase 
production and legitimise the decisions made by corporate farming industry actors and the state. 
Finally, education of farmers is an instrument of soft power, which cultivates entrepreneurial spirit 
and works in line with the goals of the political economy of capitalism, conditioning individual 
farmers to organise their production in an efficient manner to meet the demands of the market.   
The question arises why these means have been identified as likely to achieve the goals of 
efficiency and professionalism in farming and respond to the meat production strain on the national 
level in Northern Ireland identified by the GfG authors. The chosen means present an amalgamation 
of material and ideological support for a profit-driven, efficient, and professionalised model of 
farming. Material support for technological innovation and research is enabled by the collaboration 
between political interests and the interests of capital. The state is necessary for sustaining the 
ideological structure of neoliberal capitalism in the long term (Harvey, 2005; Bittle et al, 2018) and 
can serve as a facilitator of the industry’s profitability (Bittle et al, 2018; Pechlaner and Otero, 2008). 
My analysis shows that free markets heavily depend on state interventionism, thus echoing Polanyi’s 
(1944) thinking. Corporate actors in the farming industry responsible for the development of the GfG 
strategy, being proponents and beneficiaries of neoliberal capitalism, are not seeking the 
disappearance of the institution of the state. Instead, they seek profit-generating incentives and a 
business-friendly regulatory environment (as will be explored in the next subsection), which is 
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reciprocated by the state (Slobodian, 2018). At the same time, the government itself has a significant 
interest in the economic growth through capital accumulation (Schnaiberg, 1980). As it was shown 
in Chapter 3, farming in Northern Ireland makes a substantial contribution towards economic 
expansion, which is necessitated in the context of the political economy of capitalism. Therefore, the 
government also reacts under the pressure to grow its economy and aims to salvage the capital 
(Schnaiberg, 1980). In this context, its support of GfG seems like a reasonable solution.  
The second catalyst for harm is dependent not only on material outcomes of the interactions 
between the state and the farming industry, but also on ‘moral and intellectual leadership’ (Pearce 
and Tombs, 1998, p. 52). The role of discursive sites of power and discursive rationalisations should 
not be underestimated (Kramer et al, 2002; Barak, 2017). They enable the dominant ideas to be 
normalised and treated as ‘common sense’. Discourses of dismissal of small-scale farming, research 
into production efficiency and discourses of economic rationality dominating farming education 
solidify a particular idea of how meat production should be organised. As the consensus around 
efficient farming is created, alternatives to profit-oriented and ultimately larger-scale, more intensive 
production are eliminated. Yet, as I stated before, this mode of production also accelerates ecological 
destruction (Lynch et al, 2013).  
Thus far I discussed the first and the second catalysts for environmentally harmful pig 
farming intensification in Northern Ireland – motivation behind GfG and the opportunity structure 
constructed to achieve this motivation. To recap, the global market rule ideology driven by capital 
accumulation creates a strain for the ambitions of the farming industry in Northern Ireland. In 
response, the GfG strategy has been developed to consolidate the pursuit of the goals of efficient 
production and professionalism in farming. To achieve these goals, an opportunity structure has been 
created consisting of both material and ideological support, both of which encourage farming 
intensification. Yet, the third catalyst – operationality of control – needs to be discussed. Kramer et 
al (2002) suggest that crime and harm may occur when regulatory or social control bodies are either 
guided by or work for elite interests. The subsection below discusses controls in the context of 
farming intensification and analyses how the industry-government relations are organised to 
eliminate pathways for control (Kramer et al, 2002), thus exacerbating environmental harm from 
farming intensification.  
5.3.3 Operationality of control 
5.3.3.1 State   
As discussed above, the Northern Irish state adopted the GfG strategy and co-constructed opportunity 
structures to achieve the goals of efficient and professionalised farming, encouraging an 
environmentally harmful intensification of pig meat production. Nevertheless, the GfG authors also 
saw the state as part of social control framework; this view echoes the neoclassical economic thinking 




‘It’s been difficult – sometimes it’s like walking through treacle with government, but we 
are making progress’ (AFSB001). 
 
‘The system has discouraged some people from progressing, doing the right thing’ 
(AFSB002). 
 
Therefore, the question of how Northern Irish farming industry’s motivations of growth are pursued 
when the state is not being cooperative needs to be examined more closely. The pursuit of the GfG 
goals appeared to rely significantly on corporate farming industry actors putting pressure on the 
government:  
 
‘Northern Ireland has a political population that never had to do a job for forty years. They 
really did not do their job. The reason that the industry [needed to step in] is to tell them 
what to do. We needed to educate the politicians, so that when they made a decision, they 
knew how to do it. They may or may not agree with it but at least they knew what they are 
doing <...> We worked with civil servants and institutions’ (AFSB002).  
 
This quote refers to the political stalemate caused by the Troubles. As I showed in Chapter 3, after 
the end of the Troubles, the state actors felt the pressure to be integrated into the global context of 
neoliberal capitalism and grow its economy, rewarding profit-making industries with a more 
favourable treatment. The culture of ‘demanding’ such favourable treatment by the industry persists, 
particularly because of the power wielded by the farming lobby in Northern Ireland. At the same 
time, as I suggested in the previous section, politicians are unwilling to jeopardise economic 
development and are likely to respond favourably to the lobbying demands or simply delegate certain 
policy areas to the lobbying groups (Culpepper, 2011), as exemplified by GfG.   
Although the farming industry succeeds at getting the incentives for its goal pursuit, the 
tension between the industry and the state nevertheless exists; the latter does not always guarantee 
smooth functioning of the capitalist system (Kolko, 1963). As mentioned in Chapter 3, current 
absence of the Executive as well as Brexit aggravated this tension, which was evidenced in the 
interviews18:  
‘For pig farmers there’s uncertainty with Brexit – they don’t really know what it’s going to 
bring, what it’ll look like’ (UFU002). 
 
‘And we can do with ministers to make the decisions on those issues, but we don’t have the 
ministers at the moment. Therefore, nothing is happening. Will we continue with our nitrate 
vulnerable zones? Nobody quite knows what the answer to those things is’ (UFU001). 
 
Capitalist production requires a predictable environment under the control of capitalists (Datta, 
2018), and both the absence of the Executive and Brexit usher in unpredictability. When the stability 
of the capitalist environment is compromised, as Schnaiberg (1980) points out, it is common that the 
economic elites blame the state for creating this environment and demand the restoration of a 
business-friendly climate, which the quotes above demonstrate. In the case of Brexit, such demands 
 
18 The Assembly was restored on January 10, 2020, yet at the time of data collection and data analysis, 
Northern Ireland did not have a functioning Executive in place.  
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were expressed by a coalition of the UK farming unions (which included the Northern Irish UFU) 
who made a series of policy proposals for political consideration. Their message was to ensure that 
the ‘developments on Brexit prioritise the needs of farm businesses and the long-term prosperity of 
the agri-food sector’ and that policy decisions lead to a ‘productive, profitable and progressive 
farming sector that benefits us all’ (NFU and UFU, 2019, p. 3). Moreover, continuation of the smooth 
functioning of the capitalist political economy also implies the reduction of legislative controls. As 
both government and the industry ultimately adhere to the same set of common goals of economic 
growth and profit maximisation, aggressive regulation may hamper the achievement of these goals 
(Kramer et al, 2002). Below I discuss two facets of regulation in farming as a mechanism of control.  
5.3.3.2 Environmental regulation  
Several industry respondents emphasised that the NIEA adopts a punitive approach towards 
environmental transgressions from farming (UFU001): 
 
‘<…> our environment agency has only been a police force’ (AFSB002). 
 
‘In Scotland the Environment Agency does advocacy and trains people but it also comes in 
with penalties. In NI we don’t really have the advocacy and education part, it goes straight 
to penalties. There are different ways to change behaviour and education is one of them’ 
(UFU002). 
 
In these comments, environmental regulation is portrayed as a ‘big stick’ (White, 2013, p. 58) and 
consequently ineffective. These comments also suggest that a ‘police force’ approach implies a 
‘single-minded enforcement of the rules’ (Tombs and Pearce, 1990, p. 27). This line of thinking 
resonates with the neoliberal ethos in regulation, where regulatory bodies are seen as inflexible, 
purposefully searching for violations, overly bureaucratic and sluggish (Bardach and Kagan, 1982). 
As a result, the GfG authors encouraged the farming industry to ‘engage with Regulators in order to 
develop an agreed regulatory environment which adds value, is proportionate, informed and has a 
risk-based approach to regulation’ (AFSB, 2013, p. 16). This plea was reflected in the interviews. 
The respondents argued in favour of what can be described as a consensus perspective that ‘requires 
that strict enforcement and prosecution are minimised in order to encourage the active participation 
of business in ‘self-regulation’’ (Whyte, 2004, p. 133). Respondents advocated for advice rather than 
punishment from the environmental regulator as well as for working in close collaboration with the 
NIEA (RET001):  
 
‘There is a stick and obviously no one likes to be beaten. There is a problem, but we do not 
see it from the same viewpoint, so it is about working on the solution collaboratively’ 
(UFU002). 
 
‘We should have a much more driven agenda within the government. The resistance within 
the government [against] supporting the farmers who want to do the right thing is 
disgraceful. It should be much more supportive in principle. You have to be able to sit down 
with the Environment Agency and say – let us do it the best we can. [we might not always 
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agree] but if we can do it better than we are doing it today, then we are making progress’ 
(AFSB002). 
 
The conciliatory stance taken by the respondents aimed to ensure that environmental regulations do 
not challenge the industry’s economic sustainability. Moreover, the respondents recognised the 
existence of the environmental challenges and aimed to contribute to their regulation to ensure that 
structural reorganisation of farming could continue in what Bittle et al (2018) label as a safe and 
predictable regulatory environment. The industry respondents, therefore, attempted to establish what 
Szasz (1986) sees as the regulatory order that preserves the status quo with the least change and also 
removes the pressure of accountability for regulatory violation.   
The desire for a predictable regulatory environment also manifested in actively advocating 
against an independent environmental protection agency in Northern Ireland (AFSB001; UFU003). 
It serves as the empirical evidence for the discussions on the neoliberal attack on environmental 
regulation (Whyte et al, 2004; Faber, 2008; Czarnezki and Fiedler, 2016) developed in Chapter 3, 
where the regulatory functions of the state are subordinate to the hegemony of capital (Faber, 2008). 
It was aptly summarised by one of the respondents: ‘You constantly get into market-driven factors 
versus regulatory-driven factors, and regulatory-driven factors are driven by what the market wants’ 
(UFU002). The hegemony of capital in regulation also involves emphasising the costly nature of 
regulation, which was seen as detrimental to the overarching ambition of profit-making:  
 
‘It is challenging, it adds a lot of cost – sometimes it puts people off. They spend thousands 
on ammonia assessments before they even start the project’ (UFU002).  
 
‘So if there is a market for that product, are we better off supplying it here and focusing on 
doing it better? Or you put so many controls and regulations that it becomes unprofitable - 
you lose your income, you lose your farmers, you lose your rural community <…>’ 
(UFU003). 
 
Therefore, in addition to being structured around consensus, environmental regulation in Northern 
Ireland also possesses the characteristics of neoliberal regulation, where regulation by the state is 
shifted towards the regulation by the market (Whyte et al, 2004).  
Moreover, when the interests of profit are threatened, the farming industry is capable of 
tampering with the existing regulatory systems. In the process of creating a climate where 
environmental regulation becomes a matter of governing and normalising the capitalist social order 
(Bittle et al, 2018), environmental regulators become subject to regulatory capture (Bernstein, 1955; 
Barak, 2017). The farming industry in Northern Ireland participated in shaping the regulation for its 
own benefit and creating ‘a mandate on how to develop the economy the right way’ (AFSB002) with 
the NIEA. For example, a Judicial Review taken by the UFU against the NIEA and the then 
Department of Agriculture on the subject of breaches of the CAP support cross-compliance was in 
favour of the UFU position (UFU, 2017). The Review aimed ‘to defend [the UFU] members against 
unfairness and to protect the wider industry from harsh treatment for minor mistakes’. Another 
instance is the Memorandum of Understanding between the NIEA and the UFU signed in 2017, 
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which contributed to the creation of the collaborative regulatory environment between the industry 
and the environment agency. The memorandum aimed to ‘help the farming community unlock the 
commercial advantages that excellent environmental performance can generate in competitive global 
agricultural markets’ and ‘improve environmental outcomes through a more effective partnership 
approach’ (NIEA and UFU, 2017, p.1). Similarly to the Judicial Review, the Memorandum also 
encouraged the NIEA ‘to explore new ways of dealing with low severity incidents’ (NIEA and UFU, 
2017, p.8), which, in other words, encouraged the NIEA to adopt a more lenient stance towards low 
severity environmental transgressions in farming. Both of these examples demonstrate that 
regulatory capture eventually morphs into cognitive capture (Barak, 2017); the ideological hegemony 
of neoliberal capitalism shapes the course of regulation and the regulators themselves become more 
pliable in their response to the demands of the industry. Cognitive capture is emblematic of the 
normalisation of the neoliberal mindset where ‘the conduct of conduct’ of neoliberalism is accepted 
(Keil, 2010).  
Using the context of environmental regulation of farming as it becomes more intensive 
following the adoption of GfG, I demonstrate how in the context of neoliberal capitalism where 
capital accumulation is the main imperative, regulatory agencies are vulnerable to regulatory and 
cognitive capture by the farming industry. To continue the discussion developed in Chapter 3, the 
NIEA relents to the pressure of the industry to ‘own the environmental problem’ and also starts 
advocating for a collaborative approach. The NIEA’s acceptance of the industry’s definitions of what 
constitutes the appropriate regulation boosts the legitimacy of the capitalist order and creates ‘a better 
regulation of capitalism’ (Garside, 2013, p. 247). Environmental regulation, thus, does not serve to 
penalise the industry or reform the current political economic order; it serves to resolve the 
contradiction between capitalism and the environment, and save capitalism from itself (Khoury, 
2018). However, prioritising the interests of capital at the expense of the environment results in the 
generation of ecological destruction and disorganisation (Lynch et al, 2017), from both the 
cumulative impacts of minor environmental infractions and more serious harms associated with 
intensive farming.  
5.3.3.3 Planning regulation 
As I discussed in Chapter 3, planning has a significant role to play in safeguarding environmental 
sustainability and, therefore, is closely linked with environmental regulation. However, the structure 
of current planning frameworks was described as limiting by the industry respondents. The GfG 
authors asked the government to ‘revise current planning and IPPC application procedures and 
priorities to ensure the speed of successful processing of Agri-Food applications is equal to, or better 
than those in Great Britain’ (AFSB, 2013, p. 16). The regulation of ammonia emissions was seen as 
particularly important. The obligation to reduce ammonia emissions under the European law means 
that many planning applications for the new farms are suspended in the planning system because of 
the rising ammonia levels in Northern Ireland: ‘Ammonia emissions are also affecting the planning 
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system because the planners don’t know how to get round the ammonia stuff’ (UFU001). The current 
situation was described as ‘a planning limbo’ (Farming UK, 2018) and caused major dissatisfaction 
for the industry:  
 
‘Ammonia is a problem from a planning point of view – so if industry is looking to expand, 
it can’t. Industry will find a way once someone says what you can and cannot do but at the 
moment there is no clarity so they cannot start planning the next pathway. It is frustrating 
for a progressive industry’ (UFU002).  
 
Preoccupations about the uncertainty of regulation is related to the ‘obsessive relationship of 
powerful individuals with their future’ (Ruggiero, 2015), where the power accrued thus far can be 
lost as a result of future events. However, the action the farming industry takes to cope with the 
unforeseen situations, rather than being determined by the future, is shaped by the capitalist system 
of production (Bourdieu, 1990), which is reproduced through the relations between the industry and 
the state. This symbiosis once again is essential to address the planning controls both in the past and 
at the present moment.  One of the NGO respondents pointed out that in the past, 
 
‘there was a particular unit within the planning system which was set up to fast-track people 
putting in factory applications <…>. So they would have their own planners dealing with 
applications. It’s no longer in operation’ (NGO002).  
 
This separate planning arrangement was organised within GfG by the then Department of 
Environment and ended before planning responsibilities were transferred to local councils in 2015 
(DAERA, 2016). DAERA (2016, p. 10) also reported that after the dissolution of this arrangement, 
regular meetings were held by the NIEA and the corporate farming industry actors ‘to discuss 
relevant issues relating to their expansion plans and help co-ordination of applications e.g. PPC 
permits’. This example can be seen as an attempt to redesign planning institutions to protect the 
interests of the market (Kauzlarich and Matthews, 2006; Slobodian, 2018) and realise the dominant 
goals of the farming industry.  
Furthermore, political pressure has been put on the civil servants involved in the decision-
making around planning by the DUP – a political party that protects the interests of the farming 
community in Northern Ireland, as I mentioned in Chapter 3. DUP MLAs, during their meeting with 
the NIEA, pointed out that, 
 
‘Northern Ireland has in the region of 100 applications in the planning system currently 
awaiting environment assessments by the NIEA. The lack of decision-making has effectively 
put a brakes on the agri-food industry at a time when farm gate prices and returns have been 
relatively positive. With Brexit on the horizon farmers want to take advantage of an 
opportunity to expand to meet demand in some sectors however that has been frustrated by 
this process’ (Farming Life, 2018).  
 
During the meeting, the NIEA officials were encouraged to process their input in the planning 
decision-making faster to ensure that the expansion of farming does not face any impediments. 
Similarly to the environmental regulation controls, regulatory capture (Barak, 2017; Bernstein, 1955) 
133 
 
is present, this time by the political party that represents the interests of the farming community. Both 
industry and political pressure to address the backlog of farm planning applications related to 
ammonia concerns paid off: in August 2020, the current Agriculture and Environment 
Minister intervened urging elimination of the backlog in one month (Macauley, 2020). The decision 
raised concerns about the breaches in the European legislation protecting important habitats. 
Ruggiero (2013) suggests that the neoliberal economic order encourages individuals to 
change the existing rules and resort to innovation to achieve their goals, resulting in a socially and 
environmentally injurious behaviour. In Northern Ireland, the pressure to pursue the goal of profit-
making by the farming industry through intensifying meat production (as consolidated by the GfG 
strategy) encourages the industry actors to influence the regulatory forums to shape the existing 
environmental and planning regulation in their favour. Simultaneously, being under the pressure to 
maintain economic growth within the neoliberal political economic order as well as under the 
pressure from the farming industry, state actors create an enabling environment for the pursuit of the 
economic interests (Bisschop et al, 2018), thus loosening some of the controls over farming 
expansion.  
5.3.4 Summary 
This section demonstrated how the context of the previously discussed macro level political 
economic order of meat production influences the national context in Northern Ireland. On the macro 
level, the overarching goal of economic success dictates efficient organisation of production. In light 
of the discrepancy between the macro level goals of profit-making, growth and efficiency and the 
structural reality of small-scale farming in Northern Ireland, environmentally and socially injurious 
behaviour of farming intensification takes place, as economic production is prioritised over 
ecological production (Stretesky et al, 2014). The motivation to organise production efficiently by 
increasing its scale to ensure an increase in economic returns and competitiveness of the industry, as 
consolidated by the GfG strategy, constitutes the first catalyst for harm. Efficient production cannot 
be possible without the individual producers embracing the model of farming premised on market 
hegemony and accepting it as a given. As a result, another goal was to professionalise farming to 
ensure that individual farmers structure their production in accordance with the needs of the market.  
As these goals are pursued, the second catalyst for harm – opportunity structures – have 
developed in support of them (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998). They include promulgation of the 
discourse against small-scale farms as inefficient, material support for technological innovation and 
research into efficient production, and redesigning education of farmers to professionalise the 
industry. This opportunity structure exemplifies the intersection of political economic and 
ideological power (Michalowski, 2018) to allow for constant innovation of relations of production 
(Quinney, 2000). The intersection of political and economic power takes place as farming industry 
actors and the state cooperate in the creation of the opportunity structure to maintain a smooth 
functioning of the capitalist system (Tombs, 2017; Bittle et al, 2018; Michalowski, 2018) of 
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production. It demonstrates that state power, despite its changes in ‘form, scale, type of practice, or 
effectiveness’ (Peluso, 2007, p. 89), remains essential for the functioning of the neoliberal capitalist 
regime and therefore plays a crucial role in providing the conditions for farming intensification. The 
ideological power intersects with the other two elements of power; the opportunity structure is also 
premised on the soft power of legitimation of the harmful practice of farming intensification as the 
idea of common sense in farming is produced through education and research. Within it, avoidable 
harm from farming intensification is framed as necessary and inevitable or is denied altogether 
(Cohen, 2001). The dissemination of common sense provides consent (Gramsci, 1971) to the 
changing model of farming.  
Moreover, the analysis of the third catalyst for harm – controls for farming intensification – 
demonstrates how regulatory relationships in Northern Ireland are conducive to harm. Economic 
actors exist in tension with the state actors but also work in tandem to engineer an appropriate 
regulatory environment that diminishes the possibility of control (Ruggiero, 2015). The intersection 
of economic and political power is reported to decrease the likelihood of regulation of harmful 
behaviour (Kramer et al, 2002). Farming industry actors guarantee that the regulatory frameworks 
continue to protect their vested interests (Boekhout van Solinge, 2010). Their close involvement in 
environmental and planning regulation with the approval from the state results in the regulations 
remaining malleable enough to allow industry actors to shape them according to their goals 
(Ruggiero, 2013) and remain in touch with external political economic contingencies. Through 
transformation of the regulation, they, therefore, form a new type of legitimacy (Ruggiero, 2018) that 
consolidates efficient, growth-oriented meat production. Its consolidation safeguards the hegemony 
of the dominant capitalist order and implies that alternatives to it are excluded; the analysis of the 
motivations, opportunity structures and operationality of control on the meso level demonstrates this 
exclusion by highlighting the marginalisation of small-scale farmers. Individual farmers are 
influenced by the political economic arrangements in which they are embedded. The next section 
details how the macro and meso level political economic contexts influence the actions of individual 
farmers.   
5.4 Micro level political economic arrangements  
This section analyses how catalysts for environmentally harmful farming intensification on the macro 
and meso levels operate on the micro level, influencing the decisions made by individual pig farmers. 
Ultimately, ‘a decision and a system of preferences which underlies it depend not only on the 
previous choices of the decider but also on the conditions in which his choices have been made, 
which include all the choices of those who have chosen for him, pre-judging his judgement and so 
shaping his judgement’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 49).  
The above described goals and opportunity structures create a competitive environment that 
forces farmers to embrace dependence on the market and step away from self-reliance and control 
over their production (Morris, 2001; Gray, 2019). Embracing dependence on the market entails 
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accepting the forces that are beyond farmers’ control, but instead are regulated by corporate actors 
in the meat supply chain, such as animal feed companies profiting from such arrangements (Gray, 
2019). The farmer respondents expressed their displeasure about the lack of control over the market 
forces: 
‘The feed is very expensive’ (FAR002). 
 
‘<…> it doesn’t matter if you’re self-sustaining on your own crops, the world grain price 
sets the pressure and same for the pork price’ (FAR001).  
The forces of capital pressure the farmers to embrace a farming process that uses the inputs of 
maximum value to the input producers (Lewontin, 2000). In addition, Lewontin (2000) demonstrates 
that farm produce is tailored to the demands of a few major purchasers. As meat supply chains 
become more retail-based and profit driven (Brisman et al, 2014), retailers can put pressure down 
the supply chain, taking control over farming production further away from the farmers, as the 
comments below suggest:  
‘We went through the period of food deflation and cheap food. But actually it was a price 
war going on between the 5 biggest supermarkets. Lidl and Aldi arrived, and they were 
a really big disruptor in the grocery market – they supplied a good quality product at a small 
price. So the UK supermarkets needed to get down to the same prices. There was a 
recognition that if they continue to put that amount of pressure on a supply chain, we’ll lose 
the indigenous supply chain’ (AFSB001). 
‘It used to be that an animal will be moved 5 times on average during its lifetime. Sainsbury’s 
person told us: ‘the cost is 40 pounds a movement and its 200 pounds per animal that you 
are losing. When are you going to stop losing this money and stop asking supermarkets to 
pay more for food?’ (AFSB001). 
‘But there is a lot of demand out there for cheap food, we cannot ignore it. Certainly, the 
retailers will not ignore it, they will want to continue to get cheap food to satisfy that 
demand and therefore there would be pressure for farms to become more concentrated and 
squeeze out every last economy of scale’ (DAERA001). 
 
These comments evidence how the drive for profit on the retail level can shape the environment at 
the bottom of the meat supply chain. Farmers, while having to integrate into the market-driven 
environment, are also confronted with the negative impacts of the volatile food economy (Clapp, 
2012), where they face constant financial pressure as well as pressure to increase production (James, 
2019). The response to these pressures within the narrow confines of the competitive industry 
(Tandon, 2010) might be engagement in ethically questionable practices (James, 2019) such as the 
decision to intensify production, leading to an environmentally deviant outcome (Kramer and 
Michalowski, 2012). As some respondents put it, 
 
‘if you do not move with the time, there will be a point when you are stagnant, so you have 
to continually move with the time to keep your efficiencies and know what consumer wants. 
<…> We had to expand to be doing it fulltime. <…> We had to expand in order to stay 




‘Another problem with the British farmers is that we’re responding to the demands of 
supermarkets. Can we get a market return on all those things we have to do to meet 
those standards?’ (UFU001). 
 
These quotes illustrate that in order to participate in the capitalist race, farming success needs to be 
measured in financial achievement, and intensification of production might be necessary for that: 
 
‘You’re balancing demand, you try to listen to retailers and what they say about price which 
again encourages you to expand economies of scale’ (UFU002). 
 
The importance of the economic capital (Bourdieu, 1990) is valued by the broader supply chain 
community, thus reinforcing its power. Individual farmers’ pursuit of the goals for production set on 
the macro and meso levels reinforces the existence of a competitive, profit-driven environment. Yet, 
the relationship between the market and morality is controversial (Merton, 1938). Under market rule 
ideology, farmers might not have an opportunity to make ethical choices and risk committing 
environmental harms. As one respondent concluded, ‘[the expansion is about] pushing [farming] to 
the business side rather than the environment side’. The goal of professionalising farming also 
resonated with individual farmers:  
 
‘The environment [in farming] is getting very business-like. <…> it is the money controlling 
what happens there rather than a farmer controlling the pigs. <…>’ (FAR003). 
 
The quote once again demonstrates that corporate control of farming leads to the reduction of 
farmers’ control over production (Pechlaner, 2012). It results in the loss of decisive power in farmers 
where they no longer determine what they produce and for whom, leading to a rupture between the 
farmer and the practice of farming (Tandon, 2010). Instead, farmers find themselves in an 
environment where concerns of economic costs and benefits outweigh other (Passas, 1990), such as 
environmental, concerns. It risks normalising environmental harm and perceiving it as a ‘normal, 
routine or accepted practice’ (Halsey, 2004, p. 837). Normalisation of harm is done through framing 
intensification as a ‘normal’ and inevitable part of the business structure, which negates the element 
of deviancy in it (Whyte, 2016). Some farmers also appeal to a higher loyalty (Sykes and Matza, 
1957) of the mission of ‘feeding the world’, thus deflecting the focus from the economic rationale 
behind their decision:  
 
‘We are trying to increase production here and on the other side of the world people are 
starving. How does it add up? And then [local community] says they want it all green, they 
want farmers to grow more trees’ (FAR001). 
 
Yet, as I stated earlier, normalisation of harm also serves to reinforce the hegemony of neoliberal 
capitalism (Pearce, 1976), ensuring that the status quo remains unquestioned and unchanged.   
The pursuit of the goal of professionalism, in addition to encouraging farmers to prioritise 
economic sustainability, has tangible effects on individual small-scale farmers. Farms with less than 
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2,000 pigs are often vertically integrated in the supply chain and this trend is being developed further 
in the pig sector, based on the success of the poultry sector:  
 
‘There are several very big producers of pigs and they are subcontracting fattening of pigs 
to smaller farms and it’s working quite well. It’s very target driven and professional’ 
(UFU001). 
 
Vertical integration tended to be associated with professionalism and was actively promoted 
throughout the GfG strategy. It has been described as ‘much more market driven, [where] everything 
is organised and controlled by the processing system’ (UFU003) and one respondent remarked that 
integration in a single supply chain implies that ‘what farmers decided is connected to what the 
processor, supermarket and consumer does’ (AFSB002). These comments mask the complexity of 
the relationships in the meat supply chain – they appear to be determined by the institutionalised 
mechanism of the free market, but actually become an arena where relations of domination are 
established through personal interactions (Bourdieu, 1990). Such relations of domination guarantee 
that individual farmers are convinced of the benefits of such form of production, thus demonstrating 
the ideological power of vertical integration (McMahon and Glatt, 2019), which masks the relations 
of power in meat supply chains. Vertical integration is reported to strengthen retailers’ power 
(Morgan et al, 2006) with retailers dictating production practices to processors and farmers: 
‘You find supermarkets wanting a cheap product and the only way of getting it is by taking 
shortcuts in production. <…> Now you have an animal, you take it to the factory to get 
killed, then you have a processor that’s trying to get as much as possible out of it, then 
packaging, then it goes to a supermarket which has to get a cut as well. There are four or five 
different links and each of them is making profit. The farmer comes at the bottom of that. If 
there are not enough pigs from a farmer, other [actors in the food chain] are still getting profit 
because they will charge the consumer more. But they try to keep the price down, but how? 
They do not pay the farmer as much’ (FAR003). 
 
This quote once again illustrates the retail-based and profit-driven nature of meat supply chains, 
characterised by unequal distribution of power, which may lead to environmental harm and even 
crime (Donnermeyer, 2016). The current interaction between meat processing companies and 
farmers is emblematic of power disequilibrium and serves to reproduce the relations of domination: 
 
‘Food processors were complaining that they can’t manage the inconsistencies related to 
farming (50 different types of cattle, etc.) and needed uniformity. The business is not 
sustainable that way. The vertical integration put a degree of sustainability and profitability 
into it’ (AFSB001). 
 
‘In Northern Ireland we have two big meat processing plants, they import 8000 to 10000 
pigs per week to slaughter from the south of Ireland simply because we can’t get the local 
supply. We need more local pigs. Cranswick [the processing plant] since taking over want 
to increase the capacity of the plant which means more demand for pigs’ (UFU002). 
 
It is evident from these comments that the dispositions of the meat processors (some of whom are 
responsible for the development of GfG) are influenced by the political economy of capitalism as 
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they are driven by the ambition of capital accumulation. As a result, individual processors are 
incentivised to put pressure down the supply chain and encourage farmers to have bigger units of 
production, thus reinforcing individual farmer disposition to intensify production. The latter was 
reflected in this comment:  
‘If you look at it from a production point of view, it is easier for a factory [to work] with a 
large producer. Say you want to kill pigs privately – once a small farmer wants to get their 
pigs killed, there is just one factory that will kill them now. And that factory is far. Other 
factories will only take from bigger producers. It is because of the size and scale of it now. 
[the factories] are producing for supermarkets, there are quality regulations and everything. 
It is a system that’s tied up very much so now. That’s why it would suit factories to have 
bigger units [of pigs]’ (FAR003). 
 
The relationship between processors and farmers can result in the latter becoming vertically 
integrated into the meat supply chain. While the industry respondents pointed out that vertical 
integration in Northern Ireland is a suitable model for small-scale farmers, this arrangement is 
nevertheless reported to be facilitating access to the market for large-scale producers (McMahon and 
Glatt, 2019). Intensification of farming serves the interests of retailers and processors (Westra, 2004), 
as they form relations that increase their ability to pursue profit interests (Bourdieu, 1990); the 
farmers who choose the environmentally harmful route of intensification merely respond to the goals 
presented as the normal functioning of the meat supply chain and opportunity structures created to 
meet such goals.  
Yet, the farmers who choose not to produce intensively to stay competitive and instead opt 
for a different mode of production are marginalised (Fuchs et al, 2009). The previous section 
discussed how the meso level opportunity structure facilitates this marginalisation through labelling 
small farms as inefficient, re-structuring mechanisms of their support, opening avenues for 
technological innovation that favour large-scale farming and advancing research into efficient rather 
than small-scale farming. The issue of marginalisation resonated with small-scale farmer 
respondents:  
 
‘It doesn’t make any economic sense to go organic, we don’t make any money [from keeping 
pigs]’ (FAR002). 
 
‘A small farmer is on the way out at the minute’ (FAR003).  
 
These responses demonstrate that political economy of neoliberal capitalism is not favourable to 
small-scale farming in the same way as it is favourable to large-scale, more intensive farming. The 
farmers who prioritise the environment are marginalised because this priority does not fit the 
dominant ideology that sees profit-making as the main marker of success. The above-described 
relations in the supply chain structured around the capitalist logic and reinforced in the GfG strategy 
also help to reproduce marginalisation of small-scale farmers. Supply chain relations reinforce the 
idea of profit-growth-efficiency as common sense in farming and work to exclude the behaviours 




Marginalisation of small-scale farmers is also orchestrated through the meso level 
opportunity structures discussed in the previous section. Small-scale farmers have low profit margins 
and the opportunity structure for technological innovation does not provide financial assistance for 
them to mitigate some of the impacts of farming, such as ammonia emissions (The Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism, 2019). The funding available under GfG was, as one respondent pointed 
out, 
 
‘for much larger capital projects, so the number of people that benefitted would have been 
small to begin with - you’re talking really large sums of money, maybe quarter of a 
million for a big project and the average person isn’t willing to make that much investment 
so it only suited a small percentage to begin with’ (UFU002). 
 
Instead, as I showed earlier, the opportunity structure for technological innovation is more likely to 
benefit larger farmers. Farmers who decide to intensify their production reported to have benefitted 
from the AD subsidy:  
 
‘There is a lot of misconception over the price gained from an AD – you have to buy the 
plant, feed it, maintain it. The subsidy is ok, but it’s required – there are a lot of beneficial 
factors [associated with it]’ (FAR001). 
 
As individual farmers implement the technology, the doctrine of promotion of ‘green growth’ 
through innovation (Hannigan, 2006) is further reinforced, creating an impression that environmental 
issues stemming from farming intensification are successfully dealt with. However, as I discussed in 
the previous section, proliferation of technological innovation as an answer to the environmental 
crisis does not serve the interests of social and ecological justice. Instead, it reinforces the existing 
regimes of power that govern meat production globally and nationally (White, 2017). Technology 
serves the interests of capitalism and not the environment and fuels the continuation of environmental 
harm caused by unsustainable intensive production (Lynch et al, 2016).  
Furthermore, farmers are also discouraged from protecting the local farming economies. As 
it was pointed out by one respondent, ‘there is no support for farmers to work within the local 
economy, only for them to export’ (NGO001). The incentives that exist to support an 
environmentally friendly and socially beneficial practice in farming that is not geared towards capital 
accumulation are very limited: 
 
‘Recently [we] started getting Organic Payments – Environmental Farming Scheme. It is not 
enough but is better than nothing’ (FAR002). 
 
‘You’ll get schemes where farmers would be planting hedges, that money isn’t so much there 
now’ (FAR003). 
 
Since a subsidy can be defined as a form of support that aims to promote an activity considered to be 
beneficial (Myers and Kent, 2001), the following dynamics of subsidy distribution demonstrates that 
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protection of the environment may not be considered as beneficial as economic growth, which is in 
line with the existing political economic arrangements (McKie, 2018).  
Finally, the opportunity structure around research support on the national level also has 
consequences on the local level. Pioneering intensive farms volunteer to contribute to research 
development, specifically on the topics of technological innovation:  
‘there will also be research people coming in to show what we put in, what we got out, what 
the benefits are. That’s when it starts benefitting everybody when we go down the route of 
health’ (FAR001). 
Development of scientific knowledge is linked with the interests of the global and national political 
economic power structure of capitalism (McKie, 2018) and in this case further reinforces the 
consensus around the market-oriented profit-driven model of farming by stressing its benefits.   
In terms of dealing with the controls for intensification, the national-level response informs 
the response on the local level. As I stated in the previous section, the industry respondents contribute 
to shaping environmental and planning regulation, controlling stability and predictability of the 
regulatory environment. In a similar vein, individual farmers respond to this trend by pre-empting 
environmental regulation, thus allowing for an uninterrupted production: 
 
‘Our farm is way in excess of what is required [for environmental regulation]. I wanted to 
live my life easier for whenever they change the rules, I wanted to box it off so that nothing 
gets pass 300 mm concrete wall. When someone wants to buy from me, they want to buy at 
a certain standard – the last thing you want is something happening and you having an 
environmental problem’ (FAR001). 
Such pre-empting of regulation or over-compliance (Pearce and Tombs, 1998) may result in its 
institutionalisation (Culpepper, 2011) and allow the industry, rather than the government, to be 
regulatory authorities (Gray, 2018) and shape the regulation in their favour. Producers may also 
influence the structure of penalties (Lynch et al, 2016), ensuring that they avoid the latter by pre-
empting regulation.  
5.4.1 Summary 
This section presented an analysis of the micro level political economic arrangements around farming 
intensification. It demonstrated the trickle-down effect of the macro and meso level catalysts for 
environmentally harmful intensification, exposing the link between capitalism and ecological harm 
(Lynch et al, 2015) on the local level. Individual farmers experience the pressure to attain the goal 
of profit-making by keeping their production efficient. Strain is experienced again (Merton, 1938), 
as response to such pressure (Kramer and Michalowski, 2012) from individual farmers may be the 
intensification of production, which ultimately leads to grave environmental damages from 
institutionalised legal violence of intensive farming (Westra, 2004). Thus, individual farmers 
reproduce the ideological hegemony of the capitalist order as they resign their production to the rule 
of the market.  
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The analysis also evidences marginalisation of small-scale farmers. Power relations in the 
meat supply chain reproduce this marginalisation as they reinforce the idea of profit-growth-
efficiency as common sense in farming, thus curtailing the alternatives to the globalised capitalist 
order of meat production. The national opportunity structure to achieve the goals of efficient and 
professionalised farming also excludes such alternatives by removing the opportunities for small-
scale farmers and giving preference to larger-scale production. The opportunity structure operates as 
a mutually reinforcing mechanism. It serves the needs of the powerful actors who shape it, while less 
powerful actors perpetuate its workings by reproducing the dominant rules of production. Finally, 
individual farmers’ reaction to controls for production intensification also reflects the global and 
national trends of neoliberalisation of regulation; individual farmers contribute to the creation of a 
predictable regulatory environment by pre-empting government regulation. 
5.5 Conclusion   
This chapter provided the analysis of the political economy of farming intensification in Northern 
Ireland and examined power relations that support and reinforce it on the three levels: macro 
(international), meso (national) and micro (local).  
On the macro level, a profit-driven competitive global market rule ideology demands an 
efficient organisation of meat production. For Northern Ireland, the pursuit of the dominant goals of 
meat production is associated with strain; predominantly small-scale farms are being re-structured to 
organise their production more efficiently, leading to environmental and social harms. Efficiency 
implies increasing the scale of production, which is associated with faster-paced production at lower 
cost (Wyatt, 2014). In this process of profit-making through efficient production, non-human animals 
are killed and maimed (Beirne, 2014; White, 2016), environmental and planetary integrity are 
compromised (Wyatt, 2014; Schally, 2017; White and Yeates, 2018) and public health might be 
endangered (Gunderson, 2015). Neoliberal market rule ideology also shapes the consensus around 
common sense in farming; adverse environmental and social outcomes associated with 
intensification are seen as part of a ‘normal’ political economy of meat production (Cruciotti and 
Matthews, 2006; Lynch et al, 2015). The need to meet an increasing demand for pork globally is 
embedded in the idea of market rationality and works to secure the hegemony of the capitalist order.  
The macro level political economy plays a role in creating structural conditions for harm 
(Bernat and Whyte, 2017) on the meso level. The goals of making production more efficient and 
professional on the national level consolidated by the GfG strategy serve as the first catalyst for harm 
and are rooted in a particular context where the drive for capital is an overarching ambition (Kramer, 
2002). Embeddedness in the global political economy of capitalism influences the relationship 
between the state and economic actors (Kramer and Michalowski, 2006). Bernat and Whyte (2017) 
suggest that in the political economy of capitalism, state actors act as enablers of capital accumulation 
while economic actors realise that capital accumulation. In my analysis, political actors enable the 
expansion of the farming industry to guarantee economic growth on the national level, while 
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corporate farming industry actors take the opportunity to increase their profits through developing 
and adopting a strategy such as GfG with the help of the state. This symbiotic relationship determines 
the opportunity structure – a discourse against small-scale farms, material support for technological 
innovation and research, and education of farmers – which is premised on eliminating the alternatives 
to a market-oriented, profit-driven model of farming, and serves as the second catalyst for harm.  
The symbiotic relationship between the state and farming industry actors also works to 
eliminate the regulatory controls to farming intensification in Northern Ireland, further reinforcing 
the ideological hegemony of neoliberal capitalism. Social relationships that shape regulation (Tombs, 
2012) in relation to the environment and planning are organised in a manner that creates a favourable 
regulatory climate for capital accumulation, enabling the industry to pursue their vested interests. As 
I demonstrated in this chapter, both consensus and neoliberal perspectives are visible in regulation, 
whereby the farming industry actors advocate for both self-regulation and minimisation of regulation. 
Moreover, regulatory agencies are vulnerable to regulatory and cognitive capture by the farming 
industry, leading to the formation of a new type of legitimacy (Ruggiero, 2018) that consolidates 
efficient, growth-oriented meat production. In each of these contexts, the farming industry possesses 
power reinforced by political actors for their mutual benefit, which enables them to perform 
purposive actions for the achievement of their goals (Ruggiero, 2018) and reinforces their ability to 
compromise regulatory controls for farming intensification. The compromised regulatory controls 
are the third catalyst for harm.  
The micro level political economy is also affected by the power relations that create the 
macro and meso level catalysts for harm and reinforce the hegemony of capitalism. According to 
Smith (1990), it is the national-level goals that empower individual farmers. The goal of re-orienting 
farming in the entrepreneurial direction and guiding farmers’ behaviour by market-based efficiency 
norms results in an increased pressure from a culturally prescribed drive for economic success by 
any means necessary (Gray, 2019). Ruggiero (2018) suggests that such pressure on the local level is 
tantamount to coercion accompanied by the development of a ‘false consciousness’. Yet, rather than 
seeing the emergence of false consciousness as coercive, it can be seen as emerging through consent, 
as individuals are ‘acting in all consciousness according to his [their] belief’ (Althusser, 1971, p. 
158). Through the meso level opportunity structures, individual farmers accept a market-oriented 
profit-driven model of farming as a norm and endeavour making their production more efficient, 
which results in intensification. The farmers who adopt the prevailing definition of success reproduce 
and strengthen the dominant rules of production through benefitting from the opportunity structure 
and the existing regulatory climate. In this situation, they are confronted with the fact that the 
dominant production order is worth investing their vital energy in (Neveu, 2018). At the same time, 
the farmers who do not adopt the neoliberal capitalist definition of success are marginalised, as 
evidenced in the meso level opportunity structures and relations in meat supply chains. Their 
marginalisation means that alternatives to the capitalist meat production are eliminated.   
To conclude, the three levels of inquiry – international, national, and local – are interrelated. 
On each of them, a market-oriented, profit-driven model of farming that prioritises efficiency is 
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supported and reinforced. This model is embedded in the capitalist political economic order and 
sustained by power relations catalysing harm and excluding alternatives to the dominant order. Yet, 
as this chapter repeatedly emphasised, this model of farming is also environmentally harmful. The 
next findings chapter, thus, analyses the distribution of environmental harms associated with farming 
intensification and their effects on the realm of capabilities. Furthermore, considering that power and 
influence inequalities remain the norm in environmental decision-making (Holifield et al, 2018), the 
next chapter also unpacks power dynamics in environmental decision-making around pig farming 
intensification. The latter determines whether the realm of planning can act as a mechanism of 
regulatory control for farming intensification or operates to further catalyse harm and lead to its 























Chapter 6 – Farming intensification and environmental (in)justice in 
Northern Ireland 
6.1 Introduction  
The intensive model of farming, while being a normalised production practice, has been identified 
to have harmful effects on both the environment and society. Considering this, the analysis below 
employs the environmental justice paradigm to demonstrate how the existing environmental 
harms from farming are currently distributed in the studied community and what impact they have 
on the realm of capabilities. The chapter subsequently discusses recognition of the views of the 
affected community on farming intensification. Justice as recognition requires individuals within a 
group to be considered full members in a social interaction (Fraser, 1995) and the notion of 
recognition applies not only to individuals but also to their values and ideas.  Following that, the 
chapter turns to analyse the procedure of environmental decision-making to understand ‘who has the 
power to make decisions, the kinds of decisions that are made, in whose interests they are made, and 
how social practices based on these decisions are materially organised’ (White, 2008, p. 56). The 
chapter dissects power relations that connect those who are or may be affected by environmental 
harm from farming intensification to the institutional structures of environmental decision-making 
(Lake, 1996). It demonstrates how power relations that underpin the broader forces of meat 
production manifest themselves in environmental decision-making process and analyses how the 
latter is organised to preserve the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism. The chapter concludes by 
stating that environmental decision-making is marked by recognitional and procedural injustices. 
The injustices indicate that the previously discussed inability of the realm of planning to act as a 
mechanism of regulatory control for farming intensification is further compromised, which catalyses 
harm. The latter will bring about injustice in the distribution of environmental harms from pig 
farming intensification and have an adverse effect on the realm of capabilities in the future.  
6.2 Distributional environmental justice and pig farming intensification  
The issue of the distribution of environmental harms in the studied area was brought up in most 
interviews with the Antrim and Newtownabbey district community. The interviewees were 
preoccupied and displeased with the proliferation of intensive farms in the area (COM001, COM005, 
COM007, COM008, COU002):   
‘You cannot put too much in one place. If you put too much farming in one place, you get 
pollution. It is like giving the land its heart attack; you are destroying the ecological 
balance’ (COM002). 
‘If we take it back to the sheer numbers of these things being proposed, the problem that 
people feel that they are being swamped by these proposals, then within it there are concerns 
over air quality, build-up of gases, concerns over water quality and general quality of life in 
the area. The impacts are bad enough if you take a single unit, but they will be massively 




For the respondents, proliferation of intensive farms was associated with a number of environmental 
harms. First, disposal of animal waste presented a challenge for the area. Whereas in non-intensive 
farms animal waste is considered to be an essential element of a natural nutrient cycle, animal waste 
disposal becomes a problem in intensive farms (Goodman and Redclift, 1991; Gray and Hinch, 
2015). As I stated before, mismanagement of both waste itself and wastewater may result in air, soil, 
and water pollution. A common current practice is to use animal manure as a fertiliser by applying it 
onto land. Yet, the proliferation of farms means that the amount of animal waste will increase 
dramatically, which was reflected in the interviews:  
‘I think [pig farming expansion] is a very bad idea. The worst thing is the amount of nitrates 
and slurry that will be produced and dumped on the land’ (COM007). 
‘We are a very small country; it cannot take all this digestate. Is it going to be policed to 
make sure it’s not harming the ground?’ (COM004). 
‘Then there is an environmental impact that this concentration of animals will cause – a 
considerable amount of waste that will be produced and how it will be disposed of. There 
are a lot of issues that are not well understood and how we can deal with them in the future’ 
(COU001). 
Moreover, the distribution of harms associated with the disposal of animal waste was perceived as a 
problem on the national scale as the respondents suggested that more communities in Northern 
Ireland might be exposed to such harms due to the country’s geographical makeup: 
‘The whole problem is as far as we know the meat is going abroad and we are left with all 
the slurry and we cannot take more of that because the ammonia levels are far too high. 
Northern Ireland is very small’ (COM005). 
‘<…> pork goes over to England. What are we left with in Northern Ireland? We are left 
with pig dump’ (COM006). 
These quotes demonstrate that the global connectivities underpinning meat production (as shown in 
the previous chapter) may also produce inequitable distribution of environmental harms on the 
national level; the ‘supplying’ countries in the global economy are likely to be confronted with 
environmental burdens (Lynch et al, 2017). The respondents regarded Northern Ireland as a 
‘supplying’ country, due to the strategic importance of the farming sector. This argument ignores the 
fact that some pork produced in Northern Ireland will also be consumed within the country; AHDB 
(n.d.) reports that Northern Ireland would consume around one third of its domestic pig meat 
production. Nevertheless, from the interviews it was evident that current practices of animal waste 
disposal are already having an impact in the area.  Water and air quality were of particular concern 
to participants. Water pollution preoccupied local residents both in terms of its impact on the native 
species and local people (COM001; COM002; COM007):  
 
‘There is so many nitrates going down into the river now, the rivers are going eutrophic. We 
are losing the native species because the water quality has been destroyed’ (COM002).  
Water pollution stems from the fact that ‘generally accepted livestock waste management practices 
do not adequately or effectively protect water resources from contamination’ (Burkholder et al, 2007, 
p. 308). Some interviewees reported that water contamination has already taken place in the area:  
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‘There have been episodes of water pollution from the existing farm and the farmer has been 
convicted in court’ (COM002).  
The latter calls into question the issue of protection of the basic right to clean water (Walker, 2012). It 
has been recognised at the international level by the U.N. General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 
and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and requires states to ‘refrain from 
interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to water’ (Meshel, 2018, p. 283). 
Despite this, it has been reported that the farming industry may not be held accountable for the 
impacts of their practices on local water resources (Meshel, 2018; Schaider et al, 2019). The 
respondents also expressed their uncertainty about the future of the water quality in the area:  
 
‘There was also a waste water leak going into the river. From my point of view, <…> dogs 
that I walk there – I do not want them to be on land or let alone swim somewhere where there 
is a risk. And I would not know if there is a risk, it is not something that you can see per se’ 
(COM001).  
Harm from water pollution is linked to the rise in intensive farms in the Antrim and Newtownabbey 
district. At the same time, it is part of the collective production of environmental harm from farming 
intensification in Northern Ireland and beyond. Ultimately, harm becomes an inevitable part of the 
neoliberal governance of meat production (Stoddard, 2015). As I previously stated, neoliberal 
capitalism prioritises economic growth, and this process is accompanied by the creation of harm, 
without which economic growth becomes impossible. In the context of meat production, such harms 
have an impact on the environment and human health. The respondents also saw the existing farms 
as a burden on the local ecological system and were concerned about the loss of biodiversity. Loss 
of biodiversity in river ecosystems was indicated above, but the respondents were also preoccupied 
about terrestrial biodiversity:  
 
‘If you look at what is happening to the countryside, it is becoming sterile. Those used to be 
fields with different grasses and wild flowers; there was an orchard. What was the first thing 
they [the farmers] did? They fenced it to keep out larger animals – foxes, badgers. Then they 
ploughed it and put in a particular grass that will produce silage for them’ (COM006). 
Intensive farming may foment deforestation and loss of vegetation, and also has adverse effects on 
wildlife (Fitzgerald, 2019). As I stressed in Chapter 3, ammonia emissions from animal waste are 
undermining the diversity of local ecological systems, and this sentiment was present in the 
interviews:  
‘The house down the field has a meadow next to it and all wildlife disappeared from there. 
When we first moved here, the neighbouring pig farm had land and other animals on it. And 
then it was bought over – they sold off all the land and just kept the pig farms, so it was 
transformed from a family farm into a pig factory’ (COM007). 
As previously stated, the drawing of nitrogen compounds from animal waste into the air causes air 
pollution in the form of ammonia. Antrim and Newtownabbey district is likely to face a higher 
concentration of ammonia as pig farming intensification gathers pace: ‘<…> environmentally, we 
have a collective of pig farms which will happen in this area. As you know, ammonia levels are up 
through the roof’ (COU002).  
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 All of the above indicates that the environmental conditions that constitute the meta-
capability of sustainable ecological capacity are compromised. Yet, such environmental conditions 
are instrumental to human capabilities (Holland, 2008). The compromised meta-capability of 
sustainable ecological capacity has a knock-on effect on other capabilities. Air and water pollution 
and soil degradation contribute to mental and physical health risks, thus rupturing ‘the organic 
reproduction of ‘man’’ (Lasslett, 2010, p.12). As outlined in Chapter 1, there is evidence to suggest 
that communities in close proximity to intensive farms and fields where slurry is spread are exposed 
to antibiotic resistant bacteria and have higher risks of developing respiratory diseases, Q fever, and 
changes in stress and mood levels (Casey et al, 2015). The health concern was reflected in the 
interviews:  
 
‘I cannot see how you can manage that number of animals in a safe and humane way without 
having to develop processes that would not meet many animal health and safety regulations. 
I am sure they will say that they have all the processes in place to meet those needs, but one 
issue of concern is that with that many animals there will be a significant need for antibiotics 
and the knock-on effect of those antibiotics on human health [will be detrimental]’ 
(COU001). 
‘Apparently cancer risks in people living close to [intensive farms] and breathing all that 
crappy air is higher, especially in America. For asthmatics and others with pulmonary 
diseases breathing pig slurry is also not a good thing’ (COM002). 
Bodily health is included in Nussbaum’s (2001, p. 78) list of capabilities, as she adopts the idea that 
health is ‘complete physical, mental and social well-being’. From the quotes above, it can be 
surmised that proliferation of intensive farms will compromise this capability. Inability to breathe 
unpolluted air compromises it further:  
‘I had been living close to the existing farm before I moved; the smell is horrendous’ 
(COM003). 
‘Even the <…> walk, it leads to [the existing] farm – you get half way down there and you 
choke. It is a community tree lined area that you can walk in and it is absolutely stinking’ 
(COM002). 
‘The smell from [the existing] farm is really bad, and that is going to double. [the farmer] 
might talk about state-of-the-art technology and no smell, that is not true. There is potentially 
three times the smell’ (COM006). 
The quotes above evidence sensory disruption and the experiences of ‘the unequal access to healthy 
sensory environments’ (Hoover, 2018, p. 53), whereby the community has a limited opportunity to 
enjoy good quality air. Hoover (2018) claims that the senses incorporate the environment into the 
body and changes to the environment may cause health problems, from which the conclusion can be 
drawn that farming intensification in the area will have an impact on human health. Furthermore, pig 
farming intensification was reported to affect the community’s quality of life:  
 
‘Everywhere they are spreading the slurry, the fields are surrounded by villages. It will have 
an effect on the health of the people and their quality of life’ (COM007). 
The negative effect on the quality of life is further evidenced by the compromised capability 
of play, particularly in relation to enjoyment of recreational activities: ‘A pig farm just across 
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the road from us with 4,300 pigs had an impact on us and it will be multiplied once those 
[big] farms are built. The existing unit will also be expanded, and the number of pigs will 
increase dramatically. It impacts all aspects of your life – we do not have a clothes 
line outside, we cannot open the windows and doors at times, we cannot use our garden in 
the summer time because of the smell and flies’ (COM007). 
‘The slurry is being spread during public holidays and stuff when families are sitting outside, 
barbecuing. The smell drives them indoors. They cannot hang their washing out; it has to be 
done again. You want to be able to use your garden. <…> If the new planning application 
goes through, we will end up with three intensive farms in a very small area. Nobody would 
want to go to the countryside when it’s up and running’ (COM004).  
As Holland (2008, p. 323) suggests, being able to enjoy recreational activities ‘might require the 
protection of particular natural places in which people can find the components of ecosystems that 
enable them to pursue the kinds of recreation and play that they enjoy’. For the local residents, the 
capability of play was linked with the capability of affiliation, in particular the ability ‘to engage in 
various forms of social interaction’ (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 41):  
‘you can have a barbecue and then a waft of the pig farm comes – everybody in, we will 
bring the barbecue inside and shut all the windows. It does affect you from the point of 
socialising’ (COM002).  
 
The inability to do so has a subsequent negative effect on community functioning (Schlosberg, 
2014):   
‘[the new farm] is a blight on the natural environment – it’s concerning whether the 
environment is safe now, whether the water is safe, how long it’s going to be safe for. It does 
take away some enjoyment from being outside – knowing that it’s been polluted and 
destroyed’ (COM003). 
The quote above also demonstrates that the capability of other species is compromised. Nussbaum 
(2001) asserts that natural places are central to living a good and dignified human life. Yet, as 
intensification continues, the latter becomes impossible.  
6.2.1 Summary 
To sum up, sustainable ecological capacity as a meta-capability and the capabilities depending on it 
– bodily health, play, affiliation, other species – are compromised, thus leading to injustice. 
Moreover, the current distribution of harms from farming in the Antrim and Newtownabbey district 
is uneven because the residents living in close proximity to the farms are exposed to a 
disproportionate amount of environmental harm. The proliferation of pig farms in the area is likely 
to exacerbate this inequitable distribution and further compromise the above capabilities.  
As suggested in Chapter 2, Nussbaum (2001) also includes control over one’s environment 
in her basic set of capabilities, which, as it will be shown later in this chapter, local residents may 
not possess. The lack of control over one’s environment is also exemplified by the local community’s 
position in the environmental decision-making forums. The next section analyses the first aspect of 




6.3 Pig farming intensification and recognitional injustice   
This section discusses several markers of recognitional injustice in the process of environmental 
decision-making in regard to farming intensification. First, it considers non-recognition of the ideas 
of opposition to farming intensification and unpacks the reasons behind it. Second, it analyses non-
recognition of non-expert voices in the decision-making process.    
6.3.1 Non-recognition of the ideas of opposition to farming intensification 
From the interviewees’ perspectives, the process of environmental decision-making was 
characterised by a lack of recognition of values, rationales, and lifestyles of those opposed to farming 
intensification in Northern Ireland. The respondents lamented that their ideas of how farming should 
be organised in the area and what environment they would like to live in were not recognised by 
decision-makers. First, such ideas need to be presented and discussed.  
The question of what kind of environment people wish to preserve or inhabit is, according 
to Swyngedouw (2009), the key political question as it brings to the surface the disagreements about 
the desirable economic development. When disagreeing with the direction that farming was taking 
in Northern Ireland, some respondents expressed concerns about future generations:  
 
‘We need to protect the countryside for the future generations. Smaller farms are a better bet 
than these factory farms’ (COM004). 
‘Kids will grow up and there would not be an animal in the field. [Animals in the fields] are 
becoming less and less obvious. When I was a kid the field beside us always had sheep and 
cattle in it, and now there is nothing on it, a barren piece of grass’ (COU002). 
The above quotes favour making environmental decisions that do not compromise the livelihoods of 
future generations. The question of whether future generations can be recipients of justice has 
frequently been considered (Brisman, 2007; Reed, 2008; Walker, 2012). Future generations have 
been considered as environmental victims (Hall, 2015) and have been included in the framework of 
social justice (Dobson, 1998). While their interests are under-represented in the existing decision-
making forums, it nevertheless does not mean that they should not be taken into consideration. Their 
consideration is part of Eckersley’s (2000) ‘enlarged thinking’ that includes the interests of future 
generations and non-human animals.   
In terms of inhabiting a particular environment, respondents’ understandings of and reactions 
to environmental degradation (Schlosberg, 2002) focused on the scale of farming intensification 
threatening their right to a clean and healthy environment:  
 
‘For the local people, environment is of massive importance – it relates directly to the quality 
of their everyday lives. Clearly [the environment] is not important enough for the 
government <…> Balance is important – no one is trying to restrain agriculture or the 
importance of agriculture to the economy of NI in general. But you have to balance that with 
the needs of the local community and the right of the local community to live in the 
environment that is safe and clean and healthy. The farming need is always there and will be 
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there. Objectors are not objecting to any development of any kind; they are objecting to the 
sheer scale of what is being proposed’ (MLA002). 
Swyngedouw (2000) suggests that the question of the visions of the environment alternative to the 
dominant paradigm of economic development has a geographical element that is tied to territorial 
identity, which was also reflected in some of the interviews:  
‘If you look around, it is all small fields, small farmers. A big farmer coming in will take all 
the wee farmers [out of business]. In my opinion, it will ruin the culture of NI’ (COM005). 
‘Whenever the proposal came to take thirty acres and turn it into a big factory – it was 
phenomenal. It is unacceptable to say that something like that is worth keeping in the 
countryside. The whole thing is horrendous’ (COM006). 
‘Traditionally there have always been small family farms in the whole of Ireland; that has 
been the backbone of the rural community. If it has to go, it will certainly change the 
landscape – all small fields will have to change into large fields’ (COM007). 
It is evident that the respondents’ idea of how farming should be organised in the area was premised 
on a small-scale model of farming dominated by family farms. This idea was grounded in the distinct 
agricultural identity of Northern Ireland as a country and the need to support small local farmers 
jeopardised by the recent trend in intensification. Therefore, what was seen by the farming industry 
as a structural impediment in their achievement of the goals of profit-making and efficient 
professionalised farming, was considered instrumental for the community’s vision of the 
environment they would like to live in. To sum up, the respondents’ ideas of living in and with the 
environment focused on intergenerational equity (White and Kramer, 2015), environmental rights 
(Eckersley, 1996; May and Daly, 2009), and tried to resist the process where the natural environment 
becomes embedded in the forces of production that shape accumulation strategies (Swyngedouw, 
1992). 
However, there was a lack of recognition of the views that depart from the dominant political 
economic ideology. The respondents brought up the issue of a moratorium on the planning 
applications for intensive farms: ‘The Government had 4,326 emails from the public calling for a 
moratorium’ (NGO002)19. Yet, despite these concerns, they suggested that the government agencies 
were reluctant to address them: 
‘We talked to the NIEA and asked all stakeholders for a moratorium on such applications. 
NIEA was admitting that the slurry from these farms were impacting environmentally 
sensitive areas, ninety percent of them were being impacted by the nitrates. They never got 
round to tell us why they would not put a moratorium’ (COM007). 
Rather than heeding public concerns over farming intensification, the government dismissed those 
expressing the views against economic growth being beneficial for the collective good (Gould, 1991, 
1992) as ‘anti-economy’: 
 
19 Currently the petition from Friends of the Earth Northern Ireland calling for a moratorium is at 
5,170 emails. Moreover, on November 16, 2020 a briefing paper was presented to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly in response to a Green Party motion to place a moratorium on planning for new 
intensive farms (Brennan et al, 2020). 
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‘There is a backlash against us coming through from the government. <…> We try to 
separate it out – we are not against farms. <…> But when you have the GfG programme and 
it states that it will reduce 26,000 family farms to 6,000. In a country where farming is the 
main industry! It is unbelievable. But we have been accused of interfering with the Northern 
Irish economy and civil service policies’ (COM008). 
These comments demonstrate the imbalance of power between the state and members of the public 
that stems from the state-farming industry symbiosis discussed in the previous chapter. State actors, 
in symbiosis with the economic interests, have the power to reinforce predominant values of the 
neoliberal capitalism (Tombs and Whyte, 2010; Walters and Martin, 2013) and pre-empt conflicts of 
interest by excluding the environmental harm from farming intensification from the political process. 
The imbalance of power was also visible on the local council level:  
‘I do not think [the council] recognises the views and concerns of people – they just let 
everything happen. Even though they know that there is quite a big opposition, they are not 
making any effort to put checks in place, they are not treating it like an ongoing issue. They 
are not taking it seriously and they are not dealing with it’ (COM003). 
The latter was exacerbated by the fact that the government agencies responsible for the oversight of 
the new planning applications were reported to ignore the potential impacts of farming 
intensification:  
 
‘We were challenging them on the fact that all our statutory agencies had written back to the 
planning department on the largest pig factory farm in the UK that they had no concerns. 
Public health – no concerns, veterinary – no concerns, NIEA – no concerns’ (COM008). 
‘But if you look at most application <…> – roads never seem to have an issue, environment 
and water never seem to have an issue. If anybody in their right mind looked at those 
applications, they would have an issue with them’ (COU002). 
Non-recognition of the views of opposition to farming intensification is linked to the previously 
discussed idea of the consensus around growth- and profit-driven neoliberal capitalist system, which 
links the micro level activities and the macro level political economic climate (Hillyard et al, 2004). 
In this case, institutions of governance embrace and act according to the goals of accumulation 
(Michalowski, 2010), which compromises their ability to act as a mechanism of control for farming 
intensification. Such non-recognition ensures that the economy remains bonded to the profit motive 
(Winlow et al, 2015). Moreover, non-recognition was also coupled with disrespect (Fraser, 1998):  
‘There was a predetermination meeting and a decision-making meeting. Were the concerns 
taken into account? They were not. Even when I went down the line of planning, it was still 
not believed and ridiculed’ (COU002). 
 
Fraser (1995) conceptualises disrespect as the state of being disparaged in everyday life interactions 
and regards such demeaning representations to be the root of injustice. In my case, it was the ideas 
of opposition to farming intensification that were disparaged, which, along with their non-
recognition, is the first marker of recognitional injustice. Recognition of difference, thus, did not take 
place. The reasons for non-recognition are rooted in the previously discussed hegemony of neoliberal 
capitalism constituted through power relations that reject the possibility of alternatives to it. 
Alternative ideas are included as long as they do not question the integrity of the neoliberal political 
152 
 
economy (Swyngedouw, 2011). Such alternative ideas should accept the existing distribution of 
environmental harm, but once the reasons behind such distribution are questioned, these ideas are 
excluded. In my case, the residents questioned the political economic rationale behind farming 
intensification, which led to their views being dismissed.   
Furthermore, the architecture of and the relations within the planning system also safeguard 
the hegemony of the dominant capitalist order and reinforce power disequilibriums between 
individuals and communities and the farming industry. Struggles for the recognition of ideas are 
rooted in what Fraser (2000) calls institutionalised misrecognition. The latter was reflected in the 
interviews:  
‘Although you might get a thousand objection letters, it is a very small number of those 
objections that consider a planning issue and can be addressed by the council. People’s 
reasons for opposing something are perfectly valid but not relevant to the planning so they 
cannot be addressed’ (COU001). 
‘Government departments produced initiatives from a decade or more ago which were 
allowed to run because there is no process for challenging them against the environmental 
need of local people, local residents’ (MLA002). 
As Novek (2003) points out, it is harder to argue against a proposal that is compliant with legally 
established standards, which was also suggested by one interviewee: 
‘I think planning legislation is set up in a way that restrictions cannot be put upon these 
developments, proliferation of these developments is not a planning consideration in terms 
of objections to these. Planners would point to the fact that they are operating within the 
existing planning legislation’ (MLA002).  
The legitimation on the institutional level further reinforces lack of recognition of ideas against 
farming intensification. As power of the economic capital is reinforced in the institutional sphere, it 
also works to ‘reduce the cognitive area of those subjected to it’ (Ruggiero, 2018, p. 62). The 
interviewees pointed out that the structure of decision-making forums obscures the concerns beyond 
the economic rationale:  
‘We have no role or ability to look at ethical issues or any other kind of issues – animal 
welfare, issues beyond the planning scope. That restricts our ability to look at all the possible 
consequences. We cannot ask for expert advice on health, animal health, waste management. 
It is very limited. <…> The legislation sets out Conduct and Guidance for planners 
specifying what evidence they can look at – it is very restrictive in terms of what it allows 
us to do. It is concerned with us going off on a tangent and looking at things we should not 
look at. It is possible but that fear does not allow us to look at things we should be looking 
at to make a more informed choice’ (COU001). 
The economic dimension, on the other hand, was put forward in the decision-making forums:  
‘There’s so much emphasis in the planning applications on economic supremacy. If they are 
bringing in some pounds, it seems to be the real frontrunner that makes them [decision-
makers] go – this is a good thing. Economic supremacy is used time and again as a 
justification for quite poor decisions’ (NGO002). 
Several respondents stressed that concerns such as profitability, efficiency, and economic growth 




‘They have to have greater goals towards the community need and the environmental need 
for the wider area where you’re dealing with the quality of life for a large number of the 
local people. That is not a field in the planning legislation’ (MLA002). 
This idea resonates with Lukes’ (1974) second dimension of power, namely control of the agenda. 
To safeguard the hegemony of capitalism, certain issues and ideas are unwittingly neglected or 
consciously excluded from the agenda; power is exercised through non-decision making (Bachrach 
and Baratz, 1970; Ruggiero, 2018).  
To conclude, non-recognition and disrespect of the ideas of opposition to farming 
intensification are the first marker of recognitional injustice. They originate in the hegemony of the 
growth- and profit-driven neoliberal capitalist system constituted through power relations between 
the state and corporate actors in the farming industry that reject the possibility of alternatives to it. 
The hegemony becomes ‘an organic and relational whole, embedded in institutions and apparatuses’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 67). It is reproduced through the micro level relations in planning, 
which compromises the ability of the latter to act as a mechanism of control for farming 
intensification. Therefore, environmental decision-making activities within the realm of planning act 
as a catalyst for harm. Fraser (2001) suggests that norms reproduced on the institutional level may 
deny some people the status of full partners in interaction. In my case, norms reproduced on the 
institutional level protect the dominant capitalist order, which favours intensification of farming, 
ensuring that any ideas that seek to challenge this order are depreciated or ignored.  
6.3.2 Non-recognition of non-expert voices in the decision-making process 
Environmental justice movement is characterised by scepticism towards professional experts and 
instead prefers to rely on situated knowledge of communities (Schlosberg, 2002). Situated 
knowledge is theorised as a particular knowledge that arises from the experience of a particular social 
position, which, in turn, influences what interests and assumptions are voiced (Haraway, 1991). Even 
the most technical decisions involve value judgments and may raise political questions beyond the 
experts’ field of knowledge (Gauna, 1998), thus making situated knowledge of communities more 
important. The importance of situated knowledge was also expressed in some of my interviews:  
‘I can only judge an application by what has been given to me. Without the relevant 
information, it is very difficult to make a judgement. As local representatives, we know the 
area; I was brought up here. I can see the problems arising but sometimes you read the reports 
[and it seems like] nobody actually knows the area, no one’s been out here to have a look. I 
don’t think someone comes out to the sight to have a look; that is my perception’ (COU002). 
Situated knowledges emerge not from a formal study, but from intimacy with social and physical 
environments over time (Gauna, 1998). While the government agencies that provide input into 
decision-making may lack the knowledge of the local area specificities, knowledge that fills those 
gaps was nevertheless ignored in the decision-making process, according to some of the respondents: 
‘The only letters they were paid any attention to were the letters that came from expert 
engineers. They paid attention to that because it came from experts. Another one was from 
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an MBA in planning because they saw a specialist planner. This whole idea that local people 
will be listened to – nobody paid any attention at all’ (COM006). 
Hunold and Young (1998) suggest that those wanting to partake in the decision-making process must 
be able to express their views and needs in their own way, and not be dismissed because they lack 
expertise. If this condition is missing, the procedure cannot be deemed just. Another marker of 
recognitional injustice, therefore, is non-recognition of non-expert voices in the decision-making 
process (Walker, 2012). The quote above also suggests the importance of an appeal to experts to 
legitimise the decisions made. Masked in technical jargon, the decisions around new farms can be 
framed in the terms favourable to those benefitting from them (Forester, 1986): 
‘[They] do not read environmental impact assessments, the applicant puts something in and 
they go – great, we have got it. They accept it because those people have ‘PhD’ or ‘expert’ 
next to their name’ (COM002). 
Although some of the interviewed community members acquired impressive levels of technical and 
legal expertise related to planning around farm applications, they, as Hunold and Young (1998) 
articulate it, were disadvantaged at the outset: 
‘What we found was that the applicant was very economical with the truth. We started to 
dissect the planning application and saying that the figures were not right. And nobody really 
was listening to us, nor wanted to listen to us’ (COM008). 
The disadvantage mentioned above is related to power disequilibrium between members of the public 
and the farming industry. Michalowski (2018) states that power resides in the ability to organise the 
relevant resources, including the economic ones, and the issue of power disequilibrium was reflected 
in the interviews: ‘They have big money, they can afford specialists’ (COM006). Power deriving 
from the possession of resources (Ruggiero, 2018) is organised around the mandate to facilitate 
capital accumulation (Michalowski, 2018). The existing economic structures underpinned by 
inequality deprive local residents of the resources needed for full participation. That was linked to 
their views and ideas and situated knowledge not being recognised:  
‘We did what we could to prevent it but there is a lot of money behind it and a lot of paid-
for expertise that helped them to deal with objections that might have risen. People opposing 
it are local people who did not have resources and were dependent on friendly advice from 
universities and other parties’ (COU001). 
Subordination of the ideas that challenge the existing political economic regime of meat production, 
thus, is directly related to economic disadvantages experienced by those expressing such ideas. 
6.3.3 Summary 
This section discussed several markers of recognitional injustice in decision-making in the context 
of farming intensification. First, it identified non-recognition of the views of opposition to farming 
intensification. I suggest that this facet of recognitional injustice reflects the idea of common sense 
in farming developed in the previous chapter, which is embedded in the consensus around growth- 
and profit-driven neoliberal capitalist system. The architecture of and the relations within the 
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planning system also reinforce the hegemony of the dominant capitalist order and exacerbate power 
disequilibriums between members of the public and the farming industry. The planning system, thus, 
serves to legitimise the existing structures of economic power and seeks to prevent conflict that might 
lead to power redistribution (Gaventa, 1980). While planners have power over decision-making, this 
power serves ‘to keep people in their place, to protect existing power’ (Forester, 1982, p. 69). As a 
result, it becomes more challenging for individuals and communities to defend alternative ideas and 
views, and to express the ideas of opposition to farming intensification. The first marker of 
recognitional injustice also compromises the ability of the realm of planning to act as a mechanism 
of regulatory control for farming intensification discussed in Chapter 5, which catalyses harm. Non-
recognition of the views opposing farming intensification further perpetuates the dominant mode of 
meat production and precludes a political-economic change necessary for preventing environmental 
harm.  
Second, this section considered non-recognition of non-expert voices in the decision-making 
process. In this case, hegemony of capitalism is safeguarded through privileging the voices of 
‘experts’ to the situated knowledges of non-expert community members. It reinforces the power 
imbalance between members of the public and the farming industry on the micro level, where the 
latter uses its power to sway the planning process for desired outcomes (Walters, 2011). The power 
imbalance may lead to depoliticisation whereby members of the public transfer the responsibility 
over the issues affecting their lives to experts, deeming the issues of planning too complex (Young, 
1990). The discussion of recognitional injustice also demonstrates how the ‘normal’ exercise of 
hegemony of neoliberal capitalism (Gramsci, 1971) reconfigures the political process of 
environmental decision-making. As power relations work to exclude the alternatives to the growth- 
and profit-driven political economic system, they also reinforce consensus-based technocratic 
decision-making (Mouffe, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2007). As my respondents were unable to ‘counter 
argue the prevailing consensuses that sustain their situation’ (Bustos et al, 2017, p. 292), the decision-
making process became largely depoliticised. Having identified several markers of recognitional 
injustice in decision-making in the context of farming intensification, the next section analyses the 
procedural dimension of environmental decision-making regarding new intensive pig farms.  
6.4 Pig farming intensification and procedural injustice   
Brisman (2013, p. 291) states that ‘the extent to which harm or potential harm to the environment 
(its natural resources, living beings, and their ecosystems) is identified, resisted, mitigated, or 
prevented’ might be linked to public access to information, participation in decision-making over 
environmental matters and access to justice. Those aspects, grounded in the Aarhus convention as 
described in Chapter 2, are known as procedural environmental rights (Gellers and Jeffords, 2018) 
and are a subject of justice in their own right (Walker, 2012). This section analyses the three aspects 
of the procedure of decision-making in relation to farming intensification and discusses the dynamics 
of power in it.  
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6.4.1 Public access to information  
The availability of environmental information is a necessary condition for effective participation in 
decision-making processes (Walker, 2012) as well as for safeguarding human rights and protecting 
the environment (Brisman, 2013). To reiterate, the right of access to environmental information is 
enshrined in the Aarhus Convention discussed in Chapter 2 and includes three aspects of this right: 
information on the state of the environment, on the factors affecting the environment and on the 
effect that changes in the environment may have. The right of access to environmental information 
is divided between the passive and active right. It is developed from the perspective of a public 
authority and includes the authorities’ obligations to respond to requests for environmental 
information from members of the public (passive right) and the authorities’ obligations to proactively 
disclose environmental information without receiving a request from the public (active right) 
(Whittaker et al, 2019).   
Dissemination of environmental information is often organised through putting a public 
notice in the local press. The chosen press should be distributed in the area where potential effects 
of the proposed development will be experienced and should reach members of the public who are 
likely to be affected (Rachynska, 2017). However, one of the interviewees pointed out that some 
public notices were circulated in what were considered to be unpopular newspapers:  
‘[The applicants] were talking about putting planning application notifications in certain 
newspapers. They put it into Belfast Gazette – nobody even knows what it is. It is not Belfast 
Telegraph, the Irish News and the Newsletter which are three most common NI national 
newspapers’ (NGO002). 
The website of the newspaper states that The Gazette is an official journal of record and ‘provides a 
permanent, official public record of important statutory and non-statutory notices that can be used to 
support legal and other processes, and act as a means of advertising public notices’ (The Gazette, 
n.d.). Nevertheless, the notice might not reach the affected populations due to the limited readership 
of the newspaper and, as a result, it does not transmit information about the proposed development 
effectively. Therefore, members of the public may not possess sufficient information about the 
changes in their local area.  
Public access to information also includes information on the state of the environment (such 
as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and natural sites, biological diversity, etc.). Some 
respondents pointed out that obtaining information about air quality in the areas with the existing 
farms can be challenging:  
‘For the last week, the wind has been coming from the south and it has been smelling every 
day in our house. I called the council and said – I want to know what is in that air. I am not 
an expert; we need them out to sample that air. If the smell is coming from the slurry spread 
on the fields, it is the responsibility of the council. If the smell is coming from the farm, it is 
the responsibility of the environment agency. One keeps pushing it back and forward to the 
other’ (COM006). 
The above quote is an example of a passive right of requesting access to environmental information, 
which refers to the obligation of an authority to provide environmental information if the latter is 
requested by the public (Whittaker et al, 2019). Limitations of the passive right to environmental 
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information in the context of farming intensification may result in local residents having limited 
information about the impact of intensification on the state of the environment. In addition to limiting 
their capacity to participate in environmental decision-making, it will create further health-related 
concerns.  
Public access to information also includes information on the factors affecting or likely to 
affect the environment (such as substances, energy, noise, etc.) (UNECE, 1998; Brisman, 2013). 
Some respondents pointed out that information about the potential effects of farming intensification 
might not be available beyond the communities that will be immediately impacted:  
 
‘The council is not engaged in raising awareness about such issues, it is not their job. The 
way planning legislation works is that you only need to tell people [residing] in that certain 
area. It is all down to community telling people that it [the farm] is coming down the tracks. 
And then it will be dealing with the aftermath because it will be – we cannot do anything 
because it [the farm] is built’ (COU002). 
As noted in Chapter 3, the council is obliged to notify people who occupy buildings on land adjoining 
the application site boundary, and those within 90 metres of it, and ask for their comments (nidirect, 
2019). However, the impact of farming intensification is far-reaching and environmental harms travel 
across borders, transported by humans or nature itself (Dybing, 2012; White, 2018). It means that 
the rest of the population will lack the awareness about the factors that are likely to affect the 
environment as a result of farming intensification. The comments above call into question an active 
right to environmental information, which refers to the obligation of an authority to be proactive in 
dissemination of environmental information without receiving a request from the public (Whittaker 
et al, 2019). It appears that Northern Irish local authorities did not exercise the active right to 
environmental information. The latter contributes to depoliticisation of environmental decision-
making by removing the potential for deliberation around farming intensification and reinforces the 
hegemony of capitalism.  
Finally, public access to information includes the information pertaining to ‘the state of 
human health and safety, conditions of human life, and cultural sites and built structures, inasmuch 
as they are or may be affected by the state of elements of the environment’ (Brisman, 2013, p. 293). 
Some interviewees complained that information about the impacts of intensification on human health 
was not widely available:  
 
‘We have kids walking to school and stuff, we have pensioners, people with lung disease. 
What effect is [the smell] having on these people? Nobody seems to want to tell us’ 
(COM004). 
 
To conclude, Antrim and Newtownabbey district residents’ access to environmental information 
about farming intensification was reported to be limited. The aspects of environmental information 
that have a human dimension are important for environmental justice (Collin and Collin, 2015), and 
limited availability of such information is the first marker of procedural injustice. The limited access 
to environmental information also demonstrates the workings of power relations that support and 
reinforce farming intensification in Northern Ireland. The planning regulations on the subject of 
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environmental information benefit the farming industry over Antrim and Newtownabbey district 
residents affected by the intensification, meaning that the latter are less likely to raise their concerns 
and defend their interests. It is indicative of the second dimension of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1970; Lukes, 1974; Tombs and Whyte, 2010) and serves to solidify the hegemony of capitalism by 
narrowing the decision-making agenda, further reducing the ability of the realm of planning to serve 
as a mechanism of regulatory control. Limited access to environmental information also prevents a 
conflict between the powerful and the powerless from emerging (and, therefore, requiring 
resolution), leading to depoliticisation of environmental decision-making around farming 
intensification. The intricacies of participation in the context of limited availability of environmental 
information will be examined in the next section.  
6.4.2 Participation in decision-making  
In line with the right to public participation in environmental decision-making, members of the public 
should be provided with the opportunities to comment on the planning applications that will affect 
the environment they live in, their comments must be taken into account and the rationale for the 
decision made should be provided. From my interviews, it was clear that members of the public were 
formally included in the process of decision-making. Yet, Chapter 3 demonstrated the problematic 
nature of formal inclusion and public participation in Northern Ireland due to its safeguarding of the 
existing power balance and turning into an empty ritual of participation (Arnstein, 1969). The latter 
was aptly summarised by one of the respondents:  
‘Whenever we went to a predetermination meeting, it was a matter of going through the 
hoops of a meeting so that they could say that local people have participated. But we did not! 
We were each given three minutes to speak’ (COM006).  
 
Rowe and Frewer (2000) claim that participation methods such as public hearings see public 
engagement as an end in itself rather than a means towards an end. Thus, they are organised merely 
to meet the need to involve the public in some way and, as noted in Chapter 3, do little to share power 
and involve citizens meaningfully (Walker et al, 2006). Other factors also contribute to an impotent 
participation of the public. It was stressed that members of the public have little time to get acquainted 
with a new development in their area: 
‘And people are given only two weeks to respond [provide comments on the planned 
development]. All campaigners had to start from somewhere so two weeks to learn the 
planning system, waste licensing system, the pollution prevention control, potential effects 
of having a massive farm on your doorstep, health implications – it is an explosion of 
information. To get your head around something like that to be able to object within two 
weeks is completely impossible’ (NGO002). 
The emphasis on the complexity of new farm developments provides a further illustration of the 
previously discussed prioritisation of expert opinion over the situated knowledge of the public. The 
appeal to experts serves to legitimise decisions that are deemed too complex for ordinary citizens 
(Sloterdijk, 2005) and the use of jargon is designed to exclude (Ellis, 2000). The above-described 
non-recognition of non-expert voices resulted in the limited participation:  
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‘[when it comes to participation in decision-making], you are given three minutes to speak 
if you are an objector [at a meeting to make a verbal submission to the council]. Three 
minutes when you are looking at a huge list of things that potentially could impact – 
environmental pollution, health, the size, etc. You have to somehow work out what the key 
points are – you need to know how to sway people. It is an absolute minefield and to be 
given just three minutes for that’ (NGO002). 
The comment above reveals power disequilibriums in the decision-making forums. Yet, 
Swyngedouw (2009) suggests that justice enters the space of the political under the name of equality. 
Moreover, a proper democratic space of public participation, according to Oosterlynck and 
Swyngedouw (2010), allows expression of diverse opinions under the unconditional presumption of 
equality. The account below demonstrates that members of the public were not considered to be full 
members in a social interaction (Fraser, 1996) and their demands were seen as unjustified or 
irrelevant:  
‘We still have a culture that is carried over from the way things used to be – you have a 
central planning authority that is distant and aloof, they saw the public as a nuisance that had 
to be kept in their place. Since planning powers transferred to the local authority, that culture 
has been retained. While the aspiration of the Department for Infrastructure who are still 
responsible for strategic planning would be that we have a planning system with community 
involvement as much as possible. So rather than a central authority dictating what the plan 
should be, councils are devising their own plans with community involvement. That is the 
aspiration but the culture of treating the public as if they were a nuisance persists. They pay 
lip service to democratisation’ (NGO003). 
The above can be interpreted as an illustration of internal exclusion (Young, 2000), whereby the 
claims made by the public are not treated with equal respect and are not taken seriously. Perceiving 
members of the public as a nuisance also serves to legitimise a belief that situated knowledges lack 
validity, which perpetuates the cycle of limited recognition resulting in limited participation. Power 
inequalities facilitate the pursuit of the goals of the farming industry on the meso level, ultimately 
enabling realisation of the dominant goals in capitalism, those of profit and growth (Pearce, 1976).  
Power inequalities in participation also lead to public displeasure. Senecah (2004) suggests 
that the emotional response from the members of the public often results from decision-making 
bodies not giving sufficient consideration to their concerns. The boundary between rationality and 
emotion is worth exploring further, in light of the comment made by one of the GfG strategy authors 
in relation to the local residents who opposed farming intensification:  
 
‘Our industry is often vilified, and I keep saying – get your facts right. We need to look at 
evidence-based policy. What drives policy at the moment is emotion. It is in vogue to be 
concerned about the environment, to protest against big farms’ (AFSB001). 
 
This comment juxtaposes rationality and emotion (Young, 1990; Knight and Johnson, 1997), which 
was discussed earlier in Chapter 2, and demonstrates that decision-making forums favour the 
unemotional, dispassionate argument. The inferior role of emotion in politics and knowledge 
production can reinforce the hegemonic position of reason and rationality (Harding and Pribram, 
2006), traditionally associated with technocratic policy-making. Emotional expression during 
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environmental decision-making in relation to farming intensification invalidates the assertions made 
by those concerned about the changing face of farming in the country. Yet, it is also suggested that 
discourses that subordinate the role of emotion in the public sphere have an ideological function 
whereby certain groups that are associated with emotion (in this case, those opposing farming 
intensification) are also subordinated (Young, 1990). Subordination of emotion in the public sphere 
serves to preserve the consensus around the inevitability of neoliberal capitalism (Mouffe, 2005) and 
does not allow challenging power relations that sustain it.  
Furthermore, as suggested above, another element of just participation is making sure that 
public ideas matter (Walker et al, 2006) and have influence over the result of environmental 
decisions. Limited influence where public input is not taken into consideration in the decision-
making and does not have a genuine impact on the outcome (Rowe and Frewer, 2000) is a marker of 
procedural injustice. The comment below evidences such limited influence: 
‘We had a meeting with a head planner, and he encouraged us to write to the planners and 
let our views be known because they were interested in listening to the views and expertise 
and local knowledge that [we] would have. But it was all ignored! The letters that I wrote – 
I put information about different mistakes, mistakes in the drainage, different aspects of it, 
nobody paid any attention’ (COM006). 
The imbalance of power resurfaces again; participation equals power and participation without power 
redistribution is futile (Arnstein, 1969). The comment above displays the sentiment of 
disempowerment of the public, as expressed in another comment: ‘The general public is getting 
frustrated, they put in a complaint and nothing happens’ (COM005). While members of the public 
could have access to decision-making forums, simply having access did not mean that their 
contribution was valued (Senecah, 2004). A skewed balance of power allowed the decision-makers 
to acknowledge community participation, but without the community benefitting from that 
participation (Arnstein, 1969). The latter is emblematic of the exercise of hegemony of neoliberal 
capitalism, whereby democratic decision-making becomes a façade of economic power (Pearce, 
1976; Swyngedouw, 2011).  
Power imbalance in environmental decision-making participation around new intensive 
farms can also be scrutinised through the lens of political capability.  As stated above, for both Sen 
(1999) and Nussbaum (1997), control over one’s environment through political participation is 
integral to justice. Political capability can be understood as political power to shape decisions 
(Holland, 2017). An ability to voice one’s concerns in participatory forums is not sufficient; rather, 
an ability to put political pressure within the decision-making processes to steer decisions in a 
particular direction (Holland, 2017) is needed for making just decisions. Schlosberg (2012) also 
suggests that having the political capability to determine the range of other capabilities essential for 
people to live meaningful lives is part of a just procedure. The latter is fulfilled if decision-makers 
work on improving the relations between those taking part in decision-making and promote 
collaborative learning to ultimately guarantee that governing organisations ‘are ‘owned’ by the 
community and other stakeholders’ (George and Reed, 2017, p. 162). Ultimately, a capability-based 
approach is also essential for political equality (Bohman, 1997). On the contrary, as it was noted in 
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the respondents’ comments, the idea of creating infrastructures for democratic participation of the 
public does not find acceptance in Northern Ireland. The latter echoes the conclusions drawn in 
Chapter 3; building individuals’ capabilities for participation in environmental decision-making only 
finds a formal acknowledgement and does not translate into practice. The recent administrative 
reforms did not extend beyond the tokenistic gesture of formal community involvement. As a result, 
one’s political capability is not exercised fully.  
To conclude, in Northern Ireland environmental decision-making forums reinforce empty 
rituals of participation where participants start from an unequal position in terms of recognition, and 
the latter translates into an unequal position in participation. Participation without redistribution of 
power is the second marker of procedural injustice (George and Reed, 2017), whereby formal 
inclusion does not translate into a genuine impact on the decision-making outcome. Power 
disequilibriums in the environmental decision-making forums stem from state-corporate farming 
industry relations epitomised by the GfG strategy; these relations support and reinforce the intensive 
farming model discussed in the previous chapter and subsequently preserve the hegemony of 
neoliberal capitalism. Equality of material resources is crucial to convert formal rights to participate 
into real rights to participate (Sen, 1985). Yet, the common sense ideology of neoliberal capitalism 
has been negotiated by unequal forces (Rothe and Collins, 2018) and its maintenance is organised, 
along with intellectual leadership, through material power (Pearce and Tombs, 1998; Tombs, 2017). 
The previous section demonstrated inequality of material resources in the process of environmental 
decision-making; individual farmers supported by corporate farming industry actors had a significant 
advantage over those opposing farming intensification. Moreover, equality in political influence is 
also important for converting formal rights into real rights to participate. The previous chapter 
revealed the adherence to the shared goals of economic success within the state-corporate symbiosis 
(Michalowski and Kramer, 2006), which empowers the farming industry to perform purposive action 
for the achievement of their goals (Ruggiero, 2018). Differentiated political influence impedes the 
exercise of political capabilities of individuals and communities. Procedural injustice in participation 
also demonstrates that the ‘capitalist’s loyalty to democracy is only provisional’ (Pearce, 1976, p. 
60), which further proves that institutions of planning catalyse, rather than control harm. The pursuit 
of the dominant goals of capitalism - that of profit and growth - within the political economy of meat 
production means that democratic principles can be sacrificed if they interfere with the interests of 
the powerful. As a result, the unquestionable nature of capitalism as the foundation of political 
economic and social order is solidified.   
6.4.3 Access to justice 
Access to justice constitutes another pillar of procedural environmental justice. It implies that third 
parties possess a set of guarantees that allows them to challenge the legality of decisions, acts or 
omissions before an independent body established by law, if such decisions were made without the 
considerations of the fair procedure principles outlined above (UNECE, 1998; Brisman, 2013). 
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During the interviews, it emerged that access to justice of those objecting to farming intensification 
was limited since Northern Ireland has no third-party right of appeal. While the earlier described 
Aarhus convention does not directly advance the third-party right of appeal, it nevertheless helps to 
focus on how objectors should be involved in the decision-making process (Green Balance et al, 
2002). Moreover, Ellis (2002) states that regardless of the direct consequences of the Aarhus 
convention, the absence of the third-party right of appeal goes against the spirit of greater public 
involvement in planning. In particular, the applications accompanied by Environmental Impact 
Assessments (which is the case for farms housing over 2,000 animals) that are likely to have 
significant impact on the environment are deemed to deserve to have the right of appeal (Green 
Balance et al, 2002).  
If a third-party right of appeal is absent, members of the public do not possess ‘a public space 
within which citizens associate and confront the state’ (Dryzek, 1990, p. 43), which was expressed 
by several interviewees:  
 
‘They [members of the community] are massively restricted by the fact that there is no third-
party right of appeal so if they do not convince the planning process, they cannot appeal 
further. So they are restricted by our planning process in terms of securing results’ 
(MLA002). 
‘In NI if an applicant is refused, they have a right of appeal to the planning appeals 
commission. Whereas if an objector to a planning application is not successful at the local 
level, they have no further rights of appeal other than a judicial review. The UK doesn’t have 
any appetite for the third-party right of appeal, I cannot understand how in our democracy 
which for so many other things builds checks and balances, we failed to build something like 
that in planning’ (MLA001). 
As I suggested above, the planning apparatus makes restricted decisions within the boundaries of the 
consensus around neoliberal capitalism, where the balance of power is tilted towards those pursuing 
the dominant goals of the capitalist system. The failure to establish the framework for the third-party 
right of appeal is a further reflection of how the planning process legitimises the interests of economic 
power in society (Ellis, 2000) and fails to act as a mechanism of control for farming intensification, 
once again serving as a catalyst for harm:  
‘There is an imbalance in a way in which the law treats people when it comes to planning 
applications. Every planning application comes with a presumption to approve. And only 
then you have to say why you cannot approve it’ (MLA001). 
The quote above evidences the presumption in favour of development, discussed in Chapter 3. While 
not being a legal presumption, it still implies that ‘permission should be refused only if it could be 
shown that the development would cause ‘demonstrable harm to interests of acknowledged 
importance’’ (Green Balance et al, 2002, p. 23). The interviewees pointed out that the attempts to 
challenge the absence of the third-party right of appeal in Northern Ireland were stifled:  
‘Every time the debate around third-party right of appeal was raised, ministers said that it is 
anti-development, and they would not have it. I think they are looking predominantly through 
housing development eyes, but I cannot see the justice of not having third-party right of 
appeal, with appropriate protections for applicants. However, there is a massive imbalance 
in planning process. People have the rights to challenge [the applicant not complying with 
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the rules set out in the application] but it is weighted against the objector. But in the end, it 
all boils down to a legal challenge and those are very expensive’ (MLA001). 
‘The public can take them to the judicial review, but no one can afford it. But the applicant 
can take them [the planning department] to court straight away. <…> It just seems to be that 
one rule for a corporate is a different rule for an individual’ (COM008). 
This quote demonstrates the power imbalance between individuals and individual farmers deciding 
to intensify their production; this particular instance of an imbalance in material power (Pearce and 
Tombs, 1998) exacerbates disempowerment of those individuals confronting farming intensification 
in Northern Ireland. Lee and Abbot (2003) suggest that industry actors can access justice provisions 
not only because of the resources available to them, but also because high costs of accessing justice 
provisions can be set off against the economic benefits from the granting of regulatory permission.   
The status quo of the absence of the third-party right of appeal has been labelled ‘inadequate 
in a democratic society’ (Green Balance et al, 2002, p. 6). It is suggested that the introduction of 
third-party rights would help to challenge the unequal distribution of power in the planning process 
(Ellis, 2000), expand the range of opportunities for participation and establish a system of checks 
and balances within the planning process (Ellis, 2000, 2002). It can present an example of 
countervailing power for empowered participatory governance (Fung and Wright, 2003), without 
which any institutional tweaks to encourage participatory governance are likely to fail.  
To conclude, currently limited access to justice underpinned by the structural and material 
inequalities is another marker of procedural injustice. Limited access to justice also serves as a 
catalyst for harm due to the failure to act as a mechanism of control for farming intensification. 
Brisman (2013) suggests that once members of the public see the attempts to use their voice as futile, 
then procedural rights lose their meaning and become little more than lip service. The ‘culture of 
participation’ is then replaced with a ‘culture of silence’ where public apathy does not allow for 
challenging of environmental harms (Brisman, 2013). The futility of challenging the planning 
applications for intensive farms was expressed by one of the respondents:  
‘You try to use your voice as best as you can, you try to write to the planners to listen to you, 
you try to write to the council. When you go to the ombudsman, they will defend the council. 
We have really nowhere to go’ (COM006).  
The comment above illustrates how depoliticisation takes place as the contingency of a choice and 
‘capacity for agency’ (Hay, 2007, p. 66) are denied, as the interviewees function in a political space 
where alternatives to neoliberal capitalism are dismissed.   
The rise of neoliberalism also portended the shift of responsibility from governments to 
communities (Novek, 2003) and the recent planning reform is an example of that, as I demonstrated 
in Chapter 3. Yet, during the interviews it emerged that the decision-makers were not prepared to 
deal with the farm applications after the reform and the respondents mentioned the issue of the 
decision-making process being open to manipulation: 
‘The councils themselves are failing because a lot of decisions are being overturned – the 
planners make recommendations, but councils do not have to accept those recommendations. 
You suppose they have a planning reason for overturning but a lot of them are overturned by 
lobbying of planning applicants. And the scrutiny role where the Department for 
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Infrastructure would step in and say – you cannot do what you are currently doing – they do 
not exercise that scrutiny role. <…>The official line would be allowing councils to find their 
own way and gain their own experience’ (CIT001). 
The comments above continue the discussion developed in the previous chapter, demonstrating how 
farming industry actors influence the regulatory arenas and shape the ability of citizens to participate 
in decision-making (Weinberg and Gould, 1993). The micro level of environmental decision-making 
exemplifies the previously described regulatory and cognitive capture (Pearce and Tombs, 1998; 
Barak, 2017) of the regulators. Capture is achieved through lobbying (Whyte, 2004). Several 
respondents described pro-industry lobbying within the parameters of GfG, both on the part of the 
political party representing farming interests and the industry itself:  
 
‘Unofficially it is probably political pressure on the department. Even though we do not have 
a functioning government, we still have a relationship between politicians and MLAs who 
are involved in planning and will lobby for planning. I think planners within the department 
are wary of the role they play, and they do not want to upset the politicians. They are almost 
politically captured. There is such a culture of being politically captured, of those politicians 
exercising that power and abusing that power that our civil servants are very scared of 
stepping out of line. <…> the industry has significant influence over both [civil servants and 
politicians], the GfG is the classic example of that. We are exceeding our ammonia levels 
fourfold, civil servants are still driving the [GfG] strategy’ (CIT001). 
‘Political pressure is being put on through people lobbying on behalf of [farm] factories. 
NIEA said they were not doing anything about it, they were allowing it to get worse. That is 
what we are up against – against big money and the power that comes with big money. Soon 
there will be more pigs in NI than people and it is not going to be good for anyone’ 
(COM007). 
‘Big business is powerful as we know and there are so many people in their pockets. Even 
people in decision-making jobs do not face them up. <…> If you have a government plan 
[GfG], I think [the industry influence] would have come into play when reading the 
application and I would have thought that there would be external influences put on people. 
I believe that there was some external pressure put on either the planners or members of the 
planning committee’ (COU002). 
 
These quotes continue illustrating the imbalance of power between corporate actors in the farming 
industry and the individuals opposing farming intensification. Here, power operates through 
observable conflicts of interest and their resolution in decision-making processes, ensuring that 
economic interests predominate (Tombs and Whyte, 2010). As long as the conditions for politics are 
formulated in private by interaction between the state and corporate farming industry elites (which 
they were in the context of GfG), little space is left for the concerns of those who oppose 
environmentally and socially harmful process of farming intensification. Moreover, under these 
conditions power redistribution will not take place: ‘there is little hope for an agenda of strong 
egalitarian policies for the redistribution of power and wealth, or for the restraint of powerful 





6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrated the existing maldistribution of harms from farming in the Antrim and 
Newtownabbey district. The residents living in close proximity to the farms are exposed to a 
disproportionate amount of harm from animal waste disposal, which leads to water and air pollution 
and loss of biodiversity. Environmental harms from farming have a negative effect on the meta-
capability of sustainable ecological capacity, which compromises the capabilities dependent on it, 
such as bodily health, play, affiliation, and other species. As pig farming intensification in Northern 
Ireland takes place to fulfil the dominant motivation of the capitalist organisation of meat production, 
inequitable distribution of harm will be exacerbated and the meta-capability of sustainable ecological 
capacity and the associated capabilities will be further compromised because the possibilities 
afforded to individuals and communities to prevent such harms are limited (Walker and Bulkeley, 
2006). I demonstrated the latter by analysing the process of environmental decision-making around 
pig farming intensification and power dynamics within it.  
 I identified that the process of environmental decision-making in Northern Ireland is marked 
by recognitional and procedural injustices. Non-recognition and disrespect of the ideas of opposition 
to farming intensification are the first marker of recognitional injustice. Non-recognition of non-
expert voices in the decision-making process is the second marker of recognitional injustice. These 
markers of recognitional injustice are rooted in the consensus around a growth- and profit-driven 
neoliberal capitalist system, reinforced by the symbiotic relations between farming industry actors 
and the state actors in Northern Ireland. The consensus results in a depoliticised model of 
environmental decision-making, where alternatives to the growth- and profit-driven political 
economic system are excluded. The consensus is reproduced and reinforced in planning. The 
structure of decision-making forums neglects the concerns beyond the economic rationale and 
privileges voices of the ‘experts’ to the situated knowledges of non-expert community members. The 
relations within the decision-making forums reinforce power disequilibriums between individuals 
and communities and the farming industry, seeking to prevent conflict that might lead to power 
redistribution.  
I also identified several markers of procedural injustice in the process of environmental 
decision-making in regard to farming intensification. First, Antrim and Newtownabbey district 
residents’ access to environmental information in regard to the impact of intensification on the state 
of the environment, the factors that are likely to affect the natural environment, and the impacts of 
intensification on human health was identified to be limited. The limited access further reveals the 
power disequilibriums pertaining to environmental decision-making, serves to depoliticise it and also 
contributes to inequitable distribution of environmental benefits and burdens (Gellers and Jeffords, 
2018). Second, participation without redistribution of power is the second marker of procedural 
injustice. I showed that the residents that are or will be affected by farming intensification in the 
future, while having a formal access to the decision-making forums, participate from the position of 
inequality and their contributions do not have a genuine impact on the decision-making outcome. 
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Inequality in material resources and political influence both impede the exercise of the political 
dimension of the capability to control one’s environment. Formal mechanisms of participation 
exemplify an imaginary capitalist social order (Pearce, 1976), because such mechanisms are designed 
to conceal a decision-making process dominated by corporate elite interests (Senecah, 2004) behind 
farming intensification. The domination becomes possible because institutional structures of 
decision-making are vulnerable to market forces (Swyngedouw, 2005) in the form of industry 
lobbying; the previously discussed regulatory and cognitive capture of the regulators by corporate 
farming industry actors resurfaces. Therefore, formally democratic political processes that underpin 
environmental decision-making become a form of organising consent to capitalist leadership within 
the economy (Gramsci, 1971), rather than a site of contestation. Finally, this chapter analysed the 
third marker of procedural injustice - limited access to justice. The absence of a third-party right of 
appeal for the objectors of planning decisions is underpinned by the structural and material 
inequalities between the members of the public and the farming industry.  
Overall, recognitional and procedural injustices in environmental decision-making 
consolidate the inevitability of growth- and profit-oriented capitalist economy in meat production 
and demonstrate the provisional nature of democracy under capitalism (Pearce, 1976). The injustices 
further weaken the previously discussed limited ability of the planning frameworks to act as a 
regulatory instrument, which catalyses harm from farming intensification. The latter will result in 
injustice in the distribution of environmental harms from pig farming intensification in the future and 
















Chapter 7 - Discussion and Conclusion 
The final chapter first provides a summary of the aims of my study. Second, it summarises the 
information presented in this thesis, detailing the role of each chapter in answering the main research 
question; it outlines the context of my research by summarising the first four chapters and discusses 
Chapters 5 and 6 – the findings chapters – advancing my analysis further. The sections dedicated to 
Chapters 5 and 6 also outline the main contributions to knowledge that resulted from my study. This 
chapter proceeds to provide an answer to the main research question to establish how the process of 
pig farming intensification leads to environmental injustice in Northern Ireland. Following that, this 
chapter develops a discussion intersecting the ideology of neoliberal capitalism that underpins the 
process of farming intensification, and environmental justice to debate their compatibility. Finally, 
it considers the future of both meat production and environmental justice in Northern Ireland and 
suggests how the challenges identified in my research can be addressed. The chapter concludes with 
a brief section suggesting directions for future research.  
7.1. Aims of the study  
Using the context of intensification of pig meat production in Northern Ireland, my qualitative green 
criminological study analysed the links between harm, power, and justice. In accordance with the 
research sub-questions, I:  
1. provided a detailed analysis of the workings of power in the context of meat production by 
examining the relations that create, support, and reinforce political economy of legal yet 
harmful practice of intensive farming on the three levels of inquiry: macro (global), meso 
(national) and micro (local).  
2. considered the current distribution of harms from farming in the studied area and scrutinised 
its effect in the realm of capabilities.  
3. analysed power dynamics in the processes of environmental decision-making between 
individuals and communities and the farming industry through the study of recognition, 
decision-making procedure, and the ability to have the capability to control one’s 
environment to ultimately question how such power dynamics affect the distribution of future 
harms associated with farming intensification. 
My study addressed the need to understand how power relations that are driving a legal yet 
harmful intensive pig meat production practice on the three levels of inquiry affect the context of 
environmental decision-making around the new farms, the realm of capabilities, and the present and 
future distribution of environmental harms in the context of intensive farms.  The three questions 
outlined above helped to answer the main question of my research: how does the process of pig 




7.2 Research context overview, findings, and knowledge contributions 
This section first provides short summaries of the first four chapters, reconstructing the research 
context. It proceeds to develop longer discussions of both findings chapters (Chapter 5 and Chapter 
6) and outline knowledge contributions that each of the chapters brings.  
7.2.1 Research context overview 
7.2.1.1 Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 demonstrated how a study of a legal yet harmful intensive pig meat production practice in 
Northern Ireland can advance criminological frontiers. It reviewed the effects of intensive farming 
for non-human animals, the environment, and society as well as its political economic implications, 
outlining the harmful prospects of choosing this mode of meat production. I explained that intensive 
farming falls under the umbrella of ‘lawful but awful’ (Passas, 2005; Wyatt and Brisman, 2017) 
harms and can be seen as an ‘ordinary act that contributes to ecocide’ (Agnew, 2013). Such claims 
necessitated a deeper understanding of power relations that underlie farming intensification in 
Northern Ireland. Moreover, Chapter 1 emphasised that analysis of power raises concerns around 
injustice. I demonstrated the dearth of research that bridges intensive farming and environmental 
justice, especially in the field of green criminology. While harms from intensive farming have been 
researched in terms of their distribution, less attention has been paid to the dimensions of recognition 
and procedure in environmental justice. Moreover, most environmental justice research focused on 
the discriminated populations, which posed the question of whether non-minority communities can 
also be victims of environmental injustice. Considering the evidence of marginalisation of 
individuals and communities in the processes of environmental decision-making (Laurian, 2004; 
Senecah, 2004), in particular due to power inequalities (Arnstein, 1969), I demonstrated that my 
research analysing the processes of environmental decision-making in relation to farming 
intensification in a non-minority community is timely and relevant. I proceeded to introduce the 
context of Northern Ireland, demonstrating its suitability for my research intersecting harm, power, 
and justice: while farming intensification is becoming a pressing issue, especially after the adoption 
of the GfG strategy, the farming industry enjoys a privileged position in the country, and public 
participation in decision-making is reported to be flawed. Chapter 1 brought these insights together 
by outlining my research questions.  
7.2.1.2 Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 developed an integrative theoretical framework for my research. It first identified the 
suitability of the field of green criminology. A socio-legal approach within it allowed to develop an 
understanding of the ‘ordinary harm’ of intensive meat production and consider the role of the 
powerful in it. The integrative theoretical framework also incorporated the literature on crimes of the 
powerful. The framework of state-corporate crime was discussed in depth and its relevance for 
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analysing the relations of power that catalyse harm on the three levels of inquiry in the context of 
meat production was justified. It allowed considering the relations between state and corporate 
farming industry actors in the context of the GfG agri-food strategy and beyond through the analysis 
of three catalysts for environmentally harmful farming intensification – motivation, opportunity 
structure and operationality of control. The chosen integrative framework also allowed analysing the 
role of power in securing the ideological hegemony, which rules out the alternative ways of social, 
political, and economic organisation, and normalises environmental harm. Finally, the environmental 
justice paradigm was included into the integrative theoretical framework to examine the convergence 
of harm and power emanating from the state and corporate farming industry actors. The theorisation 
of environmental justice allowed exploring both the maldistribution of environmental harms from 
the ongoing pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland and its effect in the realm of capabilities, 
and the reasons for it through examinations of recognition and decision-making procedure. The 
integrative theoretical framework connected power relations that support and reinforce pig farming 
intensification on the three levels of inquiry to the micro level process of environmental decision-
making; the analysis of the latter enabled understanding whether the realm of planning serves as a 
mechanism of control or a catalyst for harm from farming intensification. This integrative theoretical 
framework provided a foundation for my research and, on a more practical level, was essential for 
collecting, organising, and presenting research data.  
7.2.1.3 Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 introduced background information about the context of Northern Ireland and discussed 
the macro and meso level conditions that furnish opportunities for environmental harm in the country. 
The legacy of the Troubles was shown to influence the political economy and social development. 
In regard to the latter, an examination of the current administrative landscape and the planning 
framework in the country showed the challenges associated with the efforts to increase public 
participation and access to justice, both in the light of the Troubles and the country’s embeddedness 
in the political economy of capitalism. The chapter, thus, initiated the discussion on the elimination 
of the political under neoliberal capitalism. Chapter 3 also analysed farm concentration and 
production intensification in pig farming and revealed the current environmental impact of farming, 
suggesting that the process of intensification would exacerbate the already existing environmental 
harms and expose the communities living in close proximity to such farms to a disproportionate 
amount of environmental burdens. Furthermore, Chapter 3 revealed the flaws in environmental 
regulation in Northern Ireland. It provided information on environmental governance in the country, 
linking it to the global trajectories and national socio-political background, and setting the context 
for the future analysis of power relations in the realms of environmental and planning regulation of 
farming. This analysis revealed how the broader political economy of neoliberal capitalism with its 
emphasis on growth and deregulation intermeshes with power relations between state and economic 
actors on the national level. The chapter introduced ‘state-corporate symbiosis in which economic 
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power is linked to and dependent on both the executive power of the political state and the ideological 
power’ (Michalowski, 2018, p. 107) by discussing the GfG agri-food strategy in more detail and 
evidencing compromised environmental regulation of farming and a presumption in favour of 
development in planning. Finally, Chapter 3 discussed the negative Brexit implications for both 
farming and environmental governance in Northern Ireland.  
7.2.1.4 Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 detailed the ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin my research – 
critical realism and interpretivism. It explained why the case study method was suitable as the 
methodological approach in the context of my epistemological assumptions and for green 
criminological research in general. Following that, this chapter described the literature review 
process (primary and grey literature, including policy documents, documents related to 
environmental regulation, planning documents, and planning legislation) that preceded data 
collection. The chapter also elaborated on the techniques used for data collection; Antrim and 
Newtownabbey district as well as Belfast were selected as research contexts and four participant 
categories were identified. Twenty-nine semi-structured interviews were conducted, and official 
statistics related to farming and agriculture in Northern Ireland as well as media data were used in 
this research. The data were analysed through thematic and comparative analysis. The chapter also 
outlined ethical issues and limitations pertaining to my research.  
7.2.2 Findings and knowledge contributions  
7.2.2.1 Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 built an argument to answer the first research question. It analysed the process of pig 
farming intensification in Northern Ireland and used the integrative theoretical framework to examine 
power relations that create, support, and reinforce this phenomenon on the three levels of inquiry: 
macro (global), meso (national) and micro (local).  
7.2.2.1.1 Macro level 
Barak (2017) suggests that the globalised capitalist economy works to enable rather than prevent 
crimes and harms. My findings indicated that macro level political economic arrangements in relation 
to meat production operate through the protection and reproduction of what Passas (1990) labels as 
the triad of profit-growth-efficiency, which subsequently influences meso level developments in 
Northern Ireland. Profit generation in the capitalist economy is the ultimate incentive for any change 
in the market (Damron, 2009); being embedded in the profit-driven globalised capitalist economy 
creates pressure to increase national level production in order to compete internationally. My 
interviewees emphasised the predominance of small-scale farming in Northern Ireland, which does 
not allow them to fulfil the overarching goal of economic success within the global political 
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economic arrangements in relation to meat production. The discrepancy between the global goals for 
meat production and the structural opportunities that exist to meet them in Northern Ireland led to a 
strain (Merton, 1938). The GfG strategy, focused on growth through intensification, consolidated the 
ambition of growth and served to address this discrepancy. Led by the major corporate actors in the 
farming industry, it fulfilled the goal of profit-making prescribed by the global market rule. It also 
allowed Northern Ireland to be competitive on the global scale and identify new export markets to 
maximise financial returns. Yet, the response to the strain in the form of intensifying meat production 
also results in harms outlined in Chapter 1.   
Furthermore, Chapter 5 demonstrated that pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland is 
not simply an economic matter of making profit; it is also a political project that uses human 
imagination towards preserving capitalist values (Blanchette, 2020). The discourses propagated on 
the macro level are used as an instrument in the struggle for hegemony of neoliberal capitalism 
(Pearce and Tombs, 1998; Whyte, 2016) by the authors of the GfG strategy. The discourse of market 
rationality in relation to an increasing global demand for pork that needs to be met is presented as 
common sense and the ensuing harms are framed as inevitable and ordinary. Dissemination of 
common sense in farming rules out alternatives to neoliberal capitalism (Pearce and Tombs, 1998), 
thus reinforcing its domination as the only viable way of organising production. It also masks the 
power of meat producers over demand manipulation. Crimes of the powerful theorists maintain that 
through consumption, broader ideologies and structures are perpetuated and reinforced (Rothe and 
Collins, 2017). Within GfG, consumer demand is influenced by using the image of environmentally 
friendly production and the meat quality associated with it to increase profits on the global market. 
Manipulation of consumer demand guarantees the perpetuation of the current capitalist model of 
meat production based on profit accumulation, thus proving White’s (2018) point that the origins of 
ordinary harms are related to the dominant mode of production, over which the participants have 
little or no direct control. 
7.2.2.1.2 Meso level 
For the meso level, the chapter analysed how a ‘regime of permission’ (Bernat and Whyte, 2017, p. 
71) for intensification was and continues to be established by analysing the catalysts for harm – 
motivation, opportunity structures and operationality of control. Goals are crucial components of the 
decision-making process (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998). I demonstrated that the pursuit of the 
underlying motivation of profit-making in meat production in Northern Ireland leads to 
environmental harm from intensification. The goals formulated by the AFSB within the GfG strategy 
were to drive efficiency of the farming industry as well as professionalise it, with the latter 
associating professionalism with profitability and the ability to respond to the needs of the market. 
The chosen goals reflect the ethos of the dominant political economic system (Pearce, 1976).  
As goals are pursued, institutional structures develop to provide further support for them 
(Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998), embodying the second catalyst for harm. The opportunity structure 
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to achieve the goal of efficiency relies on the promulgation of the discourse against small-scale farms 
and provision of material support for technological innovation and research into efficient production. 
The opportunity structure to achieve the goal of farmer professionalism includes education of farmers 
and organisation of business development groups. Both opportunity structures present an 
amalgamation of material and ideological support for farming intensification developed at the state-
corporate nexus. Material support refers to the resources directed towards fulfilling the nationally set 
goals within the framework of GfG and beyond. Ideological support is exemplified by the power in 
the production of consciousness regarding a harmful act (Michalowski, 2018) of farming 
intensification, and enables the dominant ideas of production organisation to be normalised and 
treated as common sense. Both opportunity structures ultimately serve the purpose of fostering the 
conditions that respond to the global ambitions of meat production and enable profit accumulation 
through more intensive production. Simultaneously, fostering the conditions for intensification also 
reinforces the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism in meat production.   
Finally, state-corporate crime theorists suggest that the chosen opportunity structures are 
most effective in the absence of strong controls (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998). The analysis of the 
regulatory controls experienced by the farming industry actors in their ambition to intensify 
continued the discussion of environmental and planning regulatory frameworks deficiencies 
developed in Chapter 3, demonstrating how the latter become the third catalyst for harm. Major 
corporate actors in the farming industry influence the regulatory forums by moulding the existing 
environmental and planning regulation in their favour and protecting their vested interests in profit 
accumulation. Thus, my research confirms that in the context of neoliberal capitalism where capital 
accumulation is the main imperative, regulatory agencies are vulnerable to regulatory (Pearce and 
Tombs, 1998; Whyte, 2004) and cognitive (Barak, 2017) capture. As a result, efficient, growth-
oriented meat production is consolidated in regulatory relationships, which further reinforces the 
hegemony of the dominant capitalist order and implies that alternatives to it are excluded. 
7.2.2.1.3 Micro level 
Chapter 5 also demonstrated how both global and national catalysts for environmentally harmful 
intensification influence the happenings on the local level. In relation to the goal of producing 
efficiently, the empirical evidence suggested that in order to stay financially viable, individual 
farmers needed to organise their production according to the market rule ideology. The goal of profit 
is continually reinforced within the meat supply chain; success is measured in financial achievement 
(Passas, 1990). A strong emphasis on goal attainment can encourage harmful behaviour (Kauzlarich 
and Kramer, 1998), and the goal of profit has been identified to produce more strain than other types 
of goals (Benson and Simpson, 2009). As individual farmers experience strain, they respond to it by 
making production more efficient (and more intensive) through benefitting from the opportunity 
structures created on the national level. This situation once again is emblematic of the harm 
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associated with a response to a strain (Merton, 1938), as intensification leads to environmental and 
social harm.  
The pursuit of the goal of farmer professionalism on the micro level further reinforces the 
ideological hegemony of the capitalist order and normalises environmental and social harm from pig 
farming intensification. Professionalising farming industry results in a business-like environment 
where individual farmers have limited control over production decisions. Furthermore, certain 
practices associated with professionalism in farming (such as vertical integration actively promoted 
by the GfG authors) result in further disempowerment of farmers and encourage environmentally 
harmful intensification. Vertical integration consolidates power within meat supply chain, whereby 
retailers and processors, driven by the ambition to accumulate capital in line with the political 
economy of neoliberal capitalism, put pressure down the supply chain encouraging pig farmers to 
expand their production. This pressure once again creates a strain where farmers have to resort to 
intensification at the expense of the environment to meet the goals dominant in the political economy 
of neoliberal capitalism.   
The goals of creating a professional farming industry that responds to the needs of the market 
to stay profitable and organises its production efficiently contribute to a demise of small-scale 
farming on the local level because a more intensive mode of farming is beneficial for the achievement 
of these goals. While benefitting from opportunity structures created on the national level, the 
farmers who decide to intensify production also reinforce these opportunity structures, further 
marginalising small-scale producers and blocking the alternatives to the prevailing mode of 
production.   
7.2.2.1.4 Relations of power 
As Bourdieu (1990) articulates it, the conversion of different forms of capital requires making and 
maintaining relations. Authors theorising crimes of the powerful also view crime as a process of 
interconnected relations working to maximise profit (Findlay, 1999). Building on the findings of 
Chapter 5, I continue analysing the operation of power relations that ultimately create, support, and 
reinforce the political economy of meat production that leads to farming intensification in Northern 
Ireland.    
Expansion of the farming sector epitomised by the GfG strategy in Northern Ireland is seen 
by the political actors as a pathway towards maintaining economic growth on the national level, and 
corporate farming industry actors behind the strategy benefit from it by realising their goals to grow 
and increase profits with the support from the state. The goals for meat production are realised thanks 
to opportunity structures constructed by both the political and farming industry actors. The 
opportunity structures exemplify the power that emanates from the social relations that centre on 
economic growth, which guarantee that profit-oriented, efficient meat production prevails and those 
not fitting within its parameters are excluded. Such opportunity structures demonstrate the vital 
importance of state power for maintaining the functioning of the neoliberal capitalist regime of meat 
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production. The state, being a facilitator for market mechanisms (Tombs, 2017; Bittle et al, 2018), 
determines the context within which neoliberal ideology flourishes (White, 2018). The opportunity 
structures also reveal that the expansion of the farming industry benefits the state as the latter 
responds to the demands of economic growth necessitated in the context of the political economy of 
capitalism. It is, thus, in the interest of both the state and corporate farming industry actors to continue 
creating and reinforcing conditions that safeguard the hegemony of the neoliberal capitalist order. 
As Wilks (2013, p. 115) articulates it, ‘the alliance with the political elite is of paramount importance. 
Corporate elite enjoys power, status, and wealth; the political elite enjoys power, status, and election. 
Both have high stakes in a system that generates income, wealth, and the material benefits of 
economic growth’. This arrangement resonates with the earlier mentioned Michalowski’s (2018) 
characterisation of the neoliberal state as state-corporate symbiosis or a ‘regime of permission’ 
(Whyte, 2014, p. 244) in which economic power links to and depends on the power of the state. 
It is not only the opportunity structures created to meet the goals of efficient production and 
professionalism that exclude the alternatives to a market-oriented, profit-driven model of farming. 
The latter is also reinforced through the relations in the Northern Irish meat supply chain. Pressure 
for attainment of the goals of profit-making on the retail level increases pressure on individual 
farmers, incentivising them to increase their production. Moreover, actions of large meat processing 
companies (some of whom are responsible for the development of GfG) also encourage larger units 
of production and reinforce the idea of profit-growth-efficiency as common sense in farming. 
Relations of power operate to ensure that individual farmers willingly embrace market rule ideology, 
see it as common sense and associate it with the collective good. Through that, neoliberal capitalism 
becomes a moral discourse (Datta, 2018) and the goals of growth and accumulation are embraced as 
their own (Chambliss et al, 2010) by the farmers.   
Furthermore, regulatory contexts in Northern Ireland present an insight into the institutional 
expressions of economic and political power (Kramer et al, 2002). Relations between state and 
corporate farming actors in environmental regulation work to promote a consensus perspective in 
regulation (Whyte, 2004), where advice is preferred over punishment and close collaboration with 
the regulators is developed. A neoliberal perspective in regulation (Whyte, 2004) is also present: 
Chapter 5 showed the relational aspect of power in regard to blocking the creation of an independent 
environmental protection agency in Northern Ireland and analysed how relations of power work to 
interfere with the existing environmental and planning regulation, both within the context of GfG 
and beyond. The latter results in a regulatory and cognitive capture where regulatory agencies 
reproduce the social conditions necessary to sustain the capitalist political economic order (Tombs, 
2017).  
Relations of power, thus, are essential for realising the goals of meat production embedded 
in the political economy of capitalism; this ability to produce the intended effects is what, according 
to Ruggiero (2018), distinguishes the powerful from the powerless. Additionally, while state-
corporate relations create, support, and reinforce the political economy of meat production that leads 
to farming intensification, they also preserve the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism and exclude 
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alternatives to it, ensuring that the environmentally harmful but profitable status quo remains 
unchanged.  
7.2.2.1.5 Knowledge contributions 
Chapter 5 brought about some of the key knowledge contributions of my research. My study engaged 
with the issues around food production and advanced the frontier of food crime and harm research 
in green criminology. More specifically, it engaged with the under-researched food production 
practice of intensive farming in an interdisciplinary fashion. Through a detailed analysis of the 
workings of power in the context of intensive farming and the state-corporate relations that 
underlie this legal yet harmful practice, my study analysed the role of power 
in legitimisation, normalisation, and regulation of harm. My research expanded the knowledge of 
complex relationships between political and economic actors from a green criminological perspective 
and demonstrated how, within those relationships, power is exercised, maintained, and ultimately 
directed to preserve the status quo of neoliberal capitalism. In Chapter 5, I applied my integrative 
theoretical framework innovatively to analyse a ‘lawful but awful’ practice of intensive farming. It 
allowed advancing the agenda of ‘greening’ of state-corporate crime (Bradshaw, 2014, p. 166). My 
research addressed one of the criticisms of the integrated framework of state-corporate crime, namely 
its immediate focus on specific incidents, institutional flaws, and ‘moments of rupture’ (Bernat and 
Whyte, 2017, p. 71). I embedded my analysis of political economy of pig farming intensification in 
Northern Ireland in a broader system of production, underpinned by enduring and ongoing 
relationships, thus demonstrating that it constitutes a process rather than a single event. Furthermore, 
the application of the integrative theoretical framework allowed extending the critique of ideology 
developed within the research on crimes of the powerful. My research revealed the significance of 
cultural power – understood as ‘the organisation of consciousness’ (Michalowski, 2018, p. 109) in 
accordance with the ideology of neoliberal capitalism – in creating, supporting, and reinforcing legal 
yet harmful practices, such as that of intensive farming. 
7.2.2.2 Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 provided an in-depth answer to the second and the third research questions, analysing the 
existing distribution of harms from farming intensification in the area and its effect in the realm of 
capabilities, and linking this distribution to the power dynamics in environmental decision-making 
through the analysis of recognition and decision-making procedure.  
7.2.2.2.1 Distributional injustice and pig farming intensification  
The maldistribution of environmental harms is a product of the political economic organisation of 
capitalism (Lynch, 2016). Chapter 6 first revealed an already disproportionate exposure of the studied 
community to environmental harms from farming that may be amplified in the future as more 
intensive farms appear in the area. Disposal of animal manure presented a serious challenge, as the 
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respondents shared their concerns about the past episodes of water and air pollution. Another 
environmental harm discussed in Chapter 6 concerned the loss of biodiversity in the area as a result 
of the existing farming practices. Connections between environmental and social harm were made, 
and the chapter elaborated on how the distribution of environmental harm from farming affects the 
community and their wellbeing. The main argument of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach 
is that it is not sufficient to look at the distribution alone, but also at how the distributive arrangements 
affect one’s wellbeing. It was shown that as the meta-capability of sustainable ecological capacity is 
compromised, it has negative implications for other capabilities such as bodily health, play, 
affiliation, other species. Considering this and following Lake’s (1996) thinking, the community in 
question should not have yet another environmentally burdensome development such as an intensive 
farm in the area since it is already unfairly burdened by environmental problems. This brought up 
the question of what can be done through the decision-making forums to prevent environmental 
harms from farming.   
The remainder of Chapter 6 analysed power disequilibriums between the communities and 
‘the institutional structures creating the burdens to be distributed’ (Lake, 1996, p.170) and linked 
them to the power relations behind pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland. The institutional 
context can be examined on a wider scale than the mode of production (Young, 1990) and, therefore, 
allows for a broader understanding of injustice beyond its distributional element.   
7.2.2.2.2 Recognitional injustice and pig farming intensification 
First, Chapter 6 demonstrated that the respondents’ idea of living in and with the environment centred 
around intergenerational equity, human right to inhabit a clean and healthy environment, and resisted 
the process where the environment becomes a source of profit accumulation. It subsequently turned 
to analyse non-recognition of the ideas of opposition to farming intensification in the decision-
making process, linking it to the consensus around growth- and profit-driven neoliberal capitalist 
system in farming.   
Once the right to determine the future of one’s environment is invoked, it ruptures the fabric 
of the dominant ideological consensus (Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw, 2010). The ideology of the 
free-market economy dominates institutional structures of planning and shapes the path taken by 
decision-makers, leading to non-recognition and even disparagement of the environmental and social 
concerns related to farming intensification. This ideology is constituted by the symbiotic relations 
between corporate farming industry and the state actors in Northern Ireland. The structure of 
decision-making forums is such that it obscures public concerns beyond the economic rationale and 
thus becomes a form of legitimation of the dominant consensus. The problematic nature of consensus 
is that under it a questioning of the existing order becomes nearly impossible. The community that 
questions the fundamental idea of what they are being consulted upon (in my case, construction of 
intensive farms in the area) ‘find themselves excluded from the post-democratic apparatus of 
consensual governance’ (Haughton, et al, 2016, p. 477). Young (2000) labels such phenomenon 
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internal exclusion, meaning that the discourse of nominally democratic decision-making makes 
assumptions that some do not share. In my case, such assumptions embedded in the processes of 
environmental decision-making are those of the primacy of economic growth, and they are not shared 
by local residents opposing intensification. The ideas of the community participating in 
environmental decision-making find little recognition at the institutional level on the merits of being 
outside the reigning consensus, thus leaving the community members feeling disempowered.  
Furthermore, Chapter 6 showed that non-recognition manifests through the dismissal of non-
expert voices and community members’ situated knowledge. ‘Unauthorised actors’ (Beck, 1997) 
such as experts and consultants are privileged over citizen knowledge. Decisions around farms were 
seen as complex and technical, and it was concluded that members of the public can contribute little 
to them (Lee and Abbot, 2003). Expert opinion served to legitimise the process of intensification and 
protect the reigning consensus around the manner in which meat production should be organised, 
thus further reinforcing power imbalance between members of the public and the farming industry. 
The chapter also showed that even when community members acquired all the necessary expertise 
related to planning around farm applications, they were, nevertheless, in a disadvantaged position 
due to the lack of material resources necessary to prevail in the negotiations. Ultimately, non-
recognition of ideas that challenge the hegemony of capitalism overlapped with economic 
subordination (Young, 1997).  
Therefore, both markers of recognitional injustice consolidate the inevitability of a growth- 
and profit-oriented capitalist economy in meat production. They further compromise the ability of 
planning institutions to act as a mechanism of control discussed in Chapter 5, catalysing harm from 
farming intensification. As environmental decision-making process favours economic interests while 
marginalising alternatives to the dominant order, it becomes depoliticised because ‘contradictions 
are reduced to policy problems to be managed by experts and legitimated through participatory 
processes in which the scope of possible outcomes is narrowly defined in advance’ (Wilson and 
Swyngedouw, 2014, p.6).  
7.2.2.2.3 Procedural injustice and pig farming intensification 
Chapter 6 also analysed how the procedure of environmental decision-making bears several markers 
of injustice, as the majority of the interviewed community members were not satisfied with their 
interaction with what Fraser (1997) calls formally inclusive public arenas. The scope of 
environmental information in regard to the impact of intensification on the state of the environment, 
the factors that are likely to affect the natural environment, and the impacts of intensification on 
human health were identified to be limited. This limitation contributed to the consolidation of the 
hegemony of capitalism by narrowing the decision-making agenda. Additionally, limited 
environmental information made it more challenging for the respondents to raise their concerns and 
defend their interests, thus serving to reinforce a depoliticised, consensus-based model of decision-
making. Moreover, limited access to justice of individuals and communities expressed through the 
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lack of third-party right of appeal for those opposing planning decisions was identified to be another 
marker of procedural injustice. The failure to establish the framework for the third-party right of 
appeal further reinforced the interests of economic power in the planning process. Furthermore, it 
demonstrated the power imbalance between community members and the farming industry, where 
the former lacked financial resources to access a costly judicial review – the only avenue of justice 
available to them in the light of absence of the third-party right of appeal.  
Chapter 6 analysed another marker of procedural justice related to participation in 
environmental decision-making. It showed that participation was reduced to an empty ritual, where 
formal inclusion did not translate into a genuine impact on the decision-making outcome. Non-
recognition, thus, constructed barriers for meaningful participation – the views of opposition to 
farming intensification not recognised within the reigning political economic consensus found little 
influence in the participatory arena. Additionally, I revealed power disequilibriums in the 
environmental decision-making related to both inequality of material resources and political 
influence, which reinforced the status quo of participation without power redistribution.  
It would be easy to assume that environmental decision-making in a Western democracy 
such as Northern Ireland recognises the value of participatory elements – indeed, Chapter 3 
demonstrated that the element of community participation underpins planning. This evokes the doing 
versus having dilemma outlined by Young (1990): the opportunity to participate in my case can be 
conceptualised as a possession rather than an instrument of enablement. The community, thus, 
presented an example of what Fraser (1990, p. 75) calls ‘weak publics’: the publics whose 
participation consists of forming an opinion, but does not encompass decision-making. While the 
instruments of participation can be seen as a concession that runs against the interest of state and 
industry elites, it can be suggested that their power appears stronger when instruments of 
participation rather than exclusion are employed (Parenti, 1978). Participation in environmental 
decision-making without power redistribution is essential for securing capitalist hegemony (Kamat, 
2014) and becomes part of the imaginary social order projected by capitalism (Pearce, 1976).  
Instruments of participation become a means of serving the operations of capitalism, stifling 
disputes around the neoliberal growth agenda, and consequently leading to the elimination of the 
political under neoliberal capitalism (Mouffe, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2007; Wilson and Swyngedouw, 
2014). Disagreements can exist, but decision-making forums operate ‘within an overall model of 
elite consensus and agreement, subordinated to a managerial-technocratic regime’ (Swyngedouw, 
2009, p. 610).  Demands and concerns related to the sphere of meat production and inequalities 
through which environmental harms from it are produced and reproduced are positioned outside the 
arena of disagreement (Beck, 1997). It creates a situation in which, while power of individuals and 
communities is widely circulated, relationships in decision-making are still marked by injustice 
(Young, 1990) and hegemony of neoliberal capitalism ‘based on the decisive function exercised by 
the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 46) is not 
challenged. Procedural injustice, thus, once again demonstrates that harm is catalysed rather than 
controlled within the realm of planning. 
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7.2.2.2.4 Converging injustices and capabilities  
To summarise, recognitional and procedural injustices further weaken regulatory controls in 
planning discussed in Chapter 5, which catalyses harm from farming intensification. Consequently, 
the disproportional exposure to environmental harm of the studied community will be exacerbated 
as farming intensification progresses. The issues of distributive justice are closely linked with the 
notion of capabilities, as ‘justice is not about achieving an appropriate distribution of things between 
people, but rather about people being able to live lives that they consider worthwhile’ (Edwards et 
al., 2016, p. 755). Consideration of capabilities in Chapter 6 allowed me to connect distributive and 
procedural injustices in regard to farming intensification. I showed that the existing concentration of 
environmental harms already affects sustainable ecological capacity as a meta-capability and the 
capabilities dependent on it – bodily health, play, affiliation, and other species. Yet, the prospects of 
preventing future harms were poor. The capability to control one’s environment was compromised 
as a result of the participatory arrangements that only create a façade of participation and do not 
address the structural inequalities inherent in capitalism that play a role in individual and community 
disempowerment. The compromised capability also means that those who choose not to participate 
in environmental decision-making because they feel powerless are not developing the skills needed 
for effective participation in the future; thus, the vicious cycle continues.    
Different areas of environmental injustice are interlinked. The manner in which 
environmental decision-making is organised ultimately exacerbates maldistribution of environmental 
harms in the future and negatively affects the realm of capabilities. Thus, recognitional and 
procedural injustices on the micro level of planning catalyse harm and lead to distributional injustice, 
as harms from farming intensification persist. The markers of recognitional and procedural injustice 
described in Chapter 6 underlie the planning system that reinforces powerlessness in public 
participation (Deacon and Baxter, 2013). The institutions of public participation ignore the fact that 
imbalances of power are vital for the existence of the neoliberal consensus.  
In summary, relations that underpin environmental decision-making processes on the micro 
level of planning in Northern Ireland act as a tool of hegemony that seeks to perpetuate the prevailing 
socio-political order (Tang et al, 2012). The prevailing socio-political order is constituted by 
symbiotic relations between the state and corporate farming industry actors that devalue the interests 
of the environment and society when contrasted with the interests of economic growth and profit.  
7.2.2.2.5 Knowledge contributions  
Chapter 6 also resulted in further knowledge contributions of my research. It is evident that the 
environmental justice paradigm illuminates the aspect of distribution of environmental harms in 
relation to farming intensification. My research advanced the idea that the populations that are not 
considered minority and do not experience discrimination can also face environmental injustice. 
While Chapter 2 listed the evidence that the brunt of environmental injustice is borne by minority 
groups, I advanced the idea that rural populations residing in a country where agriculture and farming 
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are the backbone of the national economy (such as Northern Ireland) are exposed to the harms from 
intensive pig meat production, regardless of their social status. The results of my study advance 
environmental justice research in criminology by linking intensive farming and environmental 
justice, suggesting that further examination of the non-minority populations as victims of 
environmental injustice is needed.   
The claim that non-minority groups can be victims of environmental injustice is made on the 
grounds of such populations experiencing disenfranchisement in the processes of environmental 
decision-making. The environmental justice paradigm in my research illuminated the reasons behind 
the maldistribution of environmental harms by examining individual and community recognition and 
procedure of decision-making in relation to farming intensification. Therefore, another knowledge 
contribution of my thesis was to push the frontier of an under-researched area of recognitional and 
procedural environmental justice in green criminology. An analysis of recognitional and procedural 
injustice in the context of pig farming intensification in Northern Ireland also contributed to the 
existing knowledge through a close examination of the relationship between the capitalist economy 
and democratic politics, demonstrating that environmental affairs oftentimes serve as an arena where 
‘the hegemony of the neoliberal thought becomes entrenched’ (Bluhdorn, 2014, p. 147). My research 
examined how a democratic deficit (Swyngedouw, 2000) is growing despite celebration of individual 
and community political empowerment through participation, by linking recognitional and 
procedural injustice to state-corporate symbiotic relations that reinforce hegemony of neoliberal 
capitalism and exclude alternatives to it.  
Finally, another contribution of my research was to expand on the insufficiently discussed 
concept of capabilities in environmental justice. My research innovatively applied the concept of the 
meta-capability of sustainable ecological capacity to demonstrate that this meta-capability enables 
other human capabilities, such as bodily health, play, affiliation, other species. I also demonstrated 
the relevance of capabilities in relation to procedural justice through the consideration of political 
capabilities and stressed the importance of capabilities-related research in green criminology.   
7.3 Answering the research question  
The main question posed in my study asked how the process of pig farming intensification in 
Northern Ireland leads to environmental injustice. It aimed to establish how power relations that are 
driving the process of intensification on the three levels of inquiry may affect the context of 
environmental decision-making on the micro level, and ultimately influence the distribution of 
environmental harms from farming intensification and the realm of capabilities.   
The study of intensification on the international, national, and local levels revealed the 
workings of the political economy of neoliberal capitalism in meat production. Moreover, it 
demonstrated how power relations between the corporate farming industry actors and the state 
operate to secure and perpetuate a growth- and efficiency-driven model of meat production to pursue 
an overarching motivation of capital accumulation (Kramer, 2002). The adoption of the GfG agri-
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food strategy in 2012 consolidated this motivation and my analysis of the relations underpinning it 
demonstrates why pig farming intensification is taking place in Northern Ireland. The workings of 
state-corporate relations subsequently exclude alternatives to the capitalist order, thus reinforcing its 
hegemony. The fatalistic idea of ‘capitalist realism’ (Fisher, 2009) underlies it, whereby neoliberal 
capitalism is accepted as the only viable political economic system and a future beyond capitalism is 
unimaginable. The latter can also be seen as the ‘maturation of humanity’ (Zizek, 2000, p. 324): 
acceptance of neoliberal values relating to the efficiency of markets and excluding the possibilities 
of fundamental social change. Success – for those in power - is tantamount to the generation of 
consensus around the hegemony of economic growth (Kadlec and Friedman, 2007), rather than 
addressing the environmental and social harms associated with intensification. As part of the 
consensus, the capitalist order is accepted as a given, even though this very system is to blame for 
the existing ecological crisis on the macro level (Fougere and Bond, 2016) and the negative 
externalities associated with farming intensification specifically. The hegemonic nature of neoliberal 
capitalism lies precisely in it being accepted as a given, as an inevitability, simultaneously with the 
awareness of it being responsible for the existing harms from intensification. Coexistence of 
acceptance and awareness is emblematic of the idea of fetishistic disavowal, where one is aware of 
the consequences of their action but nevertheless continues with that action; knowledge of the 
action’s impact, thus, does not lead to a change of direction (Zizek, 2008).  
State-corporate relations safeguarding the consensus around neoliberal capitalism on the 
three levels of inquiry affect the processes of environmental decision-making on the micro level. The 
processes of environmental decision-making also consolidate the inevitability of growth- and profit-
oriented capitalist economy in meat production. Challenging this status quo becomes increasingly 
difficult because of power relations that protect the consensus around neoliberal capitalist model of 
meat production and work to exclude the alternatives to it. The consensus is generated both through 
the relations in decision-making forums and the structure of the planning system itself, thus leading 
to a depoliticised model of environmental decision-making. As a result, the process of environmental 
decision-making is marked by recognitional and procedural injustices, which are rooted in an 
imbalance of power between those protecting and reinforcing the neoliberal political economy and 
those seeking to challenge it. Recognitional and procedural injustices in the process of environmental 
decision-making prove that capitalist production is dependent on injustice (Fraser and Jaeggi, 2018). 
Moreover, they reveal the pseudo-democratic nature of capitalism (Pearce, 1976), a so-called 
‘simulacrum of democracy’ (Seymour, 2010, p. 16), whereby the wellbeing of both the environment 
and society takes a back seat in the interest of capital (Pearce and Tombs, 1998). The creation of 
processes based on quasi-democratic mechanisms of participation in environmental decision-making 
‘gives the superficial appearance of engagement and legitimacy, whilst focusing on delivering 
growth expedited through some carefully choreographed processes for participation which minimise 
the potential for those with conflicting views to be given a meaningful hearing’ (Allmendinger and 
Haughton, 2012, p. 90). Processes of participation in decision-making become separated from 
politics expressed as pluralistic struggles and contestation, from the power to influence the decision-
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making process, resulting in what Brown (2015, p. 128) calls ‘the language of democracy used 
against the demos’.  
Discussions around power and injustice are closely intertwined with the discussion around 
harm. In my research, the unevenness of environmental harm distribution is not underpinned by one’s 
minority status; rather, it originates from the recognitional and procedural injustices in environmental 
decision-making forums experienced by the studied community challenging state-corporate 
symbiotic relations that protect growth- and profit-oriented capitalist economy in meat production. 
Recognitional and procedural injustices in the processes of environmental decision-making regarding 
the construction of new pig farms in Northern Ireland weaken the ability of planning frameworks to 
act as a mechanism of regulatory control, which catalyses harm from farming intensification. The 
latter guarantees that the studied community will be exposed to a disproportionate amount of harms 
from farming intensification in the future.  The uneven distribution will negatively affect the meta-
capability of sustainable ecological capacity and compromise other capabilities such as bodily health, 
play, affiliation, and other species. My research showed that the latter are already affected by the 
existing harms from farming in the studied area. Future proliferation of intensive farms will continue 
to have a negative effect on both the meta-capability and the dependent capabilities. Additionally, 
the capability to control one’s environment will also continue to be compromised as a result of power 
disparity in environmental decision-making forums, thus entrenching community disempowerment.  
To summarise, recognitional and procedural injustices in the processes of environmental 
decision-making observed on the local level in Northern Ireland stem from the state-corporate power 
symbiosis that works to secure the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism on the international, national, 
and local levels of pig meat production; recognitional and procedural injustices will result in 
distributional injustices and negatively affect the realm of capabilities in the future. The answer to 











Figure 7.1. Answering the main research question. 
Having answered the main research question, in the next section I draw on the case study in my 
research further and pose the following question: can recognitional and procedural environmental 
justice be achieved under the conditions of neoliberal capitalism at all? 
7.4 Are the ideology of neoliberal capitalism and principles of environmental 
justice compatible? 
My research revealed the extensive academic coverage of marginalisation of individuals and 
communities in the processes of environmental decision-making under neoliberal capitalism, both in 
the context of environmental justice (Hunold and Young, 1998; Deacon and Baxter, 2013; Haughton 
et al, 2016; Bustos et al, 2017) and beyond (Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw, 2010; Fougere and Bond, 
2016; Apostolopoulou, 2019). A significant proportion of such marginalisation is attributed to the 
obstacles to equality in decision-making processes stemming from the entrenched power relations 
(Forester, 1982; Young, 1990, 2000; Culley and Hughey, 2007). Considering that power asymmetries 
are one of the foundations of the capitalist regime, the question arises whether such a regime can 
accommodate the institutional conditions necessary to achieve recognitional, procedural and 
ultimately distributional environmental justice. Such conditions should allow people to exercise 
passive and active rights to environmental information, facilitate an open debate on the conditions of 
equality where pluralities of voices are recognised and whose input (provided on their own terms) is 
respected and taken into consideration in decision-making, and make the avenues to challenge the 
decisions made open and available. Ultimately, meeting such conditions implies that a redistribution 
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of power in decision-making needs to take place (Lake, 1996) in order to challenge the empty 
promise of the current environmental decision-making institutions.   
However, it can be suggested that the regime of neoliberal capitalism may not be conducive 
for such redistribution of power. As Merkel (2014) asserts, while formally democratic procedures 
(such as referenda and deliberative assemblies) may be helpful for improving local engagement or 
holding government institutions accountable, they do little for halting inequality and reversing 
market hegemony. Ultimately, neoliberal capitalism and principles of environmental justice follow 
different logics. Decisions made under neoliberal capitalism lead to a degree of inequality, including 
inequality in the distribution of environmental harms. Moreover, the procedural realm, rather than 
operating as a dialogic exchange between equals, is replaced by strategic exchanges of power 
(Roberts and Crossley, 2004), where the decisions made do not threaten the existing order. Young 
(2000) even warns that, if structural inequalities of power exist (as they do in the processes of 
environmental decision-making under neoliberal capitalism), formally democratic procedures might 
reinforce rather than assuage them. As I suggested before, the existence of the formally democratic 
procedures makes it difficult to consider alternative possibilities and actions and reinforces the 
hegemonic aspect of neoliberal capitalism. Formally democratic procedures act as a veneer of 
critique, encouraging one to believe that contestation exists and that contestation results in an 
incremental change, thus reassuring cynical populations that no action is required on their behalf 
(Winlow, 2019). Yet, as neoliberal capitalism becomes the governing political rationality that 
prevents formulation of alternatives, it also dwindles spaces of genuinely democratic politics and 
erodes the very meaning of democracy. Brown (2003) suggests that the current version of democracy 
is defined by hollow promises as it fails to generate oppositional consciousness. Moreover, formally 
democratic decision-making takes place within the existing institutional priorities and social 
structures, further reinforcing power relations that underlie injustice. Young’s (2001, p. 685) further, 
rather pessimistic, warning is that even if decision-making is freed from the pressure of economic 
imperatives, ‘the majority of participants in such a reflective deliberative setting will be influenced 
by a common discourse that itself is a complex product of structural inequality’. The latter means 
that decisions made will still be partly conditioned by unjust power relations, and the powerful will 
be advancing their own interests at the expense of others (in my case, economic interests at the 
expense of those of the environment and society).  
Furthermore, environmental decision-making is not only about protection, but also about 
determining a person’s interests in regard to the environment. Discussions around environmental 
justice also focus on what kind of environment one wants to inhabit and what kind of environment 
one values. As Sandel (2010) remarked, ‘justice is not only about the right way to distribute things. 
It is also about the right way to value things’. Environmental justice, thus, is also about valuing the 
natural environment. Throughout this thesis, it has been shown that neoliberal capitalism does not 
recognise the inherent value of the environment and side-lines environmental interests and values. It 
operates on the basis of causing ecological disorganisation (Lynch et al, 2020), which resonates with 
a more general claim that ideas of valuing and protecting the natural environment and the dominant 
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neoliberal economic system are incompatible (Peters, 2019). Struggles for environmental justice may 
have an adverse effect on economic growth; as Dryzek (1987) suggests, growth assuages tensions 
around distributive conflicts and allows the powerful to avoid questions about distributive justice. 
Institutional changes necessary to achieve environmental justice will certainly bring such conflicts 
to the surface, thus threatening the very logic that propels neoliberal capitalism. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that recognitional and procedural aspects of environmental justice and the current political 
economic regime are not compatible.  
This incompatibility results in public disengagement, despite the fact that engagement with 
environmental issues is currently on the rise. The build-up in awareness around the scale of the 
current environmental crisis, of which harms from intensive farming are part, cannot be 
underestimated. One can observe a recent shift of consciousness that recognises an urgent need for 
profound structural changes in legal frameworks, systems of governance and human behaviour to 
address the existing environmental challenges (Koons, 2009). Yet, the issue of public disengagement 
nevertheless indicates that the rhetoric of environmental consciousness-raising does not necessarily 
translate into tangible actions to reform the global political economic order, and a further examination 
of the phenomenon of depoliticisation is key for understanding the reasons behind it.  
To reiterate, consolidation of the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism is linked to a slow 
erosion of the political in favour of the economic and creates a technocratic version of politics that 
is detached from the public (Hay, 2007; Crouch, 2011). Depoliticisation can be conceptualised as the 
separation between the political nature of decision-making and decision-making itself (Bond et al, 
2019). It does not mean the disappearance of politics, but rather the reduced visibility and subsequent 
scrutiny of decision-making by the members of the public. Thus, depoliticisation undermines 
democracy and weakens the public sphere as the consensus around the dominance of neoliberal 
capitalism closes the political space to the point that there are no alternatives to it left (Wilson and 
Swyngedouw, 2014).   
Depoliticisation occurs in multiple ways. It can take place through repressing discussion and 
debate of important issues and differences and restricting subjects’ agency (Beveridge, 2017; Bond 
et al, 2019). In the case of my research, the discussion around environmental and social implications 
of farming intensification is repressed through the changes to the discourse around it; in Chapter 5, I 
demonstrate that both education aimed at farmer professionalisation and the research base developed 
to increase profitability and efficiency of farming present efficient farming as apolitical and common-
sense. Furthermore, intensification is framed as a matter of technical expertise, which is emblematic 
of a further retreat of conflict. Reliance on the technological solutions for reconciling economic 
growth and environmental and social harms from intensifying meat production also works in favour 
of depoliticisation as it silences potential controversies around the new developments.  
Depoliticisation also signals a decline in public participation and reinforces power 
asymmetries in decision-making. Mouffe (2005) asserts that the very existence of consensus around 
neoliberal capitalism perpetuates public disengagement from politics. Engagement necessitates 
politicisation, but the latter can only be achieved if conflict is not only accepted but integrated in the 
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public sphere. Another political implication of neoliberal rationality (Brown, 2003) is the way the 
process of depoliticisation alters how people regard themselves as political agents (Beveridge, 2017). 
In the case of my research, depoliticisation in relation to environmental decision-making changes the 
way members of the public regard their rights in the process of decision-making, leading them to feel 
powerless to change the course of farming intensification. Finally, depoliticisation occurs through 
ostracising those who hold the powerful accountable and precluding dissent (Giroux, 2004). In 
addition to the markers of recognitional and procedural injustice described in Chapter 6, 
depoliticisation in my case manifests itself through the farming industry actors adopting a hostile 
perspective against the farming intensification opponents and treating them with derision.  
To conclude, I suggest that the principles of environmental justice as outlined in my study 
and the imperatives of neoliberal capitalism follow different logics. The latter is premised on 
inequality, which conflicts with the principles of environmental justice. Additionally, environmental 
justice also implies recognising the inherent value of the natural environment, and neoliberal 
capitalism does not extend its value apparatus beyond the instrumental value. Not only are the 
principles of environmental justice not compatible with neoliberal capitalism, but reproduction of 
the hegemony of the latter relies on depoliticisation, which works to prevent changing the 
environmentally and socially harmful status quo. Despite arriving to this sombre conclusion, the next 
section aims to discuss some of the solutions to the existing problems.   
7.5 Any solutions?  
The solutions considered in this section mirror the three levels of inquiry considered in my research 
– macro, meso and micro.  
7.5.1 Macro level solutions 
Critics of the current arrangements of global environmental governance have long recognised that, 
when it comes to environmental change, international power structures are not neutral; there is a 
relationship between systems of economic accumulation responsible for generating environmental 
harm and systems of environmental governance in the context of global political economy (Paterson, 
2000, p. 5). In order to address environmental harms (including those of intensive meat production) 
on the macro level, the Earth Jurisprudence paradigm appears to be fitting. It suggests that 
international environmental agreements will not address the ecological crisis and instead, ‘Earth 
desperately needs a completely new paradigm for social governance’ (Cullinan, 2011, p. 60). Such a 
new paradigm implies developing an Earth-centric reconceptualisation of legality, i.e. a transition 
from a human-centred to an Earth-centred system of law and governance (Koons, 2009). Its 
principles include the intrinsic value of Earth, the relational responsibility of humanity toward Earth 
and the democratic governance of the Earth community (Koons, 2009).  
In addition to a reworking of the legal sphere, a transition from a growth economy to a 
degrowth society is needed. Degrowth ideas can be summed up as a reduction of the importance of 
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the economy in all spheres of life and prioritisation of ecological sustainability and social wellbeing. 
Parrique (2019) examines in detail how a structural transformation leading to a degrowth society can 
be achieved. First, he addresses the transformation of property, suggesting sharing possessions, 
democratic ownership of business and stewardship of nature. Second, Parrique considers the 
transformation of the world of work, mapping out how work time reduction and decent work both in 
its content and form (socially useful and ecologically sustainable) can be achieved. Finally, degrowth 
transition involves transforming money by designing a plurality of special-purpose monies 
(monetary diversity), regaining democratic control over monetary creation (sovereign banking), and 
regulating financial markets (slow finance). 
7.5.2 Meso level solutions 
Throughout this thesis, I demonstrated the interconnectivity between macro and meso levels of 
inquiry, which is why it is worth considering Northern Ireland-specific solutions on the meso level. 
As Chapter 3 noted, the Northern Ireland Assembly has reopened in January 2020, which marks a 
significant change in the country’s political situation since the beginning of my research. In this 
context, the propositions below consider the actions the Assembly could take to both challenge 
farming intensification and to reform environmental decision-making forums to remedy 
distributional and procedural injustices.  
Firstly, with the Assembly in place, there are renewed hopes that an IEPA  will be 
established. I suggest that an IEPA is essential for improving environmental regulation in general 
and addressing the environmental impacts from farming in the country, such as water and air 
pollution, biodiversity loss and climate change. Its independent status will allow the prioritisation of 
environmental interests before economic interests and avoid the downward trajectory that the 
Northern Irish environment is currently on.  
Secondly, more incentives for small-scale farming should be introduced to redistribute 
power in the meat supply chain. Small-scale farming is associated with a number of benefits. 
It preserves rural communities’ local food cultures and traditions and ensures transparency of food 
provenance because of shorter supply chains (Kay, 2016).  Small-scale family farms are also 
responsible for creating employment, helping to sustain rural services, and even contributing to the 
national character (Winter and Lobley, 2016). Small-scale farming is associated with environmental 
protection and contributes to the safeguarding of biodiversity (Altieri, 2009). It should be noted that 
it is rather dangerous to generalise that all small-scale farms are environmentally beneficial (Winter 
and Lobley, 2016). Nevertheless, Fairlie (2010) claims that from an environmental perspective, it 
will be better if humans ate less meat (and consumed sustainable meat) rather than no meat at 
all. First, having animals as part of a natural biodiversity cycle maintains ecological balance. Pasture-
fed livestock, for instance, have a positive impact on the land and ensure that grassland-based ecology 
continues. Fairlie (2010) suggests that without animals it will not be possible to have a mix of forest, 
grassland, and arable ecologies without resorting to fire or machinery. Second, farming animals on a 
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small scale is the best means for capturing the nutrients that find their way onto land that is not being 
cultivated, and particularly for recuperating phosphates. Pigs in particular are vital for this – by 
consuming substandard grains and waste, they ensure that nutrients go back to the land in the form 
of manure. Third, small-scale farming creates elasticity in the food system. Since every food system 
produces waste and biomass, farming animals helps in keeping them in the food chain. They can be 
fed surplus grain (a necessary feed buffer to avoid starvation in bad harvest years), resulting in meat 
with a very low environmental impact, almost a by-product of the small-scale farming system 
(Fairlie, 2010). Finally, some studies conclude that small-scale, family farms are also more 
considerate of animal welfare (Coats, 1989; Dolan, 1986; Pollan, 2006; Kirby, 2010; Deemer and 
Lobao, 2011).  
I have demonstrated that there is a palpable lack of incentives to support small-scale 
environmentally friendly farming. Agri-environmental payments make a substantial contribution to 
the small-scale mixed farm income and the Single Farm Payment is also essential for their viability 
(Winter et al, 2016). Yet, both of these support mechanisms are under threat after Brexit. 
Landworkers’ Alliance (2017) laid out a set of policy recommendations to support small-scale 
farmers, echoed by the proposals from the Soil Association (n.d.) after Brexit. It included provisions 
such as specific infrastructure support to encourage farmers to convert to mixed farming systems and 
access shorter supply chains. They suggested that financial support ‘will be delivered through a 
points-based system rather than an area based model, in a similar system to that of the Countryside 
Stewardship programmes’ (Landworkers’ Alliance, 2017, p. 12). The number of points awarded will 
vary according to the model of production and those opting for agroecological methods will be 
eligible for more points. Independent farm audits will assess agroecological methods applied on 
farms, thus building a foundation for a transition towards agroecological farming.   
Support for small-scale environmentally friendly farming can help to address the issues 
around distributional environmental justice; with minimisation of environmental harms from farming 
intensification, the issue of their distribution will become less relevant. Yet, the issue of recognitional 
and procedural environmental justice remains open. A question, thus, arises – how can environmental 
decision-making forums be transformed on the meso level to guarantee recognitional and procedural 
justice? It has also been demonstrated that the principles of environmental justice cannot be 
guaranteed in the context of neoliberal capitalism, and the latter is not conducive to power 
redistribution in the processes of environmental decision-making. Therefore, it first needs to be 
considered what role environmental decision-making plays in facilitating systemic change and 
whether the political economy of capitalism that favours farming intensification can be challenged if 
environmental decision-making forums are transformed.  
Lake (1996) is sceptical about such a prospect – he suggests that even if a community is 
sufficiently empowered and manages to avoid distributional injustice, it might not be motivated to 
call for fundamental changes in the production of environmental harms to make sure that no other 
community is exposed to them. Local community problems remain confined to that community alone 
and may not translate into the language of general values (Dryzek, 1987). Both Dryzek (2000) and 
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Bluhdorn (2014) state that even if environmental decision-making forums are democratic, there 
cannot be a guarantee that environmentally benign outcomes will be produced. While these criticisms 
are valid, it can still be suggested that in order to challenge farming intensification through 
environmental decision-making forums and ultimately subvert the political economy of capitalism, 
certain changes on the national level can be helpful. Mills and King (2000) suggest that democratic 
decision-making and environmentally benign outcomes are not mutually exclusive – a set of 
constitutional mechanisms should prevent an unjust distribution of environmental harms while also 
guaranteeing a fair procedure. In the case of Northern Ireland, such constitutional principles should 
include safeguarding one’s right to a healthy environment, applying core environmental principles 
and ensuring third-party right of appeal.   
The right to a clean and healthy environment is a substantive environmental right. Hall 
(2014) points out that no definitive right to a clean and healthy environment exists in the international 
law. While this right is embedded in some national constitutions, the UK is not one of them (it has 
no constitution). Therefore, it is highly recommended that the right to a clean and healthy 
environment introduced into Northern Irish legislation to ensure that environmental rights are 
prioritised over economic growth. Moreover, this change should be accompanied with the protection 
of procedural environmental rights, associated with procedural environmental justice. It has been 
suggested that the enforcement of both substantive and procedural environmental rights is associated 
with positive environmental outcomes (Gellers and Jeffords, 2018).  
All of the core environmental principles are recognised within the EU (precautionary 
principle, preventative principle, rectifying environmental damage at source and the ‘polluter pays’ 
principles).  While they are instrumental for ensuring effective environmental protection, it is crucial 
that their nature is respected post-Brexit, especially in a country like Northern Ireland, which is 
known for its environmental shortcomings (as was described in Chapter 3). Yet, enforcement of the 
environmental principles after the UK leaves the EU appears to be problematic. Lee (2019) suggests 
that the recently published Environment Bill makes the legal principles matters of policy and opens 
a terrain for multiple exceptions. Therefore, it is important that the equivalent or stronger legal 
protection of the environmental principles is guaranteed. Brennan et al (2018) also suggest that the 
principles should be binding in nature and be applied at all stages of decision-making. Finally, while 
the discussion around the third-party right of appeal has been developed earlier, it is worth reiterating 
that the third-party right of appeal is crucial for ensuring equality in the process of environmental 
decision-making and even more crucial for ensuring environmental justice. Enforcement of the third-
party right of appeal should be accompanied with a more diligent compliance with the Aarhus 
convention in general, including its pillars of access to information and mechanisms for meaningful 
participation in decisions affecting one’s environment. For instance, separate regulations for 
environmental information can be introduced to improve one’s ability to exercise their active and 
passive rights to environmental information. The implementation of legally enforceable measures to 
address both distributional and procedural environmental justice on the national level is not without 
criticism. Swyngedouw (2009) asserts that existing decision-making processes as well as 
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environmental legislation foreclose genuine political debate as they operate according to a pre-
defined set of rules, structuring one’s behaviour. Moreover, criminological scholarship has also been 
critical of the legal approach for addressing environmental harms (Michalowski, 2012; Ruggiero, 
2013; Stretesky et al, 2013; Pellow, 2018). Yet, I believe that the state and legal system on the macro 
and meso levels can still contribute to progressive change, yet such change should be accompanied 
by the micro level developments, which are discussed in the next subsection.  
7.5.3 Micro level solutions 
First, I ask how environmental decision-making forums can be transformed to remedy distributional, 
recognitional and procedural injustices as well as address the issue of depoliticisation identified in 
my research. Making sure that a plurality of contesting interests is accommodated is the first step. 
My research showed that the pursuit of ‘common interest’ in the decision-making regarding new pig 
farms is tantamount to protecting dominant economic interests, rather than those of the environment 
or the people. To guarantee a just procedure and outcome, it is suggested that groups with different 
interests, be they economic or environmental, should heed the concerns of others and be willing to 
find solutions to their collective problems (Young, 2000). Inclusion of a wide range of interests and 
needs leads to participants framing their arguments not as claims of self-interest, but as appeals to 
justice, and enables them to learn from each other to make just decisions (Young, 2000). Second, 
Bohman (1997) suggests that public capacities need to be developed further to alleviate inequalities 
that exist between those who dominate the decision-making process and those whose input does not 
influence the process. Public capacity implies the capacity to be effective in public debate and 
discussion. Deepening of capacities will encourage a social transformation where economic 
activities, including meat production, are seen ‘not as an end but as a means toward democratically 
determined forms of human development’ (Bowles and Gintis, 1986, p. 178). This argument 
resonates with Nussbaum’s (1997) idea of political capabilities, where the latter allows an increase 
of opportunities to hold those in power accountable and to influence institutional and policy 
outcomes.   
However, both suggestions also risk being perceived as cosmetic adjustments, considering 
the earlier mentioned power inequalities. The previous section also suggested that the current 
political economic regime may not be able to accommodate the institutional conditions necessary to 
achieve environmental justice; the recommendations above do little to challenge the prevalence of 
the existing power relations in the decision-making forums and create meaningful participation as 
they ensure that those included are conforming to hegemonic norms (Young, 2000). Therefore, what 
is long overdue is not a mere inclusion and development of public capacities, but rather a structural 
transformation of decision-making forums to ensure that they are resolving social and environmental 
problems in a just way. The question that really needs to be asked is how this transformation can take 
place to recalibrate the balance of power in decision-making forums, challenge intensive meat 
production and ultimately challenge the political economy of neoliberal capitalism. Fraser (1997) 
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calls this a transformative remedy for injustice, which is aimed at rectifying uneven outcomes by 
reengineering the underlying framework. It can also be labelled as a procedural redistribution of 
power.  
On the micro level, the structural transformation of the underlying framework can be elicited, 
according to Young (2001), through activism. An activist, according to her, sees the existing 
decision-making arrangements as reinforcing injustice because the structural arrangements within 
them are too restrictive. The wrongs that decision-making structures perpetuate cannot be addressed 
within them. An activist, thus, is in tension with the existing decision-making arrangements, and 
challenges relations of power rather than engaging with them. It can be done through opposing 
particular actions, systems of policies or actions as well as demanding action to reduce injustice or 
harm (Young, 2003). It is through this opposition that activism that challenges power relations in 
decision-making forums intersects with activism aimed against farming intensification. The latter 
can focus on animal welfare and animal rights or environmentalism. The two do not need to be in 
opposition – Fitzgerald (2019) claims that the two movements can be brought together by their 
concern about climate change. Challenging intensive farming as a contributor to global greenhouse 
gas emissions can strengthen the activists’ agenda and bring about change in both meat production 
practices and political economic regimes.   
Activism aimed against farming intensification can also take place through changing one’s 
diet, especially in light of the importance of societal context for meat production increases (as 
described in Chapter 5). The assumption that consumption of animal-based protein is a necessary 
and desirable act, according to Lundström (2018), submits to the speciesist logic that acts as the main 
driver of global capitalism. Therefore, one needs to question how this logic can be escaped. One of 
the answers is adopting a plant-based diet. As I stated before, over 56 billion farmed animals are 
killed every year by humans (Animal Equality, 2019), which does not include fish and other sea 
animals whose deaths are only measured in tonnes. Yet, that violates the rights of nonhuman animals 
not to be exploited, confined, separated from their kin, and killed, all of which occur in both intensive 
farming systems (to a larger extent), and small-scale farming systems (to a smaller 
extent). Moreover, a plant-based diet provides an opportunity to balance the relationship between 
non-human animals and humans, and to challenge the ingrained domination of humans over other 
species that defines the current speciesist status quo. The exploitation inherent in the processes of 
animal farming is synonymous with the exploitation inherent in the capitalist economic 
model (Kidby, 2017). Adopting a plant-based diet, therefore, opens a possibility of challenging 
predatory capitalism and can inspire other campaigns against injustice.  
These avenues for activism aimed against farming intensification may lead to a change in 
environmental decision-making forums as the two are closely linked. Activism against farming 
intensification ultimately challenges the balance of power between individuals and communities and 
the farming industry, and that same balance of power is the key issue in environmental decision-
making. Activism is not an immediate solution – it is a process, often long and challenging. But as a 
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process it gives hope for a better future, a future where intensive meat production is an unpleasant 
memory of the past and no community or individual should suffer its consequences.   
To summarise, the solutions proposed here include a new vision of jurisprudence and a 
political economy of degrowth on the macro level. In the case of Northern Ireland specifically, I 
suggest that several developments should be encouraged on the national level to address both the 
issues around environmental justice and farming intensification. An IEPA should be established and 
constitutional guarantees such as safeguarding one’s right to a healthy environment, applying core 
environmental principles and ensuring a third-party right of appeal should be enforced. Moreover, 
the Aarhus convention should be complied with more effectively. More incentives for small-scale 
farming should also be introduced to redistribute power in the meat supply chain and the use of 
agroecological methods in farming should be incentivised to transition towards more 
environmentally friendly outcomes. On the local level, a structural transformation of decision-
making forums is necessary to ensure that they are resolving social and environmental problems in a 
just way. Such a transformation can be initiated through activism that challenges power relations in 
decision-making forums and activism aimed against farming intensification. Yet, micro-resistance 
should be accompanied with redistribution of power in decision-making forums on the national level 
and the reform proposals described above contribute to it. Additionally, a macro level 
implementation of a vision of Earth Jurisprudence and degrowth should also be taking place to 
address the existing environmental challenges more broadly and those associated with global food 
production more specifically. Macro, meso and micro level solutions are, thus, in tandem and should 
take place simultaneously. 
7.6 Future research directions 
In terms of future research, I suggest that the trajectory of food harm research in criminology should 
continue to expand and far-reaching implications of food harms need to be further analysed and 
theorised. In relation to environmental justice, more research needs to be done on non-minority 
populations that do not face immediate discrimination; future research avenues should continue 
exploring procedural (in)justice and the role of capabilities for achieving justice. Such research can 
also focus on potential solutions and the new ways of recalibrating the balance of power in the 
decision-making forums to ultimately identify new ways of challenging the political economy of 
neoliberal capitalism both top-down through the state and legal system and bottom-up through 
activism. 
This chapter also initiated the discussion on the compatibility of environmental justice and 
the ideology of neoliberal capitalism; their relationship requires further scrutiny, especially in light 
of the global scale of the threat that neoliberal capitalism poses to democratic institutions. Democratic 
and participatory decision-making is an essential condition of environmental justice, and this 
condition has been corroded by the power relations that support the existing political economic 
system. The issue of depoliticisation can also be discussed through a green criminological lens – for 
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instance, through a conceptualisation of harms resulting from depoliticisation of environmental 
issues. Moreover, further research on depoliticisation in environmental decision-making can expand 
on the effects of the ideology of neoliberal capitalism on one’s ability to exercise their procedural 
rights in environmental matters and examine how the hegemonic nature of neoliberal capitalism 
affects one’s regard of such rights. The latter can also be considered through the lens of crimes of 
the powerful. Rothe (2020) emphasises the symbiotic relationship of state and corporations with 
power in the context of neoliberalism; future research should enhance our understanding of this 
relationship and reveal its effects on democratic institutions. Hopefully, this understanding will 
























Appendix 1: Interview list  
Code Date of interview Interview category 
COM001 04 December 2018 Local residents 
COM002 14 December 2018 Local residents 
COM003 14 December 2018 Local residents 
COM004 14 December 2018 Local residents 
COM005 14 December 2018 Local residents 
COM006 14 December 2018 Local residents 
COM007 17 December 2018 Local residents 
COM008 21 January 2019 Local residents 
COU001 15 December 2018 Government 
COU002 16 December 2018 Government   
DAERA001 26 November 2018 Government  
InvestNI001 28 November 2018 Government  
InvestNI002 20 December 2018 Government  
MLA001 11 December 2018 Government  
MLA002 17 December 2018 Government 
FAR001 12 December 2018 Farming industry 
FAR002 14 December 2018 Farming industry 
FAR003 17 December 2018 Farming industry 
UFU001 08 November 2018 Farming industry 
UFU002 11 December 2018 Farming industry 
UFU003 13 December 2018 Farming industry 
RET001 22 November 2018 Farming industry 
AFSB001 07 November 2018 Farming industry 
AFSB002 18 December 2018 Farming industry 
NGO001 13 December 2018 NGO 
NGO002 13 December 2018 NGO 
NGO003 13 December 2018 NGO 
NGO004 13 December 2018 NGO 





Appendix 2: Findings diagrams 
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